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The past decade has seen a boom and bust in the United States’ housing 
market, and the ensuing financial crisis in the mortgage market has led to an 
unprecedented amount of housing defaults and foreclosures. While there has been 
much interest among researchers to understand the triggers and predictors of this 
crisis, relatively little is known about the channels through which borrower 
expectations influenced borrower behavior in that period, and about the influence 
of social networks on borrowers’ default decisions. This thesis seeks to 
investigate how borrower expectations and behaviors affected the crisis, and how 
these expectations and behaviors were influenced by social networks, in terms of 
the concentration of foreclosures in surrounding areas. 
The first essay is a comparative study of the U.S. single-family and 
condominium market that investigates the influences of investor behavior and 
expectations on the U.S. mortgage market between 2003 and 2007. The results 
show that, over different vintages, condo loans defaulted more often and more 
quickly than single-family subprime loans, because of the inherently riskier 
features of condo loans, an assertion supported by loan application data. In 
addition, condo loans defaulted much earlier than single-family subprime loans, 
suggesting that foreclosures that resulted from condo loan defaults are associated 
with higher subsequent defaults in the single-family subprime market, arguably 




Based on these findings on the influence and significance of borrower 
behavior in the U.S. mortgage market, there is great necessity to understand the 
factor that might affect borrower behavior. Therefore, this thesis proceeds to study 
the impact of neighborhood foreclosure concentration on borrower default 
behavior in the second essay. Foreclosures are found to induce nearby borrowers 
to exercise default options more ruthlessly, especially during a market downturn. 
Besides the damage to the borrowers and lenders directly involved in the default 
process, foreclosures generate externalities in neighborhood: they induce more 
borrowers in the surrounding area to default. This circular reaction can continue 
and lead to foreclosure cascades. Foreclosures can also discourage borrower 
delinquency, if borrowers take foreclosures as a signal of lenders’ reaction to 
delinquencies, implying that borrowers are strategic in their default decisions. 
Multiple datasets are used in the second essay because of the limited 
coverage of the data in each dataset. Linking multiple data sources together is 
becoming more common in research. To find out the appropriate way to do data 
linkage in empirical studies on real estate, a comparative analysis of the different 
methods in linking multiple mortgage datasets is conducted: propensity score 
matching, statistical hard matching, and statistical hard matching with machine 
learning techniques, i.e. Bayes Classifier and decision-tree Classifier. The results 
show that propensity score matching, although commonly used in real estate 
empirical research, is not satisfactory for carrying out data linkage; statistical hard 
matching with machine learning techniques produces better and more reliable 
linking results.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Problem Statement 
The significant and steady increase in the volume of residential mortgages in 
the United States has attracted much attention over the past several decades. 
America has just witnessed one of the longest housing market booms in history, 
leading to an imbalance in supply and demand. Low mortgage interest rates, low 
down-payment requirements, various financing alternatives, and relaxation of 
lending standards lowered the barriers to home ownership.  
Nevertheless, credit risk increased because of the explosive growth in 
mortgage lending between 2000 and 2005, which was followed by the collapse of 
housing prices in 2007/8. This increase in mortgage lending and credit risk 
resulted in a substantial surge in residential mortgage delinquencies and a collapse 
in the values of mortgages. This widespread rise in default rates and the resulting 
losses in mortgage-backed securities led to a further increase in foreclosures and 
large decline in house prices, especially in Sun Belt states like Arizona, California, 
Florida, and Nevada, and Rust Belt states like Michigan and Ohio, 1 marking the 
start of the market’s decline (Lee, 2011). Thus, the rapid pace of foreclosures and 
house price falls exacerbated the crisis in the housing market, which had been set 
off by the financial crisis.  
                                                           
1 Sun Belt states (or sand states) are well-known as bubble states characterized by a relaxed 
lending market and overbuilding. Rust Belt states have been experiencing a weak economy 





The mortgage crisis and the ensuing uncertainty in the financial markets led 
to various discussions among academia and practitioners on the possible triggers 
of this crisis. Some discussions have focused on subprime mortgages (Agarwal et 
al., 2012), arguing that the high delinquency rate in the residential subprime 
mortgage market led to severe liquidity shocks and thus the economic depression. 
Other analysts have discussed the relationship between the growth of 
securitization and the real estate bubble and crisis (Keys et al., 2010a, 2010b, and 
Piskorski et al., 2010; Agarwal et al., 2011; An et al., 2011). Some researchers blamed 
market participants, such as appraisers and mortgage originators, for the risky 
mortgage products they designed or for mispricing default risks (Agarwal et al., 
2012; Ben-David, 2011, 2012).  
A less-discussed but fundamental issue is the role of homebuyer and investor 
expectations. At the peak of the housing boom, home price expectations behaved 
at abnormal levels; when the housing bust occurred, these expectations fell 
sharply. The abnormal expectations contributed to the existence of housing 
investors or speculators, and were highly related to price changes in the housing 
market (Case et al., 2012). From the demand side, abnormal home price 
expectations influenced housing speculators to chase short-term trends by 
speculating on house prices during the boom period and selling them during the 
market downturn (Bayer, et al., 2011; Chinco and Mayer, 2012; Fu and Qian, 
2013). What’s more, when prices turned downwards, investors or speculators 
were more willing to default than other mortgage borrowers, contributing to the 





2011). Also, investors are less risk-averse and tend to use unconventional 
mortgages. The designs of those mortgages, with low interest rates, low down-
payment requirements, and relaxed borrower screening criteria, encouraged 
investors to default (Garmaise, 2013a, 2013b). These effects reciprocally 
reinforced each other to create a cycle that led to further defaults and contributed 
to the financial crisis (Campbell, et al., 2011; Mian, et al., 2012). More 
explanation and evidence of the unique characteristics of investors are given in 
Section 2.3 of Chapter 2. 
However, empirical evidence on the roles of homebuyers’ expectations and 
investor behavior is scarce. This is because of the difficulty of obtaining 
individual investor data, meaning that most analysts can only study investor 
behavior using macro-level data. A second reason for the scarcity of individual-
level data is the mix of investment and consumption use in the housing market, 
which means that it is difficult to distinguish investors from consumers. Therefore, 
due to data limits and identification issues, the influence of the default behavior of 
investors to the crisis has not been well-studied.  
The U.S. condominium loan market provides a unique opportunity to 
identify and analyze investor behavior. The statistics in Table 1.1 indicate that a 
significantly higher portion of condominium borrowers are investors. Exotic 
mortgages are used more often in the condominium market, and less conventional 
mortgage contracts (such as mortgages requiring low or no documentation, 





income and self-employed borrowers. 2  Condominium borrowers have higher 
FICO scores and tend to purchase in more expensive areas. Following Kain and 
Quigley (1972), Agarwal (2007) analyzed the homeowners of multi-family houses 
(condominiums) and found that condo owners overestimated the value of their 
houses by as much as 4.5%, implying a high possibility of them being investors. 
Therefore, the pattern of defaults in the condominium loan market is likely to be a 
reflection of the prominent role of expectations in the crisis.  
Table 1.1 Descriptive Statistics: Condominium vs. Single-Family Loans 
Summary statistics for BlackBox (BBX): from 2003 to 2007 





FICO score 683 699 679 20*** 
D_Owner occupied 73% 69% 74% -5%*** 
D_Option ARM 5% 8% 4% 4%*** 
D_Low/No doc 35% 41% 34% 7%*** 
D_Interest only loan 22% 29% 21% 8%*** 
Log_HPI 5.33 5.36 5.32 0.04*** 
Sample Size (*1000) 5,000 909 4,091  
Note: 
This table presents the summary statistics of the BlackBox Logic (BBX) dataset. Details and 
explanations of the variables are shown in Table 3.1, Chapter 3. 
 
                                                           
2 A low or no documentation loan refers to a finance product offered by a mortgage lender to 
borrowers who: a) do not qualify for normal loan products or b) do not wish to give up their 
financial privacy. Borrowers in the first group are often defrauded by brokers who falsify their 
incomes. In contrast, those in the second group are financially well-off and less likely to be 
defrauded; however, their incomes are volatile because they are self-employed. Many of the 
borrowers of low- or no- documentation loans were self-employed (Farris and Richardson 2004). 
Those who wanted to obtain low or no documentation loans qualified using their high income, 
liquid assets, good debt-to-income ratio, and a low loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, which is consistent 





The context described above motivated the first study which examined the 
role and behaviors of borrowers in the condominium market, especially those who 
were investors, during the financial crisis. This study contributes to our 
understanding of the demand-side view by providing evidence that investor 
behavior, as manifested in the pattern of loan defaults in the U.S. condominium 
market, plays an important role in explaining mortgage defaults in the crisis. More 
evidence for this statement is provided in Chapter 3.  
In addition to the recent crisis, academics and practitioners have also sought 
to understand why house owners defaulted on their loans, and the impact of 
mortgage defaults and foreclosures on the market and individuals. One line of 
theory for explaining default and subsequent foreclosure is the presence of 
insufficient equity or negative equity in the property. When a property’s value 
falls below its mortgage value, borrowers may default to maximize their wealth. 
Such defaults are often called “ruthless defaults” (Foster and Van Order, 1984, 
1985). There is a strong relationship between negative equity and defaulting 
(Quigley and Van Order, 1991; Foster and Van Order, 1984, 1985; Clauretie and 
Sirmans, 2003). At the end of the first quarter of 2009, 20% to 27% of all 
homeowners with mortgages were in a situation of negative equity or were 
“underwater”, that is, their debt obligations exceeded their home’s market values.3  
Until the first quarter of 2014, although the national negative equity rate has 
                                                           
3 Deutsche Bank estimated that approximately 14 million U.S. homeowners had negative equity, 
which was approximately 27% of all homeowners with mortgages at the end of the first quarter of 
2009. The real estate website Zillow.com estimated that approximately 20 million homeowners 
had negative equity at the end of the first quarter 2009. Economy.com estimated that 
approximately 15 million homeowners had negative equity at the end of the first quarter of 2009 





continued to decline since the first quarter of 2012, more than 9.7 million 
homeowners with a mortgage still remain underwater, as shown in Figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1 Percentage of Homes with a Mortgage in Negative Equity 
across the United States by County 
Source: Zillow Real Estate Research Report March 2014 
Note: 
This figure presents the percentage of homes with mortgages in negative equity. The colour 
scale is centred at 18.8%, the national average. Blue counties have fewer underwater homes 
than the national average, while red counties have more underwater homes.  
As a result of the numerous home owners who were in negative equity, many 
residential defaults and foreclosures were recorded in many parts of the United 
States. Around 3.2 million of these, an increase of nearly a million since 2007, 
were identified at some stage (default notices, auction notices, or bank 
repossessions) of the foreclosure process in 2008 (RealtyTrac, 2009). Cities in the 
four Sun Belt states accounted for all of the top 20 foreclosure rates in 2009 





The impacts of defaults and thus foreclosures can be devastating on various 
levels. First, from the perspective of the entire market, high default rates in the 
residential mortgage market led to severe liquidity shocks at many financial 
institutions, creating substantial shocks to the U.S. and even global economies. 
Second, from the perspective of individual participants, defaults and foreclosures 
led to significant costs and hardships, including the loss of home equity and a 
potential lack of access to stable credit. Third, from the perspective of 
surrounding neighborhoods, the rapid increase in mortgage delinquencies and 
foreclosures had significant negative spillover effects (Lee, 2011). These 
foreclosures are likely to be spatially concentrated within metropolitan areas, 
particularly in stressed housing markets in neighborhoods where subprime and 
other exotic mortgages are more prevalent (Gramlich, 2007; Immergluck, 2008a; 
Sanders, 2008; Ding and Quercia, 2010). In addition, the increasing concentration 
of foreclosures and abandoned properties in a neighborhood can result in a rise in 
violent crime, vandalism and neighborhood deterioration (Baxter and Lauria, 
2000; Apgar et al., 2005; Immergluck and Smith, 2006a, 2006b; Kingsley et al., 
2009). Property values in these neighborhoods usually decline or stagnate. This 
price-depressing effect has been widely studied and clearly documented over the 
last five years (Immergluck and Smith, 2006; Harding, Rosenblatt and Yao, 2009; 
Daneshvary, et al., 2011; Ding et al., 2011; An and Qi, 2012; Goodstein et al., 
2012). 
Many communities in the United States have been facing the problems of 





concentration has attracted much attention from the media, home buyers, lenders, 
economists, researchers and policy makers, because of its role in the housing 
crisis. However, the mechanisms through which foreclosures influence the 
decision-making of neighbors, especially their likelihood of and attitudes towards 
exercising their mortgage default option, have not been well-studied.  
Existing studies discuss two simultaneous but contradictory mechanisms that 
may influence borrowers’ default decisions: the information effect and the 
foreclosure contagion effect. On the one hand, concentrated foreclosures in one’s 
neighborhood can send out a negative signal to nearby borrowers that they are less 
likely to receive desirable loan modification after defaults, thus discouraging them 
from exercising the option to default (Guiso et al., 2013; Towe and Lawley, 2013). 
However, on the other hand, the concentration of foreclosure can induce more 
defaults due to contagion. Such foreclosure contagion can arise from 
observational learning4  or ethical reasons,5  or as behavioral responses such as 
herding (Agarwal et al., 2011; Seiler et al., 2012). However, regardless whether 
the information effect or foreclosure contagion effect dominates, the impact of 
foreclosure concentration on the attitudes of neighbors towards defaulting on their 
loan has not been addressed. This topic is further discussed in Section 2.4 of 
Chapter 2. 
                                                           
4 Seeing foreclosures in one’s neighborhood can cause the borrower to adjust down her property 
valuation or to strengthen her belief in a declining market, and increase her chance to exercise the 
default option (Agarwal et al., 2011). 
5  Knowing that many others in the neighborhood have defaulted their mortgage loans might 





Motivated by the background of foreclosure concentration and the problems 
associated with it, the second research study examines how the display of 
foreclosure signs in one’s neighborhood affected one’s likelihood to and final 
attitude towards exercising her option to enter into mortgage default. By focusing 
on the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Anna metropolitan statistical area (the Los 
Angeles MSA), this study provides substantial evidence that the contagion effect 
dominates the information effect: borrowers are more willing to enter into default 
when there are many foreclosures in their neighborhood. However, these impacts 
vary in different regimes and across different groups of borrowers. The details of 
the methodologies and the evidence are provided in Chapter 4.  
For the second study, multiple data sources had to be linked to one another to 
obtain information on individual borrowers and their loans, because of the limited 
coverage in each dataset. Various data providers offer a range of datasets, some 
similar to each other and some unique, for different research purposes. While each 
of these datasets provides certain information, they often lack useful related 
information, because of the limitation of their sources or of concerns around 
confidentiality. Thus, no single dataset has all of the information required for a 
research project. Given these data limitations, there is a need to link records in 
two or more separate but related data sets.  
Datasets are linked by using variables common to both data sets to identify 
identical or similar records. This leads to the creation of a new synthetic data set 





data sets. The main motivation for creating a synthetic data set would be to 
integrate variables that are never observed together. It is thus important when 
linking datasets to find the best possible way to match records in the datasets 
being combined. Database linkage methods generally use both deterministic and 
probabilistic linking algorithms. Deterministic linkage techniques can be used 
when both datasets provide record-identifying information that can be matched. 
However, regulatory and legal restraints on data mean that this approach has 
limited use. Without common identifiers (such as a residence’s unique ID 
number), a probabilistic linking method is needed to link datasets, and has been 
studied by academics (Kum and Masterson, 2008; Blanchette et al., 2013). 
In recent decades, the most frequently used probabilistic data linkage 
approach in the field of real estate studies is statistical hard matching which 
matches the records exactly based on common attributes among the datasets 
(Haughwout et al., 2009; Reid and Laderman 2009; Ferreira and Gyourko 2011; 
Ghent et al., 2011; Voicu et al., 2011; Agarwal et al., 2012; Hernandez-Murillo 
and Sengupta 2012; Pace and Zhu, 2012). Compared to other approaches, 
statistical hard matching is the easiest to understand and can be used the most 
directly. However, this method could lead to selection bias resulting from the use 
of only a few of the observed covariates. Another frequently used method is 
propensity score matching, which matches records based on the same or similar 
propensity scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Rubin and Thomas, 1996; Zhou 
and Lam, 2007; Kum and Masterson, 2008; Fraeman, 2010; Westreich et al., 





between the two records from two datasets are not a result of differences on the 
matching variables, and is ideal for making casual inferences. However, biases, 
such as regression towards the mean, in propensity score matching may occur if 
there is limited overlap between the two groups on the matching variables, 
meaning that the results of the matching exercise may not be representative of the 
general population. This issue motivated the third study to search for alternative 
linking method useful in real estate studies.  
Recently, machine learning, which can automatically detect intrinsic patterns 
among the covariates in a dataset and use the uncovered patterns to predict future 
data or make other kinds of decisions under uncertainty, has been used for linking 
datasets (Murphy, 2012). Machine learning can identify potential and unobvious 
patterns in the data that human experts may not be able to, especially when the 
dataset is huge or has imperfect data quality (Setoguchi et al., 2008; Lee et al., 
2010). While the advantages of this approach have been theoretically confirmed 
in other fields such as computer science, statistics and medicine, it is seldom used 
in real estate studies, perhaps because of its complexity or a lack of familiarity. 
Combining multiple sets of data into a single new one requires a matching 
procedure that must satisfy a key concern: in the new dataset, the range of values 
for the measure of interest should be representative of the level of the entire 
population in the original datasets. Therefore, a matching procedure that preserves 
at least the marginal distributions of the variables of interest is needed. Also, since 





matched, there is no universal linking procedure that ensures the best quality in all 
situations exists.  
Mortgage data, the main data used in the whole thesis, possess several 
characteristics that require an effective linking method. First, mortgage data 
usually track individual loans from certain lenders but with distinct loan 
information. Therefore, although there might be no unique identifiers among 
distinct mortgage data, loans from different data but the same group of lenders 
can be linked, if there are certain common attributes among these data. Second, 
the mortgage data provide distinct information at certain stages, i.e., loan 
application, loan origination, and loan termination. Thus, searching a way to link 
these data at different stages can help provide an overall idea about individual 
loan performance, probably through application to origination to termination. 
Third, because of data constraints and different collection methods, there might be 
few common variables among the mortgage data, thus might not capture the 
distinct characteristics of the loan records. The fact that the frequently used 
linking approaches mostly depend on common variables makes it uncertain 
whether the linking is effective.   
Therefore, due to the empirical and technical constraints of the current 
approaches, and the distinct characteristics of mortgage data, there is a need to 
compare different approaches to see which approach produces the most 
representative linking sample and is the most suitable for remedying data linkage 





different data linkage approaches. The descriptions of the different linking 
approaches and their differences are presented in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2, and the 
comparison results and implications are detailed in Chapter 5. 
1.2 Objectives and Research Questions 
This thesis was separated into three sections: i) a study that analyzed 
mortgage default behavior in the U.S. condo market and its role as a potential 
trigger of the financial crisis, ii) a study that examined the effect of foreclosure 
concentration on borrowers’ default decisions in the context of the Los Angeles 
MSA, and iii) a study that compared various record linkage approaches to guide 
those facing data linkage problems in real estate research. 
The results of these three studies on credit risks, borrower behavior and 
residential mortgage defaults in the U.S. mortgage market will have various 
implications for borrowers, lenders, financial institutions, economists, researchers 
and policy makers. The main objectives of each study are listed here. First, this 
thesis documents the unique risk pattern among different types of borrowers, 
especially investors, and their behavior in the U.S. condominium (condo) loan 
market in the early 2000s. Second, this thesis quantifies the effects of the 
concentration of foreclosures in certain neighborhoods on the decisions of 
borrowers to default on their mortgages. Third, the comparison of different ways 
of linking records will help ascertain the most suitable approach for linking 





The first study, presented in Chapter 3, addresses the default probability of 
condo loans relative to single-family mortgages, which are more commonly 
studied, conditional on variables such as characteristics of loans and borrowers 
and macroeconomic conditions. In addition, competing explanations for the rapid 
increase in defaults in the condo loan market are examined. These include the 
unobserved heterogeneity issue, i.e. the presence of unique characteristics in the 
condo home markets, the lender (supply side) effect, and the borrower (demand 
side) effect. The following questions are investigated: do condo loans differ from 
single-family loans with respect to default patterns? If yes, what factor drives the 
pattern of defaults in the condo loan market? In a neighborhood with condo loan 
defaults, do condo loan defaults due to risky borrowers have negative spill-overs 
onto neighboring single-family loans? Or do early condo defaults predict the 
subsequent default rate in neighboring single family subprime markets? The 
results show that there is a sharp increase in condo loan defaults relative to single-
family loan defaults over the years. The condo loan default rate has also grown at 
a faster rate, even compared with subprime loans. The unique pattern of defaults 
in the condo loan market is due neither to the unobserved factors in condominium 
market compared to the single-family market, nor lender preferences and/or 
expertise with loans in the condo market and the single-family market. The unique 
default pattern in condo loan market arose out of the inherently riskier 
background of condo loan borrowers, compared to single-family loan borrowers. 
Among all condo loans, investment-purchase condo loans were much more likely 





when the option to default is more profitable (“in the money”). Last, not only do 
condo loans default earlier compared with single-family loans originating in the 
same cohort, but these earlier condo loan defaults prompt more defaults in the 
single-family sector in the same area afterwards.  
The results in the first study imply that defaults and thus foreclosures may 
influence the probability that nearby borrowers will default on their loans. The 
spillover effects of foreclosures on their surrounding neighborhoods have been 
well-studied; the effects include house price declines, an increase in violent crime 
and thefts leading to community instability, an acceleration of racial transition, 
and broader emotional and physical impacts on individual residents. However, the 
impact of the concentration of foreclosures on the sensitivity of borrowers to 
negative equity, or their attitude towards exercising the option to default, has not 
been fully discussed. It is an open question as to whether the information effect or 
the contagion effect is more dominant for this issue. This observation motivated 
the continued analysis of the impacts of foreclosure concentration.  The following 
questions are examined: what is the ultimate impact of foreclosure concentration 
on borrowers’ attitudes towards mortgage decisions? Or does neighborhood 
foreclosure concentration have positive or negative impact on borrowers’ decision 
choices? Is the impact constant or time-varying across different time periods? Do 
the concentration effects vary among different borrower groups, and among 
different neighborhoods? Chapter 4 answers these questions by conducting 
foreclosure intensity measures in two ways. First, it is calculated as the total 





2008Q3) divided by the total number of housing units (in thousands) in each zip 
code. Second, it is calculated as the total number of foreclosures in the recent four 
quarters (current quarter plus the past three quarters) divided by the total number 
of housing units in each zip code (in thousands). The results reveal that, on 
average, neighborhood foreclosure concentration enhances borrowers’ willingness 
to exercise their option to default in the period that was studied. However, the 
relative impact of the information effect and the contagion effect differs across 
different regimes and different borrower groups. 
Analyzing borrower behavior and foreclosure concentration in Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4 highlighted that each of these datasets provided only some of the 
information that was needed, because of the limitation of data sources or 
confidentiality restrictions. Most datasets lacked a significant amount of the 
information that was needed, meaning that no single source of data had all of the 
information required for each study. Given these challenges, records in two or 
more separate but related datasets have to be linked in each study to overcome the 
limitations of existing data sources. The issue is exacerbated by the absence of 
shared identifiers in datasets.  
However, current linking approaches such as statistical hard matching and 
propensity score matching have their own limitations when they are used to link 
multiple datasets. Thus, a more advanced technique from computer science, 
machine learning, was used in Chapter 5 to link the two mortgage datasets, and 





examined: what is the best method to use for linking multiple datasets in real 
estate studies, especially mortgage studies, when there are no unique identifiers? 
During the process of data linkage, how can we minimize selection bias and 
identification errors? Answering these questions extends our understanding of the 
limitations and potential of different approaches. Thus this study can provide 
guidance for future real estate researchers when they encounter the probabilistic 
data linkage.  
To answer these questions, a variety of methods on linking the same groups 
of datasets are tested and compared, including statistical hard matching, statistical 
hard matching with machine learning techniques (Naïve Bayes Classifier and 
Decision Tree Classifier), and propensity score matching. Firstly, for statistical 
hard matching, I use a SAS program to link the selected common attributes of 
BBX and HMDA data, se well as checking for and eliminating observations with 
duplicate records. Second, classification algorithms such as Naive Bayes and 
Decision Tree are applied with statistical hard matching to understand the intrinsic 
correlations of the key variables, including but not limited to selected common 
attributes, and produce the learned models for identifying the true matches. Third, 
with propensity score matching, the BBX and HMDA records with the exact same 
propensity scores or if they are similar within the same three digits after the 
decimal point of propensity scores) are regarded as a match; the SAS program is 
applied to check for and eliminate observations with a duplicate BBX id when 
there are multiple matches. Across the three approaches, slightly more linked 





compared to when statistical hard matching with machine learning (Group 2) was 
used, with the fewest linked records being obtained by the propensity score 
matching approach (Group 3). Next, in examining the representativeness of the 
linked samples to the entire population of mortgages, several representativeness 
analyses were conducted. These included examining the distributions of the key 
variables (by looking at the kernel density distributions for continuous attributes 
and frequency plots for categorical attributes), comparing the summary statistics 
of the matched and original samples, and conducting a bootstrapping analysis on 
the probability of default based on the key variables from both datasets. The 
results generally indicate that the statistical hard matching with machine learning 
approach did a better job in dealing with selection bias and misclassification 
compared to pure statistical hard matching and propensity score matching. 
However, the performance of statistical hard matching, while not the best, is 
generally acceptable when there are no alternatives. Propensity score matching, 
although well packaged in various programs, should be used more carefully. 
1.3 Significance of the Research 
The significance of this research project can be seen in its enrichment of 
existing knowledge in the field, and the practical implications of the findings to 
the issues faced by practitioners. 
This study contributes to the existing literature in at least five ways. First, it 
is the first to document a strong, robust and economically important default 





findings of Chapter 3 show, the loan origination growth rate and pattern of default 
in the condo market are comparable to the subprime mortgage market (Demyanyk 
and Van Hemert, 2011). Condo borrowers are less likely to have low-quality 
credit and to default because they could not afford to pay or refinance their 
mortgages once house prices began declining. In the sample studied, compared to 
the single family market, condo borrowers have higher FICO scores, use subprime 
mortgages less frequently, and on average are charged a lower interest rate. These 
characteristics of condo borrowers suggest that there is a larger proportion of 
investors in the condo borrower population. Therefore, the condominium loan 
market provides a unique opportunity to identify and analyze investor behavior. 
However, studies normally focus on the single-family loan market; the risk 
patterns and behaviors of condo borrowers are under-studied. This study fills this 
gap by examining the less-studied condo market to derive some implications for 
academia and practitioners. 
Second, the findings in Chapter 3 also add to our understanding of the 
economic channels that explain the financial crisis. A large strand of the literature 
has focused on subprime mortgages and other supply-side factors, such as the role 
of securitization. On the other hand, recent work (Case et al., 2012; Haughwout et 
al., 2011) suggests that a less-studied but potentially important factor may have 
triggered the crisis: homebuyer and especially investor expectations. However, 
empirical evidence on the roles of homebuyers’ expectations and investor 
behavior is limited, due to the difficulty of obtaining individual-level investor data, 





studying them. These data limits and identification issues make it difficult to 
study how the behavior of investors in terms of their propensity to engage in 
default contributed to the crisis. The findings in Chapter 3 complement the 
demand-side view by providing evidence that investor behavior, as manifested in 
the condo market’s loan default pattern in our context, play an important role in 
explaining mortgage defaults in the crisis. The results show that loans used for the 
purchases of condos as investments explained the pattern of defaults observed in 
the market for condo loans, resulting in the recent crisis. Therefore, this thesis’ 
study of the characteristics and delinquency probabilities of condo loans from the 
perspective of borrowers is not only academically meaningful, but also important 
in explaining what occurred in the recent crisis. 
Third, besides the intrinsic triggers of the recent crisis, the decision of 
mortgage borrowers to default and thus allow their banks to foreclose on their 
mortgages is an important issue, more so recently with the increasing number of 
delinquent loans in residential real estate markets in the United States. 
Understanding why mortgage borrowers decide to default on their loans is also 
critical for managing the risk of default, and pricing and underwriting mortgages. 
Traditional studies of the default decision of borrowers focused on their socio-
economic status using indicators such as their FICO scores, income constraints, 
and equity position. Recently, some studies have tried to place borrowers into 
social networks to understand their default decisions (Gangel et al., 2013; Guiso 
et al., 2013; Seiler et al., 2013). The study in Chapter 4 follows this line of 





this study uses actual default data. The findings indicate that the behavior of near 
neighbors strongly influences a borrower’s decision to default on his/her 
mortgage. Knowing that foreclosure concentration affects the decision of 
borrowers to default signifies that default models should incorporate such network 
effects to predict the default risks of borrowers. 
Fourth, from the data perspective, the analysis on probabilistic data linkage in 
Chapter 5 is useful in filling in additional or missing information, by adding in 
extra attributes. With more complete information on population units, more 
complex research questions can be answered. Linking multiple datasets might 
help in checking the accuracy and reliability of survey or administratively-
collected data, or vice versa. Last, data linkage can enhance data quality by 
providing more information for people to understand the non-response or non-
reported aspects of current datasets.  
Fifth, from the linkage approach perspective, the comparative analyses of 
different linking methods on multiple mortgage datasets improves our 
understanding of the advantages and potential limits of each method, including 
their ability to overcome selection bias and misclassification issues. This exercise 
provides guidance for future real estate studies which also require data linkage 
when there are no unique identifiers. 
This research provides significant policy implications as well. First, the 
finding that condo borrowers, especially investors, are riskier suggests that 





condominium mortgage market. From a public policy point of view, the recent the 
Dodd-Frank regulations that require lenders to have more “skin-in-the-game” and 
mandate lower loan-to-value ratios for borrowers are only a partial solution for 
avoiding a similar crisis in the future. More careful policy to manage the behavior 
of investors or speculators should be made. 
Second, understanding the impact of foreclosure concentration on the 
decision of borrowers to become delinquent on their loans is also important from 
a policy perspective. Delinquency is the first step of loan default, and foreclosure 
is usually the last step. Typically, large numbers of foreclosures follow a wave of 
delinquencies. The study in Chapter 4 finds that concentrated foreclosures can 
lead to greater levels of borrower delinquency. While foreclosures are a bad result 
for borrowers, lenders and investors, the damage was not limited to those parties 
directly involved in the default process. The foreclosures generated externalities – 
they induced more borrowers in the neighborhood to default on their mortgage 
loans. Therefore, during such crises, mortgage defaults can be self-reinforcing in 
certain neighborhoods: increased delinquencies lead to more foreclosures, and 
concentrated foreclosures lead to even more delinquencies. This cycle can go on 
and on and lead to foreclosure cascades. Therefore, it is important for the 
government and lenders to intervene to stop or reduce foreclosures to break the 
loop and stop the foreclosure cascade. 
Third, the results of Chapter 4 show that the impact of foreclosure 





contagion effect. Sometimes the impact can be on the opposite direction: 
foreclosures can discourage borrowers from becoming delinquent if borrowers 
take foreclosures as a signal of how lenders will deal with delinquencies. This 
information effect is seen to dominate the contagion effect during the market 
boom. From this perspective, borrowers are strategic in their default decisions. In 
the future, credit risk modelers should take this game feature of mortgage default 
into consideration to better understand and estimate mortgage default risk. 
1.4 Summary and Organization of the Thesis  
The financial crisis of the late-2000s/early-2010s has been accompanied with 
much discussion of its causes, individual reactions to the crisis and the triggers of 
this crisis. Among the factors that may have led to it, homebuyer and especially 
investor expectations are now considered to be key. The impact of those 
expectations and behaviors on the mortgage market and thus the crisis has been 
increasingly discussed among academia and practitioners. However, due to the 
lack of micro-level data and the difficulty in distinguishing between investors and 
consumers in the housing market, understanding how the default behavior of 
investors contributed to the financial crisis has been largely unaddressed.  
Meanwhile, the decisions by borrowers to default on their loans and foreclose 
on their homes have been integrated into lender’s decision-making and 
government’s actions, given the greater awareness of the tremendous financial 
loss and social instability that results from those decisions. Although 





mortgage default risk management, pricing and underwriting, conventional 
research on borrower decisions focuses mainly on the socio-economic status of 
mortgage borrowers; the influence of social networks remains an open question.  
This thesis focuses on credit risk and borrowers’ default behaviors during the 
2000s. It first analyses the expectations of homebuyers and especially investors, 
and provides empirical evidence on the role of borrower default behaviors on the 
mortgage market and the crisis, using the unique U.S. condominium market as 
natural experiment.  Secondly, it studies the impact of a particular social network 
- foreclosure concentrations in neighborhoods- on borrowers’ final foreclosure 
decisions in the U.S. mortgage market during the 2000s. This was done to help the 
government, lenders and related institutions understand the need for timely 
actions to break the cycle of foreclosures. The need to link multiple datasets for 
the second study as well as for other studies leads to a discussion of the most 
appropriate way to deal with data linkage issues in real estate studies, by 
comparing various approaches used in the real estate field as well as in other 
fields. This analysis suggests a better linking approach for future studies in real 
estate. 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relative literature 
for each of the following chapters. Chapter 3 presents the first essay, entitled “The 
Hidden Peril: The Role of the Condo Loan Market in the Recent Financial Crisis”. 
It examines the important role of borrower default behaviors on the mortgage 





experiment. The impact of neighborhood foreclosure concentration on borrower 
default behavior and the mortgage market is investigated in Chapter 4, entitled 
“Foreclosure Concentration and the Exercise of Mortgage Default Options”.  
Chapter 5 presents the third short essay, titled “Probabilistic Data Linkage in Real 
Estate Studies: Applications of Propensity Score Matching and Hard Matching 
with Machine Learning Techniques”. This chapter explores the relative 
appropriateness of different approach when faced with the necessity of integrating 
different datasets and how the quality of linkages can be improved, by analyzing 
the different linking methods. The final chapter concludes the thesis, highlighting 





Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature review includes four parts. Firstly, I focus on the literature 
regarding general information on mortgage defaults. The high mortgage default 
rates in residential mortgage market would lead to cash flow losses to originators 
in the primary market and also investors in both the primary and second market. 
The liquidity shocks to these financial institutions create substantial shocks to U.S. 
and even global economies. In this sense, general literature on mortgage defaults, 
including the default process, the development history of mortgage defaults and   
default risks in special markets are critical throughout this thesis.  
Secondly, besides the mortgage default literature, my first study is built on 
the literature of the current financial crisis and its triggers. In reviewing the 
previous studies about the triggers of the financial crisis, a crucial trigger in the 
crisis, which is yet largely overlooked in the past and increasing emphasized now 
in the literature, is borrower behavior, especially investor behavior in mortgage 
choices. Combining the literature of mortgage defaults and trigger of the financial 
crisis helps me to test the hypothesis that investor (speculator) behavior plays a 
significant role in leading to the crisis, and that the condominium loan market is a 
perfect market for studying the investor behavior. 
Thirdly, I briefly review the foreclosure concentration literatures which build 





the impact of foreclosures on surrounding neighborhoods, from the view of house 
price decline in neighborhoods, rise in violent crime and thefts and thus the 
instability of the community, acceleration of racial transition, children 
performance, and emotional and physical impact on people. However, it still 
remains unclear how seeing foreclosure occurs in one’s neighborhood influences 
someone’s likelihood of and attitude towards exercising her mortgage default 
option to enter into default. Therefore, this group of reviews provides support for 
the analysis in the fourth chapter, which examines how concentrated foreclosures 
affect the default decision of mortgage borrowers in the surrounding area. 
Fourthly, during the analysis of foreclosure concentration effects, there is a 
necessity to link multiple datasets, which is also a common requirement in 
academia. Conventional methods used in real estate studies include statistical hard 
matching and propensity score matching. The technical constraints of these 
methods, however, require a more advanced and cleverer method in dealing with 
the linking issues. Therefore, methods from the field of computer science, i.e. 
machine learning techniques, as well as the conventional methods are reviewed 
and compared in this chapter, and these methods are tested and compared in 
Chapter 5, to see whether the linkage situation is improved by applying the new 
advanced method.  
In this chapter, literature specializing in mortgage defaults is in Section 2.2, 
followed by a review of studies about recent financial crisis and its potential 





foreclosure neighborhood effects and how concentrated foreclosures affect the 
surrounding areas and neighbor’s decision to default. Then the development and 
the application of traditional linking methods, i.e., statistical hard matching and 
propensity score matching, as well as the review of machine learning approaches 
are presented in Section 2.5. The limitations of each stream of literature will be 
discussed in each section respectively. Finally, a summary of the literature and the 
gaps that I am trying to fill is given in Section 2.6. 
2.2 General Review on Mortgage Defaults 
2.2.1 Mortgage default process 
Mortgage defaults are typically analyzed using a dual trigger approach where 
the first trigger is a shock to the homeowner’s income stream. This interruption in 
cash flow might result from being laid off at work, getting divorced, becoming ill, 
or even passing away. Once the homeowner is unable to pay, the equity position 
in the home becomes the second trigger. If the borrower has equity in the property, 
it makes sense to sell the home, pay all associated fees, and retain the difference. 
However, if the borrower owes more to the lender than the sale of the home will 
yield, then there is a possibility that he does not have enough money to pay back 
the deficiency. But this does not necessarily mean the borrower will default. The 
homeowner can consider if it is in his best interest to use funds from any number 
of sources to compensate for the negative equity position (Seiler et al., 2012).6 If 
the borrower does pay off the mortgage by borrowing from an outside source, it is 
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most likely that the new loan will have a higher interest rate. If the homeowner 
chooses to default on the mortgage (or is otherwise unable to pay off the loan), 
then he will face severe financial consequences of breaching his mortgage 
contract. Penalties include a severe reduction in his credit score, difficulty in 
obtaining future credit, a higher cost when borrowing money in the future, and so 
forth. 
2.2.2 Development of the default theory  
Since 1960s, many theoretical and empirical studies have been proposed to 
explain default risk and default behavior of mortgagors and have developed 
increasingly mature and comprehensive over time.  
A significant stream of literature, beginning in the 1960s and extending 
through the present, offers the first insights on residential mortgage default risk 
and addresses default principally from the perspective of the individual mortgage 
lender. These empirical studies examine the role of loan characteristics and 
borrower-related factors in default, in order to provide lenders the implications for 
predicting borrower default probabilities. The early works of Jung (1962), Page 
(1964), and von Furstenberg (1969), among others, evaluate the relations between 
mortgage risk and characteristics of the mortgage loan, including the loan-to-
value ratio, interest rate, and mortgage term. Subsequent research extends this 
analysis of mortgage risk to include a series of borrower (von Furstenberg, 1969; 





and Green, 1974) characteristics. However, during that period, no attempt was 
made to provide a theoretical basis for borrower behavior at the time of default.  
Since the late 1970s, a lot of studies seek to explain the behavior of 
individual households through structured models. Rooted in the economic theory 
of consumer behavior, such studies model the behavior of individual households 
that, in the course of maximizing their utility (and net wealth) over time, 
rationally decide whether it is in their best interest to continue making payments 
on their mortgage loans. Jackson and Kasserman (1980) are the first to support the 
optimization model of consumer choice in the analysis of default decisions, 
followed by Campbell and Dietrich (1983) which work on the significance of net 
equity in the borrower’s decision to default.  
The evaluation and pricing of default have been frequently discussed since 
the last two decades. Beginning with Asay’s seminal effort in 1978, the Black-
Scholes (Black and Scholes, 1972) option pricing model has been applied to the 
pricing of mortgages and their derivative securities. Default is treated as a put 
option, allowing the borrower to sell the house to the lender for the value of the 
mortgage at the beginning of each payment period (Foster and Van Order, 1984).7 
In assessing whether or not to exercise the option, borrowers consider the market 
value of the mortgage and the equity they have in the home, which is a crude 
measure of the extent to which the put option is “in the money” (Quigley and Van 
Order, 1991). Early research about the default risks of residential mortgage and 
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economic behavior of mortgage holders employs the standard contingent claims 
approach to mortgage pricing. The contingent claims models are developed by 
Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1973), Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985), and 
others. These models provide a coherent motivation for borrower behavior, 
inferring that default and prepayment are options to put and call the contract 
respectively, as a function of loan attributes such as loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and 
debt-service coverage ratio (DCR) (Dunn and McConnell, 1981; Buser and 
Hendershott, 1984; Brennan and Schwartz, 1985; Kau et al., 1995; Harding, 1994; 
Quigley and Van Order, 1995). Hendershott and Van Order (1987) and Kau and 
Keenan (1995) have reviewed much of the literature related to mortgage pricing.  
Most studies employing option models help explain merely one of default 
and prepayment behavior: some only consider option-based prepayment models 
(Findley and Capozza, 1977; Green and Shoven, 1986; Schwartz and Torous, 
1989; Quigley and Van Order, 1990), while others only applied option models to 
price default risk (Cunningham and Hendershott, 1984; Epperson et al., 1985; 
Foster and Van Order, 1984; Quercia and Stegman, 1992; Quigley and Van Order, 
1995; Vandell, 1993). A common limitation of the above studies is the failure to 
consider default and prepayment simultaneously and interactively: the jointness of 
the prepayment and default options is crucial in explaining behavior. In addition, 
these studies do not take into account the effects of contemporaneous cash flow 





A group of papers by Titman and Torous (1989), Kau et al. (1992, 1995) and 
Kau and Keenan (1996) provide theoretical models which emphasized the 
significance of the jointly considering prepayment and default options. A 
homeowner who exercises the default option at current period gives up the option 
to default in the future, but at the same time he/she automatically gives up the 
option to prepay the mortgage. Foster and Van Order (1985) estimate 
simultaneous models of default and prepayment using data on large pools of FHA 
loans, and Schwartz and Torous (1993) estimate the joint hazard using a Poisson 
regression approach and aggregate data. Deng et al. (1996) and Deng (1997) are 
the first to analyse residential mortgage prepayment and default behavior using 
micro data on the joint choices of individuals. More importantly, Deng et al. 
(2000) present a unified model of the competing risks of mortgage termination by 
prepayment and default, considering the two hazards as dependent competing 
risks which are estimated jointly. This work also accounts for the unobserved 
heterogeneity among borrowers, and estimates the unobserved heterogeneity 
simultaneously with the parameters and baseline hazards associated with 
prepayment and default functions. From the perspective of empirical matter, Deng 
and Quigley (2002) consider that mortgage holders do not behave as ruthlessly as 
the theory predicts. They develop an option-based empirical model to analyze the 
behavior of irrational or bounded rational “woodheads”: there exist a group of 
borrowers who forego substantial savings on mortgage payments through 





unobserved heterogeneity is due in part to the non-optimizing behavior, which is 
the behavior of “woodheads”. 
Turning to default decisions, option theory predicts that negative equity is the 
most important variable determining the optimality of default. If there is negative 
equity in the house, the homeowner can exercise the put option by default to 
maximize his wealth. However, after years of development in mortgage 
theoretical model and empirical analyses, more and more studies find that option 
value is far from enough to explain borrower choices to default – many borrowers 
do not default although their houses have substantial negative equity (Vandell, 
1995; Cauley, 1996; Archer et al., 1996; Clapp et al., 2001; Pavlov, 2001; Deng et 
al., 2005).8  
Ambrose et al. (1997) state the significance of transaction costs. Deng et al. 
(1996, 2000) show that “trigger events” (i.e., shocks to an equilibrium) such as 
unemployment and divorce are important to the borrower’s default decision. 
Vandell (1995) argues for similar trigger events or shocks, which are crucial to 
default decision. Archer et al. (1996) summarize mobility driven factors related to 
mortgage termination into two broad categories: the location decision factors and 
the response to housing disequilibrium factors. Employment opportunity is the 
most important location-driven mobility factor; people usually move because of 
job relocation. Pavlov (2001) finds that the local unemployment rate is positively 
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related to move because there might be more attractive opportunities outside the 
local area. Besides employment, other factors like climate and health are also 
important location-driven mobility factors. Pavlov (2001) and Deng et al. (2005) 
also argue that default is primarily driven by the optimality of a move in the 
presence of negative equity. Moderating variables such as years in the current 
home or proxies for transaction costs are considered by these studies. There is 
increasing consensus that household mobility factors are also crucial for default. 
Credit risk, the risk of financial loss due to an unexpected deterioration of 
counterparty credit quality, has doubtless been brought into sharp focus over 
recent years, but it has also played a significant role in the majority of financial 
crises prior to this time. FICO score 9  is widely accepted by the lenders as 
observable information for credit evaluation to capture the risks of mortgagors. 
Borrowers’ credit history information used in FICO determinants includes 
delinquency (late payments), the amount of time that credit has been established, 
length of residence, and negative credit records (e.g., default, personal 
bankruptcies). When lenders use risk-based pricing to incorporate the credit 
history information into their mortgage pricing, borrowers with credit scores are 
                                                           
9 FICO risk score is a kind of credit scoring method developed by Fair Isaac&Co. and universal in 
the residential mortgage field with a range of 300 to 850. There are three largest credit bureaus 
issuing borrowers credit report and FICO scores including Experian, Transunion and Equifax. 
Strictly speaking, the lenders actually differ on grades given same FICO borrowers scores. The 
method of calculating a credit score is to attempt to condense a borrowers’ credit history into a 
single number. The Federal Trade Commission has ruled this to be acceptable. Of course, they are 
also other credit scores which would try to measure properly the credit history of the borrowers, 
such as NextGen, VantageScore, and CE score in United States. It is noted that credit score is 
required to capture the credit history factors, not other discriminate and predatory factors .For 
example, in American, the Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation B (implementing the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act), expressly prohibits a credit scoring system considering “prohibited bases” such 






assigned with different credit spreads. Automatic underwriting reduces the 
operating costs for originating and evaluating individual’s mortgage default risks. 
Studies on mortgage largely have been concentrated on the role of borrower credit 
risk and credit constraint in the analysis of mortgage origination and performance 
(e.g., Gabriel and Rosenthal, 1991; Canner et al., 1994; Bradley et al., 1995; 
Avery et al., 1996; Goering and Wienk, 1996; Munnell et al., 1996; Ambrose et 
al., 1997; Berkovec et al., 1998; Ondrich et al., 2000; Ambrose et al., 2001; 
Ambrose and Sanders, 2005).   
2.2.3 Default risks in condominium market 
Through the development of the default theories, it is shown that most of the 
mortgage studies in developed countries such as U.S. focus on single-family loans, 
those of which are based on the building occupied by just one household or family, 
and made of just one dwelling unit or suite. The reason is that single-family loans 
historically and currently account for the largest proportion of housing in U.S., 
among others. There are very limited studies focusing on the condominium loan 
market. However, since the late 1960s, the fast growth and popularity of 
condominium sales have made condominium market critical in both real life and 
academia. Condominiums are less expensive to purchase and require less 
maintenance than traditional detached single-family dwellings, yet they offer the 
same tax benefits as home ownership. The desire of homeowners to be close to 
cities and the scarcity of land in urban areas also encourage the use of condo 
housing. Additionally, home buyers often seek properties that include recreational 





condominium market because single, divorced, childless, elderly, and 
geographically mobile consumers keep entering the home-buying market and find 
that condominiums meet their special housing needs. This group of home buyers 
is distinct from traditional single-family home buyers, with respect to their 
characteristics and attitude to credit risks. Given the increasing amount of condo 
loans and distinct condo borrower characteristics, it is necessary to study whether 
the condominium loan market has different risk pattern and borrower behaviors 
than single-family loan market in the U.S.  
The mortgage default studies have developed over time and are obtaining 
greater attention since the tremendous crisis that the U.S. housing market 
experienced in the last decade. 
2.3 Recent Financial Crisis: Triggers 
During the past decade, the U.S. housing market experienced two interrelated 
events. First, it is widely believed that the U.S. experienced a housing market 
bubble in the early 2000s and that this bubble burst in 2007. Second, during this 
same period, the use of unconventional mortgage products escalated. Individual 
mortgage default has received much more attention after the unfolding of turmoil 
from the last quarter of 2007. Many commentators have looked for the triggers of 





2.3.1 Innovation in mortgage products 
Some have pointed to the innovation in mortgage products (e.g., subprime 
mortgages).10 The high default ratio in residential subprime mortgage market has 
caused liquidity shocks, which subsequently lead to economic depression in U.S. 
and other countries globally. Regulators, economists, policy makers, politicians, 
government, agencies, research, speculators, and bankers all look into the melt-
down of the “subprime” mortgages, which were mostly issued to low-income, 
minority borrowers. They attempt to find explanations for the high mortgage 
defaults, besides sharp housing downturn. They share the view that default is not 
only a pure financial event triggered by stochastic macro-condition (e.g., housing 
price and interest rate), but default behavior varies by individuals.  
2.3.2 Fast growth of securitization 
Some other literature pointed to the remarkable growth of securitization in 
recent years as a major contributor to the rise of the real estate bubble and the 
ensuing crisis (Keys et al., 2010a, 2010b, and Piskorski et al., 2010; Agarwal et al., 2011; 
An et al., 2011). Part of the argument is that securitization has created additional 
layers of adverse selection and moral hazard problems in loan origination and 
servicing, which in turn led to lax underwriting, as well as higher default rates 
(Keys et al., 2010a; Agarwal et al., 2012).  
                                                           
10  These products were designed to help borrowers in markets expecting significant price 
appreciation. However, they were often marketed to borrowers with relatively poor credit histories 
as well. As a result, these mortgages are often referred to as subprime mortgages, since they did 






2.3.3 The wisdom of market players 
Other have questioned the wisdom of the lenders and investors who invested 
in mortgages backed by overvalued assets (Agarwal et al., 2012; Ben-David, 2011, 
2012), and underpriced default risks (An et al., 2012). Specifically, these papers 
discuss the role of professional appraisers and mortgage originators, and the 
stability of the models these professionals rely upon for pricing the mortgage 
default risks. They argue that combining the poor data input, unstable model and 
human error, the mortgage originators steered borrowers to riskier products during 
the period leading up to the recent crisis. 
2.3.4 Borrower (investor) behavior 
Another significant factor in the crisis, which is largely overlooked in the 
past and increasing emphasized now in the literature, is borrower behavior in 
mortgage choices. Mortgage choice mostly studies borrowers’ self-selection in 
asymmetric information framework. In these studies, borrowers with different 
exogenous default risk (measured by exogenous movability, or probability of 
income changing in two-period models) are suggested to self-select into different 
mortgages. Firstly, borrowers with exogenous default risk profile self-select into 
different mortgages with LTV and coupon-points combination. For example, high 
risk borrowers (measured by exogenous high default costs) will self-select into 
high loan-to-value ratio; while high risk borrowers (thus low default costs) self-
select into high loan-to-value (Chari and Jagannathan, 1989; Brueckner 1994; 
LeRoy 1996; Stanton and Wallace, 1998; Brueckner 2000; Harrison et al., 2004; 





factors (e.g., socially moving incentive and impatience) prefer different mortgage 
type (Brueckner 1992; Brueckner 1993; Coulibaly and Li 2009; Dhillon et al., 
1987; Follain 1990; Hendershott et al., 1997; Mori et al. 2010; Posey and Yavas 
2001; Sa-Aadu and Sirmans 1995). For example, borrowers with low credit scores 
and high loan-to-value preference are also more likely to choose subprime hybrid 
adjustable rate mortgages; borrowers with high credit scores and low loan-to-
value preference choose prime or subprime fixed rates mortgages (Mayer et al., 
2009). The relation between the borrowers’ observable characteristics (e.g., LTV, 
mortgage size) and their unobservable risk (e.g., real income, creditworthiness, 
borrowers’ initial wealth, preference to house consumption and default tendency) 
contributes to the potential cause of the mortgage default behavior and thus the 
tremendous crisis. 
Among borrowers of mortgages, investors play especially important role in 
the crisis. Investors in the housing market are observed to possess several 
characteristics that may result in higher risks in default. First, from the labor 
market perspective, investors are usually self-employed people, who work for 
themselves instead of an employer and draw income from a trade or business that 
they operate. Compared with those taking regular monthly (or annually) salaries, 
the self-employed have instable income and thus probably are unable or not 
willing to provide full financial statements or taxation returns to verify their 
current income.  In addition, self-employed people are more unstable in job status: 





under-predict their employment risk, overvalue their houses and are thus more 
likely to default (Agarwal, 2007; Agarwal, et al., 2005). 
Second, from the housing market perspective, probably due to their relatively 
high current income and investment returns from the market, or due to the high 
expectation of their future income, investors tend to over-predict the house price 
appreciation in the future, which result in higher default risks when the housing 
market collapses. The over prediction of their income and the house price 
appreciation may also lead to default in the future if they cannot afford the 
mortgage payment, especially when the housing market collapses. 
While much of the existing literature focuses on the innovation in mortgage 
products (e.g., subprime mortgages), or securitization and the associated agency 
problems in recent years as a major contributor to the rise of the real estate bubble 
and the ensuing crisis,  some recent studies (Haughwout et al., 2011; Case et al., 
2012) suggest the root cause of the recent housing crisis in the U.S. can be 
attributed to a previously less studied, but potentially more fundamental factor—
the homebuyer and especially investor expectations. Based on a survey sample 
from four U.S. cities, Case et al. (2012) report that home price expectations, 
which reached abnormal levels relative to the mortgage rate at the peak of the 
boom and declined sharply since, were highly correlated to the price movements 
of the housing market. Haughwout et al. (2011) hypothesize that real estate 
“investors”—borrowers who use financial leverage in the form of mortgage credit 





but very important, role to fuel the housing boom and exacerbate the housing bust. 
Specifically, when prices turned down, they defaulted in large volumes and 
thereby contributed importantly to the intensity of the housing cycle’s downward 
leg. Barlevy and Fisher (2011) show that speculators are more likely to choose 
exotic mortgages and more likely to default. Amromin et al. (2011) find that high 
credit worth households chose complex mortgage products leading up to the crisis 
and they defaulted more. Case-Shiller hypothesis about the great influence of 
house price expectation and speculative behavior is well-developed and 
commonly accepted, consistent with some other studies using macro-level data to 
support this argument. A few studies are based on micro-level data which show 
that real estate investors chase price trends, push the prices away from the 
fundamental level, and are very sensitive to negative market shocks (Fu and Qian, 
2012; Fu et al., 2012). 
However, empirical evidence on the roles of homebuyers’ expectation and 
investors’ behavior is scarce. Firstly, most of the analyses are based on macro-
level data, due to the difficulty in obtaining individual investor information. 
Secondly, housing market, which both investment and consumption behavior 
exist, is different from stock market. The stock market trades everyday while the 
housing market has less frequent transactions; stocks traded in the stock market 
have only investment use, while houses are transacted for either investment or 
consumption use or the combination of both; in the stock market, people can exit 
their equity positions quickly and almost without cost, while in the housing 





and Shiller, 1988). Therefore, in the housing market, it is quite difficult to 
distinguish investment and consumption purpose from the purchase behavior due 
to the heterogeneity of individuals. 11  Due to the above data constraints and 
identification issues of investors from consumers in the housing market, it still 
remains an open question on how the default behavior of investors contributed to 
the crisis.  
The condominium loan market, given the characteristics, provides a unique 
opportunity to identify and analyze the investor behavior. Using U.S. 
condominium market as a perfect experiment, we contribute to the existing 
literature by providing a unique angel to identify the investors from consumers to 
test the Case-Shiller hypothesis about the influences of investors (speculators) 
behavior and their expectations on mortgage market.  
2.4 Neighborhood Effects of Foreclosure and 
Foreclosure Concentration  
As the national mortgage crisis has worsened in late 2000s, an increasing 
number of communities are experiencing declining housing prices and rapidly 
increasing foreclosures. Foreclosures not only hurt those who are losing their 
homes to foreclosure, but also harm neighbors by reducing the value of nearby 
properties and in turn, reducing local governments’ tax bases, thus calling for the 
                                                           
11 Some studies regard household as speculator if he purchases more than one property besides the 
one he actually lives in. However, this is doubtful in real cases. For example, the buyer buys a 
property that he himself will not live in, but this property is bought for his mother-in-law. Another 
example is that the property is bought in the vacation place such as Hawaii; his family only goes 
there for a month every summer. In these two examples, the second house is not for investment 





government intervention. The extent to which foreclosures do in fact drive down 
neighboring property values, and how those impacts vary according to 
neighborhood characteristics and local housing markets, have been highly debated 
among researchers, and also policymakers as they struggle to address the rising 
tide of foreclosures throughout the country (Schuetz et al., 2008). There is also a 
group of literature discussing the contagion effect of foreclosures (Schuetz, et al., 
2008; Harding, et al., 2009). However, how concentrated foreclosures affect the 
default decision of mortgage borrowers in the surrounding area still remain an 
open question. 
2.4.1 General Literature on Neighborhood Foreclosure effects 
 The impact of foreclosures on the individual or institution holding the failed 
mortgage has been broadly and comprehensively studied (Kau and Keenan, 1995; 
Capone, 2001). In recent decades, the neighborhood externalities for foreclosures 
have been gaining much attention, both in academia and in other fields (Leonard 
and Murdoch, 2009).12 There are some empirical studies attempting to quantify 
the effect of foreclosures on surrounding neighborhoods. Immergluck and Smith 
(2006) attempt to estimate the effects of foreclosures of one- to four-family homes 
on the property values of surrounding one- to four-family homes in Chicago. 
Following this earliest and most frequent city study, Leonard and Murdoch (2009) 
and Lin et al. (2009) also report that the presence of foreclosed properties is 
associated with lower sales prices for nearby non-distressed properties. Rogers 
                                                           
12 For instance, in a May 5, 2008 speech, Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Ben Bernanke, stated 
‘‘High rates of foreclosure can have substantial spillover effects on the housing market, the 





and Winter (2009) state that the rise in foreclosures will result in declines in the 
sales value of neighboring properties, which, in turn, will lead to an extension of 
the housing crisis.  
There are several possible mechanisms through which foreclosures might 
have a negative impact on the values of the nearby properties. The first is through 
a negative visual externality: property owners who receive foreclosure notices 
may be less likely to maintain or upgrade their properties, either because they 
have less incentive to maintain property they may lose or because they cannot 
afford regular maintenance. Properties may start to show visible signs of neglect, 
which may make the surrounding homes less desirable. The second mechanism, 
social interaction, is explained by Ioannides (2003) that individuals’ valuations of 
their own homes are influenced by those of their immediate neighbors. In 
consequence, a decrease in value of a nearby foreclosed property can result in 
lower seller reservation prices and lower sales prices for nearby non-distressed 
properties. Foreclosed properties also increase the supply of homes and the sellers 
of foreclosed properties are highly motived to sell quickly, thus affecting the price 
of “comparables” used to estimate neighboring property values and putting down 
the ward pressure on local prices (Lin at al., 2009; Harding et al., 2009). Third, 
although the motivation to sell the foreclosed properties is strong, after 
completion of foreclosure proceedings and eviction of the delinquent borrower, 
the property may still remain unsold and vacant, and thus suffer further physical 
decline. Vacant properties are likely to depress surrounding property values since 





more generally signal that the neighborhood is not stable, thus further influence 
the neighborhood property value. Finally, distressed properties sold either at 
foreclosure auctions or pre-foreclosure sales may be more likely to be sold to 
investors and become renter-occupied, which may lead to lower levels of 
maintenance even after the properties are re-occupied, thus driving down the 
values of the properties. 
Besides the research on the impact of foreclosures on housing prices 
reviewed above, several studies have examined the effects of foreclosures on 
other neighborhood outcomes. Some studies argue that the aftershock of 
foreclosure goes beyond just homeowners but also expands to towns and 
neighborhoods as a whole. Cities with high foreclosure rates often witness more 
crime and thefts with abandoned houses being broken in to, garbage collecting on 
lawns, and an increase in prostitution.13 Immergluck and Smith (2006a) use a 
cross-sectional methodology to examine the effects of single-family foreclosures 
on crime rates in Chicago, and conclude that foreclosures increase violent crime 
but not property crime. A set of related studies find that foreclosures accelerated 
racial transition in New Orleans by depressing housing prices and creating 
opportunities for lower-income black households to move into formerly white-
occupied homes (Lauria, 1998; Baxter and Lauria, 1999; and Baxter and Lauria, 
2000). They also observe that higher foreclosure rates were correlated with higher 
vacancy rates and lower proportions of owner-occupied housing. Apgar et al. 
(2005) estimate that in the City of Chicago, foreclosures impose substantial costs 
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upon the municipal government, thereby attract criminal activity or squatters, 
require physical maintenance and/or incur structural damage from fire or 
abandonment. Another significant impact from increased foreclosure rates 
mentioned in the literature is the effect it has on school mobility of children, and 
thus the potential academic performance for children (Been et al., 2011). 
Foreclosures also have an emotional and physical impact on people. In one 
particular study of 250 recruited participants who had experienced foreclosure, 
36.7% met screening criteria for major depression (Pollack and Lynch, 2009). 
Differences in state laws may shape the neighborhood impacts of 
foreclosures as well. Differences in foreclosure laws can influence the length of 
time between initial foreclosure filing and the completed foreclosure. For instance, 
judicial process states such as New York and Illinois have foreclosure proceedings 
lasting for a year or more, while in Texas most foreclosures are non-judicial and 
may be resolved in as little as three months (Bergman, 1996; Nelson and Whitman, 
2004). The distinctions in foreclosure process and local housing market conditions 
imply that even studies using comparable data and methods may reach different 
conclusions when applied to different parts of the country. Moreover, most of 
these studies have obtained data on foreclosure filings from different sources, so it 
is unclear whether even the count of foreclosures is truly comparable across 
studies. This could lead to problems such as confounding the effects of mortgage-
related foreclosures with those of tax liens, or simply an inaccurate count of the 





2.4.2 Impact of Concentrated Foreclosures on borrowers’ default 
decision 
The above studies comprehensively discuss the impact of foreclosure 
concentration on surrounding neighborhoods, from the perspective of house price 
decline in neighborhoods, rise in violent crime and thefts and thus the instability 
of the community, acceleration of racial transition, children performance, and 
emotional and physical impact on people. Nevertheless, it still remains unclear 
how witnessing foreclosure signs in one’s neighborhood influences someone’s 
probability of and attitude towards exercising her mortgage default option to enter 
into default.  
As social animals, humans knowingly or otherwise look to their peers before 
reaching financially life-altering choices. As such, the impacts of concentrated 
foreclosures in one’s neighborhood on his default decision are necessary to be 
studied. On the one hand, from a game-theoretic perspective, concentrated 
foreclosures in one’s neighborhood can discourage the borrower’s exercise of 
default option, by transmitting information to neighbors (Guiso et al., 2013; Towe 
and Lawley, 2013). This is because intense foreclosures in a neighborhood can 
send out a signal to nearby borrowers that should they choose to default they are 
likely to be similarly foreclosed instead of receiving a favorable loan modification. 
This information effect is similar to that discussed by Riddiough and Wyatt (1994) 
and Guiso et al. (2013) where borrower’s strategic default decision depends on 
her belief of what the lender’s reaction would be: foreclosing loans can prevent 





foreclosing banks as “tough” and not so willing to renegotiate. 
However, on the other hand, concentration of foreclosure can induce more 
defaults due to contagion. Such foreclosure contagion can arise from 
observational learning: seeing foreclosures in one’s neighborhood can cause the 
borrower to adjust down her property valuation or to strengthen her belief of a 
declining market, and thus increase her chance of exercising the default option 
(Agarwal et al., 2011). Foreclosure contagion can also arise from ethical reasons: 
knowing that many others in the neighborhood have defaulted their mortgage 
loans might change someone’s view that default is immoral or ease the stigma 
effect of default. In addition, it can arise from behavioral responses such as 
herding (Seiler et al., 2012). If this moral hazard problem is allowed to continue, 
the global recession currently experienced could become much more severe 
moving forward (Seiler et al., 2013). Foreclosure contagion is suspected of 
exacerbating the housing crises during the Great Depression and the recent 
financial crisis (Campbell, 2013). 
With these existing studies, the impact of neighborhood foreclosure 
concentration on individual borrower’s delinquency probability is increasingly 
emphasized and studied. However, the impact of foreclosure concentration on the 
borrower’s sensitivity to negative equity, i.e., to a certain extent the changing 
attitude of borrowers towards default option exercise, has not been fully discussed. 
Thus whether the information effect or foreclosure contagion effect dominates 





decision is an open question. 
2.5 Probabilistic Data Linkage Methodology 
In this section, the original work and categories of data linkage which is the 
foundation of our analysis is first briefly reviewed. I then review the literature on 
two commonly used approaches when dealing with probabilistic data linkage: 
hard matching and propensity score matching, especially in the field of real estate 
finance and economics. This group of reviews helps us understand and compare 
the advantages of hard matching and propensity score matching among multiple 
datasets when there is no unique identifier, and also the potential problems 
associated with these linking methods. These discussions also motivate me to 
apply these methods more carefully and more creatively. The literature on 
machine learning techniques is further reviewed, which is well developed and 
commonly used in the field of computer science. The advantages of machine 
learning techniques in dealing with selection bias encourage us to apply this 
approach to our matching mechanism. 
2.5.1 General literature on Data linkage 
Data linkage, or statistical matching, is by now a widely used technique in 
producing empirical studies (Kum and Masterson, 2008). The method is originally 
applied in many observational studies in medical literature, where patients from 
different database need to be linked together (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Rubin 





Data linkage is deterministic if a unique identifier or key of the entity of 
interest is available in the record fields of all of the data sources to be linked, and 
it is probabilistic if a unique key is not available so that not all units can be 
unambiguously identified (Steiner and Cook, 2013). The former situation is 
straightforward but not frequently occurred, while the latter one, which is also 
called probabilistic data linkage, is more complicated but also more frequently 
encountered. Rässler (2002) gives an example of the probabilistic data linkage 
where researchers are interested in the association between television viewing and 
purchasing behavior but lack data from a single source panel covering information 
on both behaviors. Thus, the idea is to combine data from an independent 
television and consumer panel by matching on similar subjects. For each unit in 
the consumer panel, the matching task consists of finding a corresponding subject 
that is identical or at least very similar on the shared covariates. Such matching of 
subjects is equivalent to imputing missing covariates on the television viewing 
behavior.  
Probabilistic data linkage approach is becoming a standard in social science 
research (Radner, 1981; Greenwood, 1983, 1987; Wolff, 2000; Brodaty et al., 
2001; Wagner, 2001; Rässler, 2002; Keister, 2000, 2003). Specifically, in the field 
of real estate studies in recent decades, the most frequently used probabilistic data 
linkage approach is statistical hard matching (Haughwout et al., 2009; Reid and 
Laderman 2009; Ferreira and Gyourko, 2011; Ghent et al., 2011; Voicu et al., 
2011; Agarwal et al., 2012; Hernandez-Murillo and Sengupta, 2012; Pace and 





linking criteria and how they deal with the potential bias from the multiple 
matches and non-matches.   
Some literature relies on random selection approach to deal with multiple 
matches during each matching step. Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) link DataQuick 
transactions data with individual loan information from HMDA, by conducting 
two-step record linkage.14  From the multiple matches after each step, for the 
records with the same identifier, only one is randomly selected to be the true 
match. Under Ferreira and Gyourko (2011)’s matching algorithm, 60 percent of 
their total matches are claimed “high quality” match. However, the matching is 
doubtful due to the accuracy of random selection for the true match. Although one 
can always use as detailed a random selection mechanism as possible, there is still 
a huge probability that the random selection procedure misclassify actual match as 
“unmatch”, and actual unmatch as “match”, due to the limited matching criteria. 
This misclassification problem may thus cause the unreliable analyses afterwards.  
Some other studies try to separate the matching into several detailed steps, 
repeatedly dealing with multiple matches in each step. Voicu et al. (2011) match 
the LoanPerformance (LP) and HMDA loans in two steps with detailed matching 
algorithm.15 Using this matching algorithm, they manage to link nearly 15 percent 
                                                           
14 In the first matching step, each transaction in DataQuick is matched to a loan in HMDA by four 
criteria (year, Census tract, the lender name, and the exact loan amount). In cases where there are 
multiple matches, one of them is randomly assigned as being a true match while the rest are 
considered unmatched. In the next step, unmatched observations in DataQuick not being 
recognized in the first step are then merged to those in HMDA using relaxed criteria: only year, 
Census tract and exact loan amount; still for multiple matches, one is randomly assigned as true 
match. 
15  In the first step, they link the two datasets based on six “mandatory” criteria. The six 





of the LP loans to HMDA data. Similar to this algorithm, Agarwal et al. (2012), 
Agarwal et al. (2012), and Pace and Zhu (2012) also match LP to HMDA loans 
and further study the potential influences of socioeconomic and demographic 
information on the borrower and lender differences on subprime foreclosure 
outcomes. Compared with other algorithms, this group of matching algorithm 
more carefully deals with the multiple matches, which to some extent reduces 
misclassification bias. However, this approach also faces potential selection bias 
issues, since it only accounts for observed confounders; those unobserved 
covariates which cannot be used in the matching procedure are not considered. 
Therefore, the matching quality is not ideal if there are only a few commonly 
observed covariates among multiple datasets. 
There is also a line of research which does not deal with multiple matches. 
Haughwout et al. (2009) also link the performance and terms of the loans from LP 
data with HMDA data, with only one-to-one matches are considered.16 Ghent et 
al. (2011) and Hernandez-Murillo and Sengupta (2012) also follow the 
Haughwout et al. (2009)’s matching algorithm to combine loan-level data with 
                                                                                                                                                               
loan number is contained in the HMDA application number; (3) the Federal Information Process 
Standard (FIPS) states codes match; (4) the loan amounts match; (5) the lien status matches; and 
(6) the LP origination date is later than the HMDA application date. In the second step, they use 
six additional criteria to select one HMDA match for each LP loan, the one satisfying most of 
these additional criteria. The additional criteria are: (1) occupancy; (2) loan purpose; (3) loan type; 
(4) originator name; (5) date (if LoanPerformance origination date is within 30 days of the HMDA 
action date); and (6) zip code (based on identifying zip codes associated with the census tract for 
the HMDA loans).  
16 They match LP into HMDA in six stages. In the first stage, LP loans are matched to HMDA 
loans with the same first 4 digits of the loan’s zip code, same purpose, occupancy, lien status, 
origination time, and loan amount within $1,000 difference. After Stage 1 all loans other than one-
to-one matches are put into the next five stages, while some criteria are relaxed or tightened (e.g. 
zip code is matched to 5-digits or origination amount must be exactly the same). Finally after the 
sixth stage, all one-to-one matches are aggregated into a dataset to be the final sample, while the 





individual- and neighborhood-level data. This matching approach, however, does 
not pay sufficient attention on the remaining records after aggregating all one-to-
one matches, which may again lead to selection bias and misclassification issues. 
These studies, consistent with broader economics and finance literature, 
usually reply on econometrics methods to hard matching multiple datasets. Hard 
matching can perform well when dealing with a small number of observations; 
however, this approach is limited when facing a large number of covariates. Also, 
hard matching does not account for selection bias resulting from limited observed 
covariates and probably abundant unobserved covariates. What’s more, these 
studies simply omit that hard matching process may result in some errors and 
incompleteness into the resulting records. As a result, two indeed unmatched 
entities from two datasets may give rise to identical records (either due to errors 
or due to the fact that an insufficient number of covariates are included in the 
record), and, conversely, two matched (identical) entities from the two data 
sources may give rise to different records (Fellegi and Sunter, 1969; Gu et al., 
2003). 
2.5.2 Propensity score matching 
Besides the hard matching method, some studies apply the propensity score 
matching (PSM) approach in the probabilistic data linkage approach. Originally 
introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), use of propensity scores has 
increased dramatically in the past few decades. They define propensity scores are 





of observed covariates”. PSM is often used in observational studies to generate 
suitable control groups that are similar to treated groups when a randomized 
experiment is not available (Rubin and Thomas, 1996). One significant feature of 
PSM is that it reduces the dimensionality problem involved in multivariate 
analysis by reducing the matching to one constructed variable—the propensity 
score (Kum and Masterson, 2008). 
Traditional uses of propensity score is in the field of medicine, especially the 
assessment of the average effect of a treatment or exposure, by estimating the 
probability of treatment given individual covariates such that conditioning on this 
probability (the propensity score) ensures that the treatment is independent of 
covariate patterns, and in particular by achieving balance on confounders by 
propensity score (Joffe and Rosenbaum 1999; Cepeda et al., 2003; Zhou and Lam, 
2007). The key assumption made is that, given an exposed individual and an 
unexposed individual with the same (or nearly the same) propensity score, 
treatment assignment for these two individuals is independent of all confounding 
factors, and so the two observations can serve as counterfactuals for the purpose 
of causal inference (Westreich et al., 2010). 
The same scoring method but different matching techniques are proposed as 
an approach to record linkage between multiple datasets (Patridge, 1998; Méray et 
al., 2007; Hammill et al., 2009; Fraeman, K., 2010). Each dataset is comprised by 
shared and unshared records, and these datasets lack a common identifier. 





generates the single score representing the propensity of existing in one dataset 
relative to the other. The propensity score can then be match-merged to link 
records belonging to the same record as defined by the independent fields.  
The propensity score matching method ensures that any differences between 
the two records from two datasets are not a result of differences on the matching 
variables, and is ideal for making casual inferences (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
It is also useful in studies with small sample sizes since when there are only a few 
confounding variables. However, according to Joffe and Rosenbaum (1999), 
propensity score matching can only control for observed confounders; that is, the 
propensity score cannot be counted upon to balance unobserved covariates. If 
there is not sufficient overlap between the two groups on the matching variables, 
then biases such as the regression toward the mean may occur. What’s more, 
similar with statistical hard matching, the matching results may not be 
representative of the general population, since this method merely select 
conditional on observed common variables. Another technological issue is the 
calculation of propensity score by logistic regression: since there is restrict on the 
variance matrix of the regression, the common attributes as dummies, such as 
zipcodes, are not allowed to be included at one time in the regression, which may 
influence the accuracy of data linking.  
2.5.3 Machine Learning  
Since recent decades, machine learning, which can automatically detect 





perform other kinds of decision making under uncertainty, has been used in 
various applications, including face recognition, voice recognition, disease 
diagnosis, spam email detection (Murphy, 2012). 
Machine learning has been with us for a long time. Since artificial 
intelligence first achieved recognition as a discipline in the mid 1950’s, machine 
learning has been a central research area. Since the late 1990s, various machine 
learning techniques have been developed to be used to estimate the conditional 
probabilities required by the Fellegi-Sunter (FS) theory (e.g., Mitchell, 1997; 
Friedman et al., 2003; Lu and Getoor, 2003; Taskar et al., 2003; and Zadrozny, B., 
2004). These techniques are popular in that they have the advantages of allowing 
central supervision of processing, better quality control, speed, consistency, and 
better reproducibility of results (Winkler, 1995). 
Back to 2000s, there exist some studies in statistics, science and other fields 
discussing the application of machine learning in linking records. Record linkage 
can be done entirely without the aid of a computer, but the primary reasons 
computers are often used for record linkages are to reduce or eliminate manual 
review and to make results more easily reproducible.  
The major contribution of machine learning techniques to data linkage is the 
accuracy and quality of the linkage. Machine learning techniques can identify the 
potential patterns and especially some unobvious patterns 17  that even human 
expert cannot easily figure out from data. Such knowledge makes the decision in 
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data linkage wisely, instead of selecting randomly. In machine learning, the data 
linkage problem can be formulated as a binary classification problem, that is, 
judging whether two records from different datasets belong to the same entry or 
not. For instance, Sarawagi and Bhamidipaty (2002) and Winkler (2002) 
demonstrated how machine learning methods could be applied in data linkage 
situations where training data (possibly small amounts) were available. Larsen 
and Rubin (2001) and Winkler (2002) have shown that error rates can be 
estimated if combinations of labeled training data and unlabeled data are used in 
the estimation. 
Conceptually traditional statistical and machine learning models are not that 
different. A number of advanced computational and machine learning methods 
generalize the original idea of parameter estimation in statistics. As mentioned by 
Galindo and Tamayo (2000), machine learning algorithms are more 
computational-based and data-driven, and by relying less on assumptions about 
the data (normality, linearity, etc.), is more robust and distribution-free. This 
algorithms not only fit the parameters of a particular model but also change the 
structure of the model itself and, in many cases, they are better at generalizing 
complex non-linear data relationships. On the other hand, however, machine 
learning algorithms may provide models that can be relatively large, idiosyncratic 
and difficult to interpret. 
There are some studies which evaluated the behavior of machine learning 





2008; Lee et al., 2010). These studies argue that the application of machine 
learning algorithms can help refining the propensity score matching procedure 
with advanced computational power. However, this application is limited due to 
the drawbacks of propensity score matching method. To my knowledge, there 
exist few studies applying machine learning techniques directly to data linkage, 
especially in real estate studies.  
In summary, as with any linkage, the quality of the match is limited to the 
quality of the original data se well as the ability of the vector covariates to 
distinguish uniqueness among the two populations. An error-free "match" is not 
guaranteed. Although the match-merge process is designed to control matching 
error, the conclusions to be drawn from any match should ultimately rely on the 
quality of each data repository. 
2.6 Summary 
An extensive literature regarding the theoretical and empirical determinants 
of mortgage credit risk has developed over the past three decades (Quercia and 
Stegman, 1993).  Literature on the possible triggers of the current financial crisis, 
including innovation in mortgage products, fast growth of securitization, the 
market players’ wisdom and borrower behavior helps to get a better understanding 
of the determinants of credit risk and the crisis. However, as mentioned in Section 
2.3, borrower behavior especially investor behavior in mortgage choices is crucial 
in triggering the current financial crisis but largely overlooked in previous 





characteristics and expectation that among borrowers of mortgages, investors in 
the housing market are observed to possess several characteristics that may result 
in higher risks in default, it is rational to start the analysis of investor behavior. 
However, empirical evidence on the roles of homebuyers’ expectation and 
investors’ behavior is scarce. Firstly, most of the analyses are based on macro-
level data, due to the difficulty in obtaining individual investor information. 
Secondly, in the housing market, it is quite difficult to distinguish investment and 
consumption purpose from the purchase behavior due to the heterogeneity of 
individuals. Due to the data limits and identification issues of investors from 
consumers in the housing market, it still remains an open question on how the 
default behavior of investors contributed to the crisis. The condominium loan 
market, given the distinct characteristics, provides a unique opportunity to 
identify and test the Case-Shiller hypothesis about the influences of investors 
(speculators) behavior and their expectations on mortgage market. The main 
analysis will be presented in Chapter 3. 
Secondly, there is a large amount of evidence that foreclosures can have great 
influences on neighborhoods, from the view of house price decline in 
neighborhoods, rise in violent crime and thefts and thus the instability of the 
community, acceleration of racial transition, children performance, and emotional 
and physical impact on people. Recently, the impact of neighborhood foreclosure 
concentration on individual borrower’s delinquency probability is increasingly 
emphasized and studied; those studies either support the information effects which 





defaults. However, the impact of foreclosure concentration on the borrower’s 
sensitivity to negative equity, i.e., to a certain extent the changing attitude of 
borrowers towards default option exercise, has not been fully discussed. Thus 
whether the information effect or foreclosure contagion effect dominates 
neighborhood foreclosure concentration impact on nearby borrowers’ delinquency 
decision is an open question. These gaps motivate me to study how witnessing 
foreclosure signs in one’s neighborhood influences someone’s probability of and 
attitude towards exercising her mortgage default option to enter into default, 
which is Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
When dealing with probabilistic data linkage issues in empirical studies, it 
raises my concern whether the current linkage method is the most appropriate one 
to be used. The conventional approach used in data linkage includes statistical 
hard matching which matches the records exactly based on common attributes 
among the datasets, and propensity score matching which matches the records 
based on the same or similar propensity scores. However, hard matching could 
not perform very well when facing a large number of covariates and thus could 
not account for selection bias resulting from limited observed covariates; and 
biases such as the regression toward the mean in propensity score matching may 
occur if there is not sufficient overlap between the two groups on the matching 
variables and thus the matching results may not be representative of the general 
population. Due to these empirical and technical constraints, and also due to the 
distinct characteristics of real estate data, there is a need for trying and comparing 





Chapter 5, using two mortgage data as main data, I conduct a small analysis in 





Chapter 3 The Hidden Peril: The Role of the Condo Loan 
Market in the Recent Financial Crisis 
3.1 Introduction 
This study is the first to document the unique risk pattern and borrower 
behavior in the U.S. condominium loan market in the early 2000s. Using a 
representative dataset of privately securitized loans, we document that the number 
of condominium (condo) loan originations increased by 15-fold during the 2001–
2007 period (Figure 3.1). Throughout this time period, condo loans accounted for 
15% of all U.S. residential loan originations, rising from 9% in 2001 to 16% in 
2007. More importantly, condo loans have also exhibited a fast growth in default 
rates over the years: its within-two-year default rate has increased by more than 
30 times from 2003 to 2007 (Figure 3.2).  These facts suggest that research has 
overlooked an important mortgage market segment in understanding the financial 
crisis. 
Using a unique comprehensive loan-level dataset for private securitized loans 
originated during 2003–2007, we formally study the default behavior of the 
condominium mortgage market. The default behavior is modeled of the condo 
loans relative to single-family mortgages18 using a logistic specification with a 
detailed list of loan and borrower characteristics, macroeconomic conditions as 
well as origination cohort, year and city fixed effects. In the pooled sample, a 
                                                           





condo loan, on average, is as likely to default within two years of origination as a 
single-family loan, after controlling for other loan and borrower characteristics. 
However, there is a sharp increase in condo loan defaults relative to single-family 
loan defaults over the years—with the most significant jump in condo loan default 
rates in 2006 and 2007. All else being equal, a condo loan originated in 2007 is 
6.4% more likely to default within two years of origination than a single-family 
loan originated in the same year.   
 
        Figure 3.1 Number of condo loans originated in 2001-2007 (in thousands) 
Note: 
The figure shows the number of condo loan originations for all U.S. states from BBX. 
 
        Figure 3.2 Percentage of condo loans originated in 2001–2007 
Note: 



























It is further shown that condo loan default rate grows at a faster rate, even 
compared with subprime loans—defined to be mortgages with borrower FICO 
score < 720—that are known to have a strong vintage effect (Demyanyk and Van 
Hemert, 2011). Condo loans originated before 2006, relative to single-family 
subprime loans originated before 2006, are much less likely to default within two 
years of origination. However, among loans originated in 2006, condo loans are 
12% more likely to default than subprime loans in the single-family market. The 
pattern is even more striking if we compare subprime loans in the condo market 
with subprime single family loans. Given the role of the subprime market in the 
financial crisis, this comparison thus highlights the possibility that the much 
overlooked condo loan market is potentially important in understanding the crisis.     
There are several competing explanations for the observed evidence on the 
faster default growth in the condo loan market. Condominiums and single family 
home markets differ in many ways. For example, compared to the detached single 
family houses, condominiums are typically concentrated in more urban areas. 
They provide different types of service flows and have distinct asset 
characteristics such as price growth and volatility that could lead to different 
default patterns over time. To address the unobserved heterogeneity issue, 
location fixed effect is allowed at the finer zip code level in a representative 
subsample and find the same results. This study also controls for direct measures 
of price dynamics for condominiums and single family homes using zip code 
level data from Zillow.com and continue to find the same pattern. Furthermore, 





result on the Freddie Mac sample provides external validation of our previous 
findings. In addition, given its uniform, homogeneous nature in loan contract 
types (i.e., 100% of Freddie Mac loans are 30-year fully amortizing fixed-rate 
mortgages), the result also suggests that the observed default pattern among condo 
loans is unlikely driven by different loan contract terms offered to and chosen by 
condo borrowers. 
A more interesting economic question is whether the documented default 
pattern among condo loans is attributable to the lender (supply side) effect or is 
due to the borrower (demand side) effect. Some lenders may have expertise or 
preference for loans in the condo market, who at the same time exhibited an 
increasingly lax lending standard over time. As a result, the differential default 
patterns between the two markets reflect the fact that disproportionately riskier 
borrowers are drawn to the condo loan market over time. Alternatively, condo 
loan borrowers could be inherently risky and thus on average default more as 
house prices and economic conditions deteriorate in the later years.  
The results reveal that the lender channel is unlikely the driver for the 
observed faster growth rates of condo loan defaults relative to those of the single 
family loans. First, if lenders apply less stringent selection criteria over condo 
loan cohorts that are unobservable to econometricians, then the proportion of 
condo loan defaults unexplained by the observed loan and borrower 
characteristics should increase faster over time (compared to the single family 





hard observable information in explaining default probabilities between the two 
markets. Second, Freddie Mac data is used that have information on lender 
identity, and the condo market’s default pattern remains robust even if time 
varying lender fixed effects are allowed (to control for the time trend in lending 
standard). While there may be a common trend in credit supply that explains the 
default pattern for both the single family and condo loan market defaults, the 
supply channel is not able to explain the faster growth trajectory among condo 
loans. The results thus suggest the (differential) default pattern in the condo 
market is more associated with inherent condo borrower characteristics. 
Condo borrowers are unlikely the low credit quality borrowers who default 
because they cannot afford to pay or refinance their mortgages as house prices 
start to decline. In our sample, compared to the single family market, condo 
borrowers have higher FICO scores, use subprime mortgages less frequently, and 
on average are charged a lower interest rate. A recent literature highlights the 
importance of homebuyer expectation and investor behavior in complementing 
our understanding of the financial crisis (e.g., Case et al., 2012). The price run-up 
in the earlier years of the decade attract more trend-chasing investors, who are 
more likely to make a pure economic decision of deciding to default after a 
significant price drop. Real estate investors likely prefer condominium units due 
to their smaller size (and thus smaller investment commitment), greater rental 
demand and less maintenance cost.  Therefore, this study is likely to observe a 
larger presence of investors in the condo borrower population over time. In the 





and the share of non-owner-occupied purchases is greater in the condominium 
market. The results are consistent with the hypothesis. Investment-purchase condo 
loans drive the observed condo loan market default pattern. On average, they are 
30% more likely to default within two years after origination compared to other 
non-investment purchase condo loans, and their defaults grow at a much higher 
rate. Investment-purchase condo loans originated in later cohorts (e.g., 2007) are 
88% more likely to default than single family loans, while the same cohort non-
investment-purchase loans in the condo market are 19% less likely to default than 
single family loans. Default option induced by house price movements is likely 
key: investment purchase condo loans are 141% more likely to default when the 
option of default is in the money (i.e., when the house price is lower than the 
outstanding loan amount). 
Lastly, this research explores the aggregate implication of the condo loan 
market defaults. It is observed that condo loan defaults have triggered more 
subsequent defaults in the single-family subprime market. Consistent with the 
notion that more of condo loan borrowers are investors who default sooner, the 
early default rates (i.e., within-one-year-default rates) of condo loans also grow at 
a faster rate than single family subprime loans. Put differently, condo loan 
borrowers default more promptly when house prices started to decrease in 2006 
and 2007. More importantly, at the zip code level, first-year defaults among condo 
loans positively predict second-year defaults of the same cohort’s single-family 
subprime loans. Early condo loan defaults also predict negatively subsequent 





verify the temporal lead-lag relationship: condo defaults precede the subprime 
mortgage defaults as well as the house price growth in the single family market. 
This provides new insight on the triggering event of the housing crisis. To better 
identify the channel, this work uses the exogenous variation in state foreclosure 
laws and find the effect of condo loan defaults, on both the subsequent house 
price growth and the subsequent single family subprime defaults, to concentrate in 
the non-judicial states in which foreclosure process is more efficient. These 
results are consistent with the idea that condo defaults prompt more defaults of 
single family subprime mortgages at the same location, through the channel that 
foreclosures on the defaulted properties depress neighboring house prices.  
This study contributes to the literature by first documenting a strong, robust 
and economically important default pattern in the much ignored condominium 
loan market. Specifically, the loan origination growth rate and default pattern in 
the condo market are comparable to the subprime mortgage market (Demyanyk 
and Van Hemert, 2011). The findings in this chapter also add to the understanding 
of the economic channels that explain the financial crisis. A large strand of the 
literature has focused on the subprime mortgages19 and other supply side factors 
such as the role of securitization.20 On the other hand, recent work (Haughwout, et 
                                                           
19  These products were designed to help borrowers in markets expecting significant price 
appreciation. However, they were often marketed to borrowers with relatively poor credit histories 
as well. As a result, these mortgages are often referred to as subprime mortgages, because they did 
not meet the underwriting criteria set by the government-sponsored enterprises, e.g. Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac (See Agarwal, Ambrose, Chomsisengphet, and Sanders 2012). 
20 For a discussion, see Agarwal et al. (2011); Agarwal, Chang, and Yavas (2012); Agarwal and 
Evanoff, 2013; An, Deng, and Gabriel (2011); Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil (2012); Keys, 
Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010a, 2010b); Mian and Sufi (2009);  Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund 






al., 2011; Case et al., 2012) suggests that a less studied but potentially 
fundamental factor may have triggered the crisis—homebuyer and especially 
investor expectations. Based on a survey sample in four U.S. cities, Case et al. 
(2012) report that home price expectations, which reached abnormal levels 
relative to the mortgage rate at the peak of the boom and have declined sharply 
since 2007, were highly correlated with the price movements of the housing 
market. Cheng et al. (2013) find that mid-level managers in securitized finance 
business continue to speculate on house prices in their own home purchases 
during the boom period. Using transaction-level data, recent studies find 
supportive evidence of housing speculators chasing short-term trends (Bayer et 
al., 2011), leading to price overreaction (Chinco and Mayer, 2014; Fu and Qian, 
2013). Haughwout et al. (2011) use unique credit report data to show the 
important role speculative investors play in contributing to the rise and fall of the 
U.S housing market in the recent crisis. Specifically, when prices turned 
downwards, these investors defaulted in large numbers, contributing to the 
intensity of the housing cycle’s downward leg. Amromin et al. (2011) identify 
another demand-side factor: high credit worth households chose complex 
mortgage products leading up to the crisis and these households were more likely 
to default. Other work documents borrowers with unconventional mortgages, or 
who misrepresented their financial network are risky borrowers and default more 
(e.g., Garmaise, 2013a, 2013b). The findings in this chapter complement the 
demand-side view by providing evidence that investor behaviour, as manifested in 





explaining mortgage defaults in the crisis. In addition, this study relates to the 
prior literature on the real effect of the housing crisis (e.g., Campbell, et al., 2011; 
Mian, et al., 2012) and shows that condo loan market defaults have aggregate 
implications on the house prices and default patterns in other segments of the 
housing market. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature in mortgage market and financial crisis and highlights the contributions 
of this chapter to the previous studies on credit risks and financial crisis. The data 
used for this study is described in Section 3.2, and the hypotheses and empirical 
methodology are shown in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, the empirical results that 
document the condo market’s default pattern are presented. Section 3.5 performs 
analysis to differentiate competing economic explanations. Next the aggregate 
implication of condo loan defaults is presented by studying its spillover effects in 
Section 3.6. Finally, we make concluding remarks in Section 3.7.  
3.2 Data Description 
3.2.1 Data sources 
The first and primary source for the study is the loan-level data furnished by 
BlackBox Logic (BBX). The loan-level data from BBX cover loans originated in 
2003–2007 (we leave out loans originated earlier due to better data coverage in 
the later sample period). BBX aggregates data from mortgage servicing 





data cover about 22 million mortgages throughout the United States, making it a 
comprehensive source for both the prime and subprime mortgages.21 For example, 
based on a comparison with HMDA data that include a near complete universe of 
U.S. mortgage applications and originations, The BBX data is estimated to cover 
about 70% of the prime market during the period. A representative sample of the 
subprime mortgage market allows us to compare the default behavior of the 
condominium loans with that of the subprime mortgages that plays a key role in 
triggering the financial crisis. 
In addition to monthly data on loan performance, BBX contains information 
on borrower and loan characteristics at origination, including the borrower’s 
FICO credit score, the loan amount and interest rate, whether the loan is a fixed- 
or adjustable rate mortgage, LTV, and whether the loan was intended for home 
purchase or refinancing, among other characteristics. The outcome variable that 
we focus on is whether the loan becomes 60 days or more past due within the 24 
months following origination. The BBX loan-level data is also merged with 
macro variables, including the slope of the yield curve and the credit spread from 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the state-level unemployment rate from 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the MSA-level quarterly purchase-only housing 
index from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), which 
was succeeded by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).22 
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22 Established in 2008, FHFA is a successor agency that resulted from the statutory merger of the 





Despite its market coverage as well as richness in many loan and borrower 
characteristics, the BBX dataset has limitations. For example, it does not contain 
lender information. In the later analysis where we examine sources of the default 
pattern in the condominium market, a second dataset is used – loan-level 
performance data from Freddie Mac. This dataset, recently made publicly 
available, includes loan-level origination and monthly loan performance data on 
approximately 15.7 million fully amortizing 30-year fixed-rate mortgages that 
Freddie Mac acquired. While the Freddie Mac sample does not cover the 
subprime mortgage market, it serves as a great supplementary dataset for this 
analysis for the following reasons. First, Freddie Mac loan-level data contain 
lender identity information, which allows us to differentiate between the borrower 
channel and the lender-related effect. Second, loans in the Freddie Mac sample are 
fixed-rate 30-year agency mortgages with full documentation. This stands in 
contrast to the BBX sample where condo loans are much more likely to have 
exotic contract terms and have little or no documentation. Analysis based on this 
more homogeneous sample of loans thus helps establish robustness of our results 
and distinguish from alternative interpretations. In addition, the Freddie Mac data 
allow us to explore in depth the specific channel of the observed default pattern in 
the condo market. To ensure consistency on the condo vs. single family loans 
comparison across the two datasets, we note that both datasets have a 
comprehensive coverage of loans in their focus markets and the fractions of 
condominium loans are comparable (14% in BBX vs. 11% in Freddie Mac).  
                                                                                                                                                               
(OFHEO), and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s government-sponsored 





3.2.2 Descriptive statistics of condo versus single-family loans 
This analysis keeps loans in the BBX dataset that were originated between 
2003 and 2007 in the single-family and condominium markets. It also restricts to 
purchase loans with original loan balances smaller than $10 million. Since condos 
likely concentrate in larger urban areas, we restrict our sample to the top 2000 
cities, which cover 98% of the entire condo market in the BBX dataset. Each zip 
code is further required to have more than 5 loans originated per year to be 
included in the sample.23 The final sample contains 5,000,241 observations, with 
909,564 condo loan observations (18.2%) and 4,090,677 single family loans 
observations (81.8%). 24 
Table 3.1, Panel A shows summary statistics of the major variables in the 
pooled sample for the 2003–2007 period. Among all the loans, 40% are fixed-rate 
mortgages and 26% are subprime mortgages. Borrowers have an average FICO 
credit score of 683, and take out up to 73% of the property value (LTV). Overall, 
the probability of default within two years of loan origination is 6% on average. 
Loan and borrower characteristics in the condo and single-family home 
mortgage market differ. On the one hand, condo loans appear safer along many 
dimensions. Condo borrowers have higher FICO credit scores than single-family 
borrowers (by 20 points). The number of subprime loans in the condo market is 
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0.8% of observations have been eliminated. 
24 We follow the same rules to construct the sample from our supplementary data source Freddie 





one-third smaller than in the single-family loan market. The average condo 
borrower’s interest rate is significantly lower than that of single-family borrowers. 
On the other hand, condo loans typically involve less conventional contract 
terms. In the condo loan market, this study observes much fewer fixed-rate 
mortgages and considerably more option ARMs, interest-only loans, and low or 
no documentation loans than in the single-family market. In addition, fewer condo 
borrowers purchase for owner-occupancy, and they tend to buy in more expensive 
areas (i.e., those with a higher FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index, or HPI).  
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics of BlackBox Full Sample 






     
D_default within 2 yrs 6% 4% 6% -2%*** 
FICO score 683 699 679 20*** 
Original LTV 73% 73% 73% 0*** 
Original loan balance (*1000) 230 220 232 -12*** 
Current interest rate 7.45 7.11 7.53 -0.42*** 
Margin 2.27 2.21 2.28 -0.07*** 
D_Subprime 26% 19% 27% -8%*** 
D_FRM 40% 35% 41% -6%*** 
D_Second lien 19% 18% 20% -2%*** 
D_Option ARM 5% 8% 4% 4%*** 
D_Interest only loan 22% 29% 21% 8%*** 
D_Heloc 2% 2% 2% 0%*** 
D_Low/No doc 35% 41% 34% 7%*** 
D_Owner occupied 73% 69% 74% -5%*** 
Log_HPI 5.33 5.36 5.32 0.04*** 
Log_duration 6.86 6.94 6.84 0.10*** 
     

















Original Year 2003 2004 2005 
          
D_default within 2 yrs 0% 1% -1%*** 1% 1% 0%*** 2% 4% -2%*** 
FICO score 697 683 14*** 701 680 21*** 700 679 21*** 
Original LTV 73% 73% 0% 74% 75% -1%*** 73% 73% 0%*** 
Original loan balance 
（*1000） 
212 234 -22*** 211 221 -10*** 214 224 -10*** 
Current interest rate 6.93 7.26 -0.33*** 6.69 7.22 -0.53*** 6.93 7.47 -0.54*** 
Margin 1.58 1.72 -0.14*** 2.21 2.29 -0.08*** 2.45 2.52 -0.07*** 
D_Subprime 16% 23% -7%*** 19% 28% -9%*** 20% 29% -9%*** 
D_FRM 38% 46% -8%*** 27% 33% -6%*** 32% 38% -6%*** 
D_Second lien 14% 14% 0% 13% 14% -1%*** 18% 21% -3%*** 
D_Option ARM 1% 0% 1%*** 5% 3% 2%*** 9% 5% 4%*** 
D_Interest only loan 11% 5% 6%*** 25% 17% 8%*** 34% 25% 9%*** 
D_Heloc 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 0%*** 3% 3% 0%*** 
D_Low/No doc 24% 24% 0%*** 29% 25% 4%*** 42% 35% 7%*** 
D_Owner occupied 78% 82% -4%*** 75% 78% -3%*** 68% 74% -6%*** 
Log_HPI 5.41 5.34 0.07*** 5.43 5.38 0.05*** 5.37 5.33 0.04*** 
Log_Duration 6.85 6.85 0 6.86 6.77 0.09*** 6.96 6.86 0.1*** 
          



















Original Year 2006 2007 
       
D_default within 2 yrs 9% 12% -3%*** 10% 13% -3%*** 
FICO score 694 674 20*** 710 689 21*** 
Original LTV 70% 71% -1%*** 76% 79% -3%*** 
Original loan balance （*1000） 212 228 -16*** 324 325 -1 
Current interest rate 7.58 7.94 -0.36*** 7.32 7.46 -0.14*** 
Margin 2.24 2.38 -0.14*** 1.58 1.55 0.03 
D_Subprime 20% 29% -9%*** 9% 18% -9%*** 
D_FRM 41% 45% -3%*** 47% 51% -4%*** 
D_Second lien 24% 25% -1%*** 16% 16% 0% 
D_Option ARM 9% 5% 4%*** 10% 5% 5%*** 
D_Interest only loan 31% 24% 7%*** 34% 26% 8%*** 
D_Heloc 2% 2% 0%*** 0% 0% 0% 
D_Low/No doc 48% 40% 8%*** 53% 43% 10%*** 
D_Owner occupied 65% 69% -4%*** 60% 61% -1%** 
Log_HPI 5.31 5.27 0.04*** 5.3 5.25 0.05*** 
Log_Duration 6.98 6.86 0.12*** 6.96 6.9 0.06*** 
       






















      
D_default within 2 yrs 7% 4% -3%*** 6% -1%*** 
FICO score 578 699 122*** 579 1*** 
Original LTV 78% 73% -6%*** 77% -1%*** 
Original loan balance (in 
thousands） 
165 220 68*** 161 -4*** 
Current interest rate 8.22 7.11 -1.19*** 8.19 -0.03*** 
Margin 3.74 2.21 -1.59*** 3.86 0.12*** 
D_FRM 29% 35% 6%*** 28% -1%*** 
D_Second lien 11% 18% 7%*** 10% -1%*** 
D_Option ARM 0% 8% 8%*** 0% 0%*** 
D_Interest only loan 9% 29% 21%*** 12% 3%*** 
D_Heloc 1% 2% 1%*** 3% 2%*** 
D_Low/No doc 14% 41% 27%*** 17% 3%*** 
D_Owner occupied 80% 69% -11%*** 80% 0%** 
Log_HPI 5.29 5.36 0.09*** 5.36 0.07*** 
Log_Duration 6.80 6.94 0.06*** 6.85 0.05*** 
      
Sample Size (in 
thousands） 
1,123 909  170  
Note: 
This table presents the summary statistics of the BlackBox Logic (BBX) dataset. This dataset includes 
only single-family and condominium (condo) loans originated during the period 2003–2007. Panel A 
reports the results from aggregate-level summary statistics of the loans and compares the average 
values of the variables by full sample, single-family loans, and condo loans, respectively. Panel B 
shows the full sample summary statistics results by origination year. Panel C shows the comparison of 
the single family subprime loan market and the condo loan market (full and subprime). D_default 
within 2 yrs is equal to one for defaulting within two years of the loan origination date. Current interest 
rate refers to the coupon rate charged to the borrower for the most recent remittance period. Original 
loan balance is defined as the amount of principal on the closing date of the mortgage. FICO score 
refers to the FICO (formerly the Fair Isaac Corporation) borrower credit score at the time of the loan 
closing. Original LTV means the ratio of the original loan amount to the property value at loan 
origination. D_FRM is equal to one for fixed-rate mortgages. D_Owner occupied takes one if the 
property is owner occupied. D_Second lien is equivalent to one for a second lien loan that is 
subservient to the main or first mortgage on a piece of real estate. D_Option ARM is equal to one if it 
is an adjustable rate mortgage with added flexibility of making one of several possible payments on 
your mortgage every month. D_Interest only loan is one if it is a loan in which, for a set term, the 
borrower pays only the interest on the principal balance with the principal balance unchanged. 
D_Heloc is equivalent to one if it is a loan in which the lender agrees to lend a maximum amount 
within an agreed term, where the collateral is the borrower's equity in his/her house (HELOC is short 
for home equity line of credit). D_Low/No doc takes one if the borrower is required to provide low or 
no documentation. D_Subprime equals one if it is a subprime loan (i.e., loans with FICO score lower 
than 720). Margin is the difference between the interest rate charged to the borrower and the applicable 
ARM index, as measured in number of percentage points. Log_HPI is log of the quarterly 
FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index. Log_Duration is the log of the elapsed time from origination to the 
end of the sample period or to the first classification as being prepaid or delinquent at least 60 days. 





To further examine the differences between the two markets among different 
origination cohorts, the pooled sample averages is decomposed by each 
origination year cohort for both the condo and single-family loans in the period 
2003–2007 (Table 3.1, Panel B). The number of both single-family and condo 
loans peaked in 2005 and then sharply declined in 2007. The number of risky loan 
contracts such as option ARMs, interest-only rate mortgages, and low or no 
documentation mortgages have risen over the years, and the increase is faster 
among condo loans than among single-family loans. On the other hand, the 
difference in the fraction of subprime mortgages between the condo and single 
family loans remains steady during the four year period. The FICO score 
difference even increases: the average condo borrower has an even higher FICO 
score than the average single family borrower in the later cohorts of the sample 
period. In addition, the gap in non-owner-occupied purchases between the condo 
and single family loans shrinks: owner-occupancy decreases in both markets but 
the decrease is faster in the single family loan market. To the extent that loan 
contract terms, borrower credit worthiness, and owner occupancy status 
potentially capture different aspects of the risk associated with a mortgage, it 
remains ambiguous whether the loans in the condo market become more or less 
risky in the later origination cohorts relative to the single family loans.  
Next the loan and borrower characteristics in the condo loan market are 
compared to the subprime segment of the single family market (Table 3.1, Panel 





comparison between condo loans and subprime loans is more informative about 
the characteristics and risk profiles of condo loans. Most of the differences in the 
loan and borrower characteristics observed in the full sample (Table 3.1, Panel A) 
remain to hold. Condo borrowers are much more creditworthy by the 
conventional measures. However, even compared to the subprime mortgages in 
the single family market, condo loans are much more likely to have non-
conventional contract terms or have low or no documentation. Similarly, the 
condo purchases are less likely to be owner-occupied. This essay also studies the 
borrower and loan characteristics in the subprime segment of the condo loan 
market in comparison to those in the subprime segment of the single family 
market. The subprime market is relatively homogeneous across the condo and 
single-family markets: although we still observe a robust pattern of riskier loan 
terms in the condo subprime market, the differences in borrower and loan 
characteristics between these two markets are much smaller than between all 
condo loans and single-family subprime loans. This suggests that it is not simply 
subprime mortgages that explain the distinct characteristics of the condo loan 
market. On the contrary, condo loans in the prime market are particularly 
associated with riskier contract terms, low or no documentation, and are more 





3.3 Hypotheses and Methodology 
3.3.1 Hypothesis Development 
Hypothesis 1 
The first null hypothesis is that the condo and single-family markets are 
similar. Hence, the default rates (as well as default growth patterns) for condo and 
single-family loans should exhibit similar patterns. This hypothesis is tested to 
determine if condo loans have higher default rates by focusing on comparable 
single-family and condo markets. 
Hypothesis 2 
The Driving factor of the unique default pattern in the condo loan market is 
neither due to the unobserved factors in condominium market compared to the 
single family market, not due to the lender preference and/or expertise with loans 
in the condo market and the single family market. The unique default pattern in 
condo loan market is mainly because condo loan borrowers could be inherently 
riskier, compared with single family loan borrowers. Given that real estate 
investors are more present in the condominium market, the observed default 







The impact of condo loan defaults resulting from risky borrowers has 
negative spillover effects on the neighboring single-family market. If this 
hypothesis holds, not only should condo loans default earlier compared with 
single-family loans originated in the same cohort, but also the earlier condo loan 
defaults prompt more defaults in the single-family sector in the same area 
afterwards. Therefore, the question can be asked do early condo defaults predict 
the single family subprime market’s subsequent default rate. 
3.3.2 Methodology 
The main empirical specification in this study is a logistic model of the 
default decision of loans originated between 2003 and 2007.25 A loan to be in 
default is defined if it becomes delinquent by at least 60 days26 within two years 
of origination. The main independent variable, Condois, is a binary variable that is 
set to one if the loan is a condo mortgage. Other explanatory variables include 
both loan-level and macro-level variables. City, and year fixed effects are 
included to control for unobservable factors at the city level and at the year level. 
Loan i enters the study in month tis, which is the first occurrence of that loan. The 
same loan exits the study in month Tis, which is the earliest occurrence of one of 
the “exit” events (default or prepay or the end of the sample period). Finally, all 
the standard errors reported in main default analysis, unless otherwise stated, are 
clustered at the city level, in addition to being robust to heteroskedasticity. 
                                                           
25 For robustness, we replicate our analysis using a linear probability model and find consistent 
results as well. 
26 More specifically, we define default as a loan that is delinquent by at least 60 days, or that is in 





Loan-level controls are motivated by the literature. They include indicators 
for FICO credit scores, indicators for fixed-rate and interest-only loans, indicators 
for low- and no-documentation (low/no doc) loans, an indicator for owner-
occupancy status, an indicator for subprime mortgages, and an indicator for home 
equity lines of credit (HELOC). Following the literature, this study also includes 
an indicator variable for LTV at origination of 80% as a proxy for the existence of 
a second lien on the property. Continuous loan-level variables include (log of) the 
loan amount, the first interest rate observed, the time elapsed from origination to 
the end of the sample period or to the first classification as being prepaid or 
delinquent at least 60 days, and LTV at the time of origination. This analysis also 
includes the current level of the residential home price index, the state-level 
unemployment rate, the slope of the yield curve, and the credit spread as control 
variables.  
3.4 Empirical Analysis on Condo Default 
3.4.1 Unconditional result of the default behavior of the condo 
market 
The default rates within two years of origination in both markets increased 
over the years in our sample (Figure 3.3.1). More importantly, the increase in the 
condo loan default rate is much faster. Among the 2003 cohort loans, the default 





However, among loans originated in 2007, the two-year condo default rate is 
10.1%, which is comparable with 12.6% in the single-family market.  
 
Figure 3.3 Frequency Distribution of Defaults within Two Years of Origination: 
Condo vs. Single-Family 
Fig. 3.3.1 Frequency distribution of defaults within two years: Full sample  
 
Fig. 3.3.2 Frequency distributions of defaults within two years: Subprime and non-
subprime 
Note: 
This figure shows the frequency distribution of loan defaults within two years of origination (in 
percentages). All the loans are originated during the period 2003–2007 and are separated by property 
type: condo and single-family. Fig. 3.3.1 shows the frequency distribution of within-two-year default 
rates for the full sample; Fig. 3.3.2 presents the distribution by comparing subprime and non-subprime 
loans. The Y-axis indicates the percentage of default probability within two years of origination, and 



































Figure 3.3.2 shows a decomposition of the default patterns in the condo and 
single-family markets, by subprime and non-subprime status. Within the subprime 
and non-subprime sub-markets, condo loan defaults start at a much lower rate 
than single-family loan defaults, but grow more quickly over the sample period. 
Specifically, the rate of condo subprime loan defaults exceeds that of the single-
family market by 0.7 percentage points among loans originated in 2007. These 
results, in combination with our previous findings, imply that condo loans have 
distinct features that make them riskier and more vulnerable to default, especially 
during times of market distress. 
3.4.2 Regression analysis of condo loan default behavior 
Option-based theoretical and empirical models for mortgage default analysis 
have been well developed during the past two decades (e.g., Kau et al., 1992; Kau 
and Keenan, 1999; Deng et al., 1996, 2000), and they have increased in realism 
and sophistication in the past decade (e.g., Ambrose et al., 2001; Deng and 
Gabriel, 2006). Clapp et al. (2006) provide a comprehensive review of these 
modeling frameworks. Following Clapp et al. (2006), we perform logistic 
regressions to formally study the default behavior of the condo market relative to 
the single-family market. Because condo loans differ substantially from single-
family loans in their loan and borrower characteristics in the BBX dataset, 
observables on loan and borrower characteristics are included as controls in the 
logistic analysis. Macroeconomic variables are also included as well as 





odds ratios in the full sample analysis: an odds ratio greater (smaller) than one 
indicates a positive (negative) effect. Consistent with the literature, FICO scores, 
LTV, FRM loan type, and owner-occupancy status are strong predictors of 
default. Second lien loans and low/no doc loans are risky, as they are associated 
with higher default rates within two years of origination.  
Although condo loans have a lower average default rate in the summary 
statistics (Table 3.1, Panel A), the logistic analysis of Table 3.2 shows that after 
controlling for loan and borrower characteristics, condo loans do not differ much 
from single-family loans in their two-year default probability. The Condo dummy 
coefficient is economically and statistically indistinguishable from 1 (i.e., the odds 
of observing a condo loan default are as high as observing a single family loan 
default). Furthermore, separating default behavior by origination year reveals a 
significant time trend in the condo market defaults that is consistent with the time-
series pattern shown in Panel B of Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2. Coefficient on the 
interaction term between the condo dummy and the origination year t captures the 
difference in odds ratio between condo loans’ and single family loans’ default 
rates in origination year t, relative to the odds ratio difference  between the two 
submarket’s loan defaults in the origination year 2003 (i.e., the absorbed 
origination year). Therefore, those coefficients in Table 3.2, which are greater 
than one, suggest that there is a sharper increase in condo loan defaults relative to 
single-family loan defaults over the years—with the most significant jump in 
condo loan default rates in 2006 and 2007. As a result, condo loans default more 





44% less likely to default, condo loans originated in 2007 are 6.4%27 more likely 
to default within two years of origination than single-family loans in the same 
cohort. 
Table 3.2 Logistic Analysis of Borrower within-two-year Default: Condo vs. 
Single-Family 
 (1) (2) 
 D_default within 2yrs D_default within 2yrs 
D_Condo 0.992 0.562*** 
 (-0.26) (-5.97) 
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2004  1.097 
  (0.84) 
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2005  1.536*** 
  (4.30) 
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2006  1.920*** 
  (6.18) 
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2007  1.894*** 
  (5.06) 
D_Owner occupied 0.595*** 0.595*** 
 (-30.43) (-30.43) 
D_Second lien 6.834*** 6.822*** 
 (44.02) (44.07) 
D_FRM  0.706*** 0.705*** 
 (-23.69) (-23.80) 
D_Option ARM 0.441*** 0.440*** 
 (-13.90) (-13.86) 
D_Interest only loan 0.965* 0.965* 
 (-1.78) (-1.81) 
D_Heloc 0.620*** 0.618*** 
 (-17.54) (-17.70) 
D_Low/No Doc 1.023 1.021 
 (1.52) (1.40) 
D_Subprime 0.739*** 0.738*** 
 (-16.95) (-16.94) 
Original LTV  1.002*** 1.002*** 
 (18.05) (18.04) 
Log_FICO score  0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (-45.87) (-45.95) 
Log_Original loan balance 1.383*** 1.382*** 
 (13.90) (13.94) 
Log_HPI 0.290*** 0.289*** 
 (-7.24) (-7.27) 
Log_Duration 0.149*** 0.149*** 
 (-63.63) (-63.42) 
Unemployment rate 0.968 0.967 
 (-1.56) (-1.63) 
Yield slope 1.153*** 1.154*** 
 (6.38) (6.46) 
Credit spread 1.635*** 1.636*** 
 (49.42) (49.47) 
                                                           
27 The coefficient on condo dummy is multiplied with the coefficient on condo x origination year 
2007 interactive term (0.562 x 1.894 = 1.064) to compute the odds ratio of a 2007-originated 





Table 3.2 Logistic Analysis of Borrower within-two-year Default: Condo vs. Single-
Family (Continued) 
 (1) (2) 
 
D_default within 2yrs D_default within 2yrs 
Current interest rate 1.049*** 1.048*** 
 (14.75) (14.61) 
   
Fixed effects City, current year and origination year 
Observations 2,291,374 2,291,374 
Pseudo R-squared 0.418 0.418 
Note: 
This table presents the result of logistic regression analysis for the refined 2000-city BBX sample. This 
dataset includes only single-family and condominium (condo) purchase loans (<10million USD in 
origination amount) from all states originated during the period 2003–2007. The dependent variable 
D_default within 2 yrs takes the value of one for defaulting within two years of the loan origination 
date. The definitions of the independent variables are shown in Table 3.1. Standard errors are clustered 
at city level. City fixed effects, current year fixed effects and origination year fixed effects are included 
in the regression but not reported. Odds ratios are reported and robust z-statistics are included in the 
parentheses. Note that ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
 
A subsample analysis is performed of all condo loans and all single-family 
subprime loans. The result in Column (1) of Table 3.3 show that, on average, 
condo loans are slightly less likely to default compared to single family subprime 
mortgages. In earlier vintages, single-family subprime loans are consistently more 
likely to default than condo loans of the same vintage. To the extent that condo 
loans are compared to a riskier segment of the mortgage market, the test is 
constructed against finding a significant result. However, condo loan defaults 
grow at a faster rate and over time condo loans begin to default more than single-
family subprime loans (Column (2) of Table 3.3). Condo loans originated in 2006 
are 12% more likely to default within two years of origination than single-family 
subprime loans originated in the same year, after controlling for all the observed 
loan and borrower characteristics. Given the role of the subprime mortgages in the 
financial crisis, this comparison thus highlights the possibility that the much 





The pattern becomes more apparent when we compare condo and single 
family loans within the subprime market. In this sample, condo subprime loans 
are riskier than single-family subprime loans—a condo subprime loan is 13% 
more likely to default than a single-family subprime loan (Column (3) of Table 
3.3). The higher default probability among condo subprime loans is driven by 
later vintages. Condo subprime loans originated in 2006 and 2007 are 29% and 
81% more likely to default than single-family subprime loans originated in the 
same years.28  
                                                           
28 For completeness, we also perform a direct comparison, using the same specification as in Table 
III, of two year default rates between (a) prime condo loans with prime single family loans; and 
between (b) prime condo loans with subprime single family loans. We find that over time prime 
condo loans exhibit a higher growth rate in defaults than prime single family loans. On the other 
hand, condo prime loans are less risky than single family subprime loans (for all origination 
cohorts), which is consistent with the findings in the literature on the default risk difference 





Table 3.3 Logistic Analysis of within-two-year Default: Condo Loans vs. Subprime Loans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 D_default within 2yrs D_default within 2yrs 
 All Condo vs SF Subprime Loans Condo Subprime vs. SF Subprime Loans 
     
D_Condo 0.895*** 0.301*** 1.125*** 0.758* 
 (-3.20) (-10.90) (3.90) (-1.81) 
D_Condo x   1.317**  1.002* 
  D_OrigYear2004  (2.44)  (0.01) 
D_Condo x   2.445***  1.151 
  D_OrigYear2005  (7.95)  (0.89) 
D_Condo x   3.724***  1.700*** 
  D_OrigYear2006  (10.95)  (3.35) 
D_Condo x   3.016***  2.384*** 
  D_OrigYear2007  (7.76)  (4.56) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes yes 
Fixed effects City, current year and origination year City, current year and origination year 
Observations 742,517 742,517 402,533 402,533 
Pseudo R-squared 0.373 0.375 0.333 0.334 
Note: 
This table presents the result of logistic regression analysis that includes all condo loans and subprime loans originated during the period 2003–07 in the BBX 
sample. Columns (1) and (2) present the logistic regression results of all condo loans and single-family subprime loans, and columns (3) and (4) show results of 
condo subprime loans and single-family subprime loans. The dependent variable D_default within 2 yrs takes the value of one for defaulting within two years of 
the loan origination date. We include the same set of control variables as in Table 3.1. City fixed effects, current year fixed effects and origination year fixed 
effects are included in the regression but not reported. Standard errors are clustered at city level. Odds ratios are reported and robust z-statistics are included in the 





3.5 What Drives the Default Pattern in the Condo Loan 
Market? 
Condo markets differ from the single family in many aspects. As a result, 
there are several competing explanations for the observed evidence in Table 3.2 
and 3.3 that the condo loan default rate grows at a faster speed and its level 
eventually exceeds that in the single family market, including the riskier subprime 
market segment. Compared to the single family market, condominiums are 
typically concentrated in more urban areas. They provide different types of 
service flows and have distinct asset characteristics such as price growth and 
volatility that could lead to different default patterns over time. Alternatively, 
lenders have different preference and/or expertise with loans in the condo market 
and the single family market, and the differential default patterns between the two 
markets reflect the lender (or supply-side) effect. Lastly, condo loan borrowers 
could be inherently riskier. Several approaches are used to distinguish these 
explanations.  
3.5.1 Unobserved characteristics of the condo market 
First, a subsample analysis is performed to better control for the location 
fixed effects. In the previous analysis, any time-invariant characteristics at the city 
level are removed. However, finer geographical boundaries are needed to address 
the concern that condo loans are simply located in different, potentially riskier 





subsample of the top 50 cities in our sample (based on the number of total loans in 
our entire period). The choice of the subsample analysis (instead of full sample 
regression) is motivated by the following considerations. There are 6,914 zip 
codes in our sample, which imposes significant computational challenge in our 
logistic regression. In addition, the top 50 city subsample constitutes 34% of the 
entire condo loans, which is fairly representative of the full sample. Column (1) of 
Table 3.4 presents the results using finer zip code fixed effects based on the 
subsample analysis. The result exhibits the same pattern as before. Condo loan 
defaults are increasing over the origination cohort years, and in particular, condo 
loans originated in later cohorts (e.g., 2006) default more than their single family 
counterparts.  
Condominiums arguably provide different types of service flows to owners, 
compared to detached single family houses. As a result, the two types of housing 
markets will have distinct asset characteristics (e.g., growth rate and volatility).  
The option pricing theory implies that the observed differences in mortgage 
defaults could result from differences in the underlying asset volatility. Therefore, 
if condo properties have a different return generating processes from single family 
properties, then this would lead to the observed differences in default risk between 
condo and single family mortgages. The analysis in Table 3.2 and 3.3 includes 
MSA-level HPI index, which is primarily based on transactions in the single 
family market, and is thus not able to address this issue. This possibility is 
examined by including specific asset characteristics for the condominium and 





subsample where there is detailed information about price dynamics in the 
condominium market using Zillow house price data which contain monthly 
transaction price at the zip code level for the condo and single family markets 
separately. Consistent with the analysis in Column (1) of Table 3.4, the top 50 
cities subsample after merging Zillow with BBX is the focus, which covers 33% 
of the entire condo loans in the sample.  
The analysis includes the zip code-level average transaction price and the 
growth rate of the average transaction price for both the condo and the single 
family market in the regression to control for the asset market dynamics in these 
two markets (Column (2), Table 3.4). The zip code fixed effects are also used to 
control for any unobserved location effects at the zip code level. The results 
continue to hold. In Column (3) of Table 3.4, location-specific time trend is 
further included in the analysis to better control for the dynamics of local markets 
(e.g., local trend in supply of condominiums relative to the single family 
houses).29 The same results still remain: condo loans default faster and their later 
cohorts default more than single family loans in the same cohort, after controlling 
for asset dynamics in the two markets and a location-specific time trend.30 
                                                           
29 In the specifications that we include location-specific time fixed effects, we modify our standard 
error clustering at the location time level. This is to allow correlation in defaults within each 
location at a given year. 
30 The weaker effect after we control for asset market characteristics suggests that the difference in 
asset attributes may account for part of the difference in default patterns. It may also be due to lack 





Table 3.4 Controlling for Location and Asset Dynamics of the Condo Market 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 D_default within 2yrs D_default within 2yrs D_default within 2yrs 
 BBX subsample (top 50 cities) Zillow-BBX merged sample (top 50 cities) 
    
D_Condo 0.900 0.947 0.945 
 (-0.73) (-0.31) (-0.38) 
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2004 0.858 0.866 0.843 
 (-0.83) (-0.71) (-0.80) 
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2005 1.214 1.103 1.074 
  (1.24)  (0.50)  (0.40) 
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2006 1.558** 1.445*   1.358* 
 (2.55)  (1.76)  (1.85) 
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2007 1.332* 1.328 1.257 
  (1.34)  (1.09)  (0.93) 
Log_Condo price level      1.971** 1.090 
   (2.32)  (1.34) 
Log_Single family price level  1.276       0.472*** 
   (0.59) (-9.47) 
Condo price growth        0.078***     0.227** 
  (-4.30) (-2.28) 
Single family price growth        0.000***       0.000*** 
  (-7.87) (-5.30) 
    
Controls Yes Yes yes 
Fixed effects 
zip codes, current year 
and origination year 
zip codes, current year 
and origination year 
City-year and origination year 
Cluster city city city-year 
Observations 679,483 565,084 539,815 








This table studies the robustness of our results in Table 3 in subsamples that allow better control for 
unobservables (e.g., location and condo market price dynamics). Column (1) repeats the analysis in 
Table 3 in the top 50 cities in the BBX sample with finer zip code fixed effects. Columns (2)-(3) 
perform the analysis in Table 3 using the merged Zillow-BBX subsample in the top 50 cities, where we 
replace the state-level HPI information with the zip code level values based on transaction prices 
obtained from Zillow, for both single family houses and condos. Specifically, Log_Condo (Single 
family) Price Level refers to the log of the monthly zip-level Zillow condo (single family) market 
average transaction price; Condo (Single family) Price growth is the monthly change in log zip-level 
Zillow condo (single family) price level.  The dependent variable D_default within 2 yrs takes the value 
of one for defaulting within two years of the loan origination date. We include the same set of control 
variables and similar fixed effects as in Table 3 (unreported here for brevity). Odds ratios are reported 
and robust z-statistics are included in the parentheses. Note that ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance, respectively. 
Condo loan default patterns are also tested in several “sand states” (i.e., 
California, Florida, Nevada, and Arizona), which exhibit more striking default 
patterns during the crisis. In unreported analyses, it can be confirmed that the 
condo loan default level and growth patterns are qualitatively the same among 
sand states as in the full sample.31 Another potential sample selection bias could 
arise from a few super star cities whose condo markets have unique characteristics 
that could confound our interpretation. Robustness tests of the key default 
analysis (Table 3.2 and 3.3) are performed by removing New York and Los 
Angeles from our sample. The results remain qualitatively the same and are not 
reported in this chapter (but are available upon request). 
3.5.2 Lender or borrower effect 
The previous analysis suggests that the results in Table 3.2 and 3.3 are 
unlikely driven by location or asset market differences. However, it still remains 
an open question as to whether lenders or borrowers account for the observed 
                                                           
31 They do not appear to be stronger in these sands states, likely because there are other important 
determinants of condo loan presence and growth (e.g., supply constraints and demographic 






default pattern difference. For example, different lenders may specialize in one 
particular asset market in loan origination, and there exists different screening 
standards across lenders (see, Rajan, Seru and Vig, 2013). As a result, the 
differential default patterns between the two markets reflect the fact that riskier 
borrowers are drawn to the condo loan market over time. Unfortunately, BBX 
does not contain lender information. The question is first approached in an 
indirect way. Using OLS, loan default is regressed on all the observables (as in 
Table 3.2 and 3.3) for condo and single family market separately for each cohort 
year. The R-square statistics are obtained for each of the 10 regressions, and 
compare the trend in R-squares between the condo market and the single family 
market (Figure 3.3). The rationale is as follows. The null hypothesis is that faster 
condo loan defaults over origination cohorts are due to the increasingly lax 
screening by some lenders who happen to originate more condo loans. Even 
though we are able to control for the observable differences in loan characteristics 
(e.g., riskier contracts among condo loans), lenders may select based on other 
unobservable information. If lenders apply different selection criteria over loan 
cohorts that are unobservable to econometricians, then the proportion of loan 
defaults unexplained by observed loan and borrower characteristics should 
increase in later origination cohorts, especially for condo loans. In other words, 
the null hypothesis implies a diverging R-square trend between the condo and 
single family loans. However, the pattern in Figure 3.4 reveals a similar trend in 
the R-squares in the two markets. In particular, the R-squares of the origination 





each other. Since condo loan defaults peaked (relative to the single family loan 
defaults) in these two cohorts, these results provide the first piece of evidence that 
lenders and the associated time trend in credit supply may not be an important 
reason underlying the (differential) condo default pattern. 
 
Figure 3.4 R square compassion from OLS regressions: condo and single family 
by year 
Note: 
This figure shows the trend in R-square statistics for condo and single family market 
separately for each loan origination year (over the period of 2003-2007). The R-squares are 
obtained from 10 (OLS) regressions, using the same independent and explanatory variables 
as in Table 3.2, by restricting to condo loans (or single family loans) within each origination 
year. The Y-axis indicates the R-square statistics, and the X-axis indicates the origination 















3.5.3 Disentangling competing explanations: further evidence 
using Freddie Mac data 
The previous analysis cannot completely eliminate concerns of a supply-
driven channel. There is no lender information in the BBX sample, and the fact 
that many loan characteristics are (increasingly) riskier over time for condo loans 
presents another identification challenge. 
In this section, another data source is introduced—loan-level performance 
data from Freddie Mac—to complement this analysis. Freddie Mac does not cover 
the subprime mortgage market, so the main analysis on the condo and the single 
market subprime market comparison and interaction is not feasible based on the 
Freddie Mac sample. However, it serves as a great supplementary dataset for the 
following reasons. Freddie Mac loan-level data contain lender identity 
information, which allows this study to better differentiate between the borrower 
channel and the lender-specific effect. Homogeneity among Freddie Mac loans 
(e.g. in contract terms) also facilitates a better identification against observed or 
unobserved heterogeneity in the condo loan market. The same filtering rule is 
applied to the Freddie Mac loan dataset, and the final Freddie Mac sample covers 
3.79 million loans, out of which 11% are condo loans. Although smaller than the 
BBX sample, Freddie Mac’s condo loan fraction is economically significant 
which ensures a meaningful comparison. The detailed summary statistics of the 






Table 3.5 presents logistic regression results using the Freddie Mac sample. The 
available borrower and loan characteristics are included as control variables (e.g., 
FICO, LTV, owner occupancy status, and loan balance). Consistent with the 
analysis using BBX data, aggregate macroeconomic variables are included. All 
specifications include zip area, origination cohort, and year fixed effects, and 
standard errors are clustered at the zip area level.32     
The baseline specification in Column (1) of Table 3.5 is closest to our BBX 
analysis in Table 3.2. It shows consistent results. On average, condo loans have a 
smaller likelihood of defaulting within two years after origination. However, the 
default rate in the condo loan grows at a far greater speed and eventually exceeds 
that in the single family market. The economic magnitude is comparable to that 
documented in Table 3.2: condo loans originated in 2007 are 10% (vs. 6.4% in 
Table 3.2) more likely to default than single family loans in the Freddie Mac 
sample. This result first provides external validity to our main analysis in Table 
3.2 by using an independent data source. Furthermore, it sheds light on the 
interpretation of the observed default pattern in the condo loan market. Freddie 
Mac loans are homogenous: they are 30-year fully amortizing fixed rate 
mortgages for both condo and single family loans, in contrast to the prominent 
differences between the two types of loans in contract terms and subprime status 
in the BBX dataset. The observation that the default difference in the two markets 
is both qualitatively and quantitatively similar in a homogeneous sample of loans 
                                                           
32 Freddie Mac only releases the location for each loan up to the first three digits of the exact zip 






complements the previous evidence by ruling out riskier contract terms or other 
unobserved heterogeneity among condo loans as the potential explanation. 
In Column (2) of Table 3.5, lender information provided by Freddie Mac and 
lender fixed effects are included in the logistic regression. The results hardly 
differ from Column (1). A time-varying lender effect is allowed in Column (3) to 
control for a potential time trend in lending standard and results remain almost the 
same as in Column (1). In addition, the R-square improvement when we add 
lender-related fixed effects is negligible. This is consistent with the observation 
that the credit quality of approved condo borrowers (e.g., FICO score, LTV) does 
not deteriorate over time (Table A1, Panel B). While there still may be a common 
trend in credit supply that explains the default pattern for both the single family 
and condo loan market, the supply channel is not able to explain the faster growth 
trajectory among condo loans. Taken together, results in Column (2) and (3) add 
support to evidence in Figure 3.3: the lender or credit supply channel is unlikely 






Table 3.5 Controlling for Lender and Contract-term Differences: Evidence using 
Freddie Mac Data 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 D_default within 2yrs D_default within 2yrs D_default within 2yrs 
    
D_Condo 0.439*** 0.450*** 0.459*** 
 (-8.01) (-7.95) (-7.84) 
D_Condo * 
D_OrigYear2004 
1.250* 1.239* 1.222* 
 (1.95) (1.88) (1.75) 
D_Condo * 
D_OrigYear2005 
1.592*** 1.625*** 1.537*** 
 (3.68) (3.89) (3.39) 
D_Condo * 
D_OrigYear2006 
2.069*** 2.061*** 1.992*** 
 (5.94) (5.99) (5.79) 
D_Condo * 
D_OrigYear2007 
2.510*** 2.455*** 2.435*** 
 (6.41) (6.48) (6.60) 
D_Owner occupied 0.914** 0.917** 0.925** 
 (-2.29) (-2.21) (-2.02) 
Original LTV 1.050*** 1.049*** 1.049*** 
 (41.94) (41.00) (41.24) 
Log_FICO score 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (-66.08) (-66.66) (-67.38) 
Log_Original loan balance 0.752*** 0.753*** 0.755*** 
 (-8.41) (-8.42) (-8.32) 
Log_Duration 0.923*** 0.924*** 0.923*** 
 (-30.76) (-30.62) (-29.97) 
Log_HPI 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 
 (-12.96) (-13.30) (-13.15) 
Unemployment rate 1.234*** 1.233*** 1.233*** 
 (10.52) (10.91) (11.23) 
Yield slope 0.904*** 0.904*** 0.906*** 
 (-3.67) (-3.74) (-3.67) 
Credit spread 1.401*** 1.406*** 1.412*** 
 (19.27) (19.53) (19.60) 
Current interest rate 1.520*** 1.522*** 1.499*** 
 (14.66) (15.00) (14.56) 
  
Fixed effects zip-area, current year and origination year 
 Lender Lender*origination year 
Observations 1,823,656 1,823,656 1,823,656 
Pseudo R-squared 0.354 0.358 0.360 
Note: 
This table presents the result of logistic regression analysis for the Freddie Mac full sample. This 
dataset includes only single-family and condominium (condo) purchase loans (< 10million USD loan 
origination amount) from all states originated during the period 2003–2007. Column (1) includes “zip-
area” and current year fixed effects, as well as origination year fixed effects. Column (2) includes 
lender fixed effects, in addition to “zip-area” fixed effects, current year fixed effects, and origination 
year fixed effects. Column (3) includes the interaction of lender and origination year fixed effects, in 
addition to “zip-area” fixed effects, current year fixed effects, and origination year fixed effects. The 
dependent variable D_default within 2 yrs takes the value of one for defaulting within two years of the 
loan origination date. Please refer to Table A3 for definitions and summary statistics of the independent 
variables. Standard errors are clustered at “zip-area” level, and the fixed effects are not reported. Odds 
ratios are reported and robust z-statistics are included in the parentheses. Note that ***, ** and * 





3.5.4 Why are condo borrowers riskier? 
It is shown, using different approaches on multiple datasets, that the default 
likelihood of condo loans increases at a greater speed and exceeds that of the 
single family loans for later origination cohorts, even after controlling differences 
in locations, asset market dynamics, contract terms and lending practice between 
the condo and the single family market. Therefore, riskier borrowers in the condo 
market emerge as the leading explanation. In this section, why borrowers in the 
condo market are riskier is investigated. Condo borrowers are unlikely the low 
credit quality borrowers who default because they cannot pay or refinance their 
mortgages as house prices start to decline. In the sample, compared to the single 
family market, condo borrowers have higher FICO scores, use subprime 
mortgages less frequently, and on average are charged a lower interest rate. 
The recent literature highlights the role of investors in understanding defaults 
during the housing bust. Haughwout, et al. (2011) suggests that real estate 
investors rely on financial leverage in their purchases and default more ruthlessly 
when the housing market condition deteriorates. The price run-up in the earlier 
years of the decade attract more trend-chasing investors (e.g., Bayer et al., 2011; 
Fu and Qian, 2013), who are more likely to make a pure economic decision of 
deciding to default after a significant price drop. Real estate investors likely prefer 
condominium units due to their smaller size (and thus smaller investment), greater 
rental demand and less maintenance cost. Therefore, it is likely to observe a larger 





this study, condominiums are indeed more likely to be investment properties; a 
larger proportion of condominium purchases are for non-owner-occupancy 
purposes (31% in BBX and 22% in Freddie Mac) compared to single family 
purchases (27% in BBX and 10% in Freddie Mac). In addition, the share of 
owner-occupied loans decreased over time in both datasets. The investor channel 
is thus hypothesized to explain the observed default patterns in the condo market.  
This study further examines whether investment-driven loans have a higher 
likelihood of default than non-investment-driven loans. The analysis is performed 
on the more homogeneous Freddie Mac sample that allows us to better control for 
heterogeneity among condo loans (e.g., in contract terms). In addition, 
investment-driven purchases can be identified with better precision in the Freddie 
Mac data: such information is incomplete and inaccurate in the BBX data where 
41% of the loans have low or no documentation, compared to all Freddie Mac 
loans that have full documentation. Thus investment purchase dummy provided in 
the Freddie Mac data is used as our key independent variable in the analysis. 
Panel A of Table 3.6 examines whether investment-associated condominium 
loans are associated with a higher likelihood default. The interaction between the 
condominium loan dummy and the investment purchase dummy in Column (1) 
supports the hypothesis: investment-associated condominium loans are on average 
30.3% more likely to default than non-investment-associated condominium loans 
during the 2003-2007 origination period. Furthermore, within the condominium 





origination cohorts (Column (2)). Importantly, while we show in Table 3.5 that 
condo loans of later cohorts (e.g., originated in 2007) on average are 10% more 
likely to default within two years than the same cohort single family loans, the 
higher default level among condo loans in that cohort is driven by investment-
associated condo loans. Non-investment-associated condo loans originated in 
2007 are 19.4% less likely to default than the same cohort single family loans, and 
investment-associated condo loans originated in 2007 are 88.7% more likely to 
default than the same cohort single family loans. This is strong evidence 
supporting the investor channel explanation, for the observed default pattern in 
the condominium market. 
In Panel B of Table 3.6, the hypothesis is further tested by taking a closer 
look at the default behavior within the condo market. Again, the first column in 
Panel B suggests a strong investor effect: the investment-driven condo loan is 
24% more likely to default within two years during our sample period, compared 
to condo loans not intended for investment purchases. This analysis seeks to 
further understand the investor channel by interacting the investment dummy with 
an Option_to_default variable that captures the moneyness of the default option 
(Column (2), Table 3.6).33 Investors should be more responsive in their default 
                                                           
33 Specifically, among the condo loan that have defaulted within two years in our sample, we 
define Option_to_default to be 1 if the current loan amount one month before default is greater 
than the average condo transaction prices (obtained from Zillow) in the same zip area during the 
same month. For those that have not defaulted within two years during our sample, 
Option_to_default is equal to 1 if, in at least one month during the first 24 months after 
origination, the loan amount in the current month is greater than the same-month average condo 
transaction price in the local area (i.e., =1 if borrower ever has one in-the-money default option 





behavior when the current loan amount is greater than the value of the property. 
Results in Column (2) show that default likelihood significantly increases when 
the default option is in the money (as proxied by our Option_to_default dummy). 
Conditional on the default option being in the money, investment condos are 
141% more likely to default within two years after origination than non-
investment condos. On the other hand, when the default option is not in the 
money, there is no difference in default probability between the investment and 
non-investment condo loans.34 Overall, the evidence suggests that investors play 
an important role in explaining condo defaults. In particular, condo investors 
(more) ruthlessly default when the current loan amount is greater than the 
property value. 
  
                                                           
34 We also compare the risk profiles of investor condo loans with those of investor single family 
loans, using the same specification as in column 1 of Table VI, Panel B. In unreported results, we 
find no difference in the two-year default rates between investor loans in the condo market and 
investor loans in the single family market. This further suggests that borrower type (i.e., investors) 





Table 3.6 Investor Channel Analysis: Evidence from Freddie Mac 
 (1) (2) 
 D_default within 2yrs D_default within 2yrs 
Panel A: Full sample   
  
D_Condo 0.850** 0.452** 
 (-3.32) (-7.92) 
D_Condo*D_Investment 1.303**  
 (3.06)  
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2004  0.791** 
  (-3.50) 
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2005  0.791** 
  (-3.75) 
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2006  0.752** 
  (-3.88) 
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2007  1.784** 
  (6.68) 
D_Condo* D_Investment* D_OrigYear2004  1.225 
  (1.68) 
D_Condo* D_Investment* D_OrigYear2005  1.691** 
  (4.20) 
D_Condo* D_Investment* D_OrigYear2006  2.105** 
  (6.12) 
D_Condo* D_Investment* D_OrigYear2007  2.340** 
  (6.18) 
   
Fixed effects zip-area, origination year, current year and lender 
Observations 1,823,656 1,823,656 
Pseudo R-squared 0.357 0.358 
   
Panel B: Condo market subsample   
  
D_Investment 1.242** 0.936 
 (2.35) (-0.56) 
Option_to_Default  2.077*** 
  (9.42) 
Option_to_default*D_Investment  2.575*** 
  (4.73) 
   
Fixed effects zip-area, origination year, current year and lender 
Observations 169,224 167,966 
Pseudo R-squared 0.421 0.427 
Note: 
Panel A of this table presents the result of logistic regression analysis for the Freddie Mac full sample 
(condominium + single family loans) from all states originated during the period 2003-2007, and Panel 
B of this table shows the result of logistic regression analysis using only condominium (condo) 
purchase loans (< 10million USD loan origination amount) out of the full sample. The dependent 
variable D_default within 2 yrs takes the value of one for defaulting within two years of the loan 
origination date. The definitions of the independent variables are same as in the summary statistics of 
the Freddie Mac sample (Table A3). D_Investment equals one if the use of the property if for 
investment (as recorded in Freddie Mac). Among the condo loans which default within 2 years, 
Option_to_Default  is a dummy equal to one if the difference between current loan amount at one 
month before the defaulting month and Zillow zip-level condo HPI at the same month is larger than 0. 
For those condo loans which do not default within 2 years, Option_to_Default  is equal to one if the 
difference between current loan amount and the current Zillow HPI is positive for at least one month 
during the first 24 months after origination. Log_HPI is log of the MSA-level quarterly FHFA/OFHEO 
House Price Index. Standard errors are clustered at “zip-area” level. “Zip-area”, origination cohort, 





statistics are included in the parentheses. Note that ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 





3.6 The Aggregate Implications of Condo Loan Defaults 
Strong and robust evidence is documented that condo loans are inherently 
riskier than single-family loans. In particular, condo loan default rate grows at a 
fast rate and those loans in later origination cohorts default more even compared 
with subprime loans in the single-family market. Does the higher risk have 
aggregate implications for the recent housing crisis? The evidence suggests that 
investment-driven, riskier borrowers in the condo market are the most plausible 
driver for the observed default patterns in this market. Furthermore, investors are 
more responsive to market conditions in their default behavior. Given such, we 
conjecture that condo loans potentially default earlier than single family loans, 
and their earlier defaults potentially spill over by prompting more subsequent 
defaults in the single-family sector of the same geographic area.  
This study examines this hypothesis in two steps. First, whether the within 
one year default likelihood among condo loans exhibit the same trend over time is 
studied. Second, whether early condo defaults predict subsequent defaults among 
single family loans with the same origination cohort located in the same local area 
is examined. This analysis focuses on the potential spillover effects to the 
subprime sector of the single family loan market. Since the implication of condo 
loan defaults on the single family subprime market is studied, this research uses 





3.6.1 Within-one-year default analysis 
This analysis explicitly studies the within-one-year default decision, defined 
to be one if the loan is at least 60 days delinquent within the first year of loan 
origination. The one-year default probability of condo loans is compared with that 
of subprime loans in the single-family market (Table 3.7, Panel A). Similar as the 
finding in Table 3.3, condo loans’ within-one-year default rate grows faster; in 
particular, condo loans’ within-one-year default rate is greater than that in the 
single family subprime market for the later origination vintages. Condo loans 
originated in 2007 are 8.8% more likely to default within the first year of 
origination than single-family subprime loans of the same cohort. Next, the one-
year default rate of condo and single family loans within the subprime sector are 
compared (Table 3.7, Panel B). Similar evidences are found. Particularly, within 
the subprime market, condo loans originated in 2007 are 87% more likely to 
default within one year of origination than single-family loans originated in 2007 
(Column 2). Overall, the evidence in Table 3.7 is consistent with the argument 
that condo borrowers are more responsive to the market condition and experience 
more early defaults when the housing market condition deteriorates (i.e., in the 






Table 3.7 Within-One-Year Default Analysis 
Panel A: Logistic analysis of all condo loans and single-family subprime loans 
 
(1) 
D_default within 1yr 
(2) 
D_default within 1yr 
   
D_Condo 0.819*** 0.595*** 
 (-3.39) (-2.84) 
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2004  0.779 
  (-1.21) 
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2005  0.876 
  (-0.75) 
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2006  1.779*** 
  (3.24) 
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2007  1.829*** 
  (3.10) 
  
Fixed effects City, current year and origination year 
Observations 626,419 626,419 
Pseudo R-squared 0.445 0.447 
Panel B: Logistic analysis of all condo subprime loans and single-family subprime loans 
 
(1) 
D_default within 1yr 
(2) 
D_default within 1yr 
   
D_Condo 1.045 0.874 
 (0.66) (-0.47) 
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2004  0.862 
  (-0.40) 
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2005  0.938 
  (-0.20) 
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2006  1.388 
  (1.05) 
D_Condo * D_OrigYear2007  2.140** 
  (2.10) 
  
Fixed effects City, current year and origination year 
Observations 343,628 343,628 
Pseudo R-squared 0.451 0.452 
Note: 
This table presents the results of the within-one-year default logistic regression analysis. The sample 
includes all condo loans and subprime loans originated during the period 2003–2007 in the BBX 
sample. Panel A presents the logistic regression results of all condo loans and single-family subprime 
loans, and Panel B presents results of condo subprime loans and single-family subprime loans. The 
dependent variable D_default within 1 yr takes a value of one for defaulting within one year of the loan 
origination date. We include the entire list of control variables; refer to Table 3.2 for the full regression 
list and Table 3.1 for the definitions of the variables. Standard errors are clustered at city level. City 
fixed effects, current year fixed effects and origination year fixed effects are included in the regression 
but not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. Odds ratios are reported and t-statistics 






3.6.2 Do (early) condo defaults predict the single family subprime 
market’s subsequent default rate? 
Next, we investigate the effect of condo loan defaults on the same-cohort 
single-family subprime loan market within the same zip code. Specifically, we 
study whether the one-year defaults of condo loans positively predicts second-
year defaults of the same-cohort single family subprime loans in the same zip 
code.  
From the BBX loan-level sample of all the condo and single-family subprime 
loans, the dependent variable             2                (%) ,   is computed 
as the proportion of single-family subprime loans in the zip code j originated in 
year t that defaulted during the second year after origination. The main 
independent variable is          ℎ   1              (%) ,  , the proportion of 
condo loans in zip code j originated in year t that defaulted in the first year after 
origination.  
To control for the within-subprime-market dynamics, 
               ℎ   1              (%) ,  is included, the proportion of single 
family subprime loans in zip code j originated in year t that defaulted in the first 
year after origination, in the regression. Also, the MSA level HPI and the fraction 
of condo loans originated in the same year in the same zip code are controlled in 
the regression. Zip code fixed effects are included to allow any time-invariant 





control for any time-varying macroeconomic conditions at the state level. The 
standard error is clustered to allow correlation among zip codes within the same 
state in a given year. 
In Column (1) of Table 3.8, we report the full sample result of regressing the 
proportion of the second-year defaults of single-family subprime loans originated 
in year t in zip code j on the proportion of first-year defaults of the same-cohort 
condo loans in the same zip code. Within the same cohort, a higher level of 
within-one-year defaults in the condo loan market positively predicts subsequent 
defaults of the single-family subprime loans in the second year after origination. 
(Unreported) granger causality tests verify the temporal lead-lag relationship: 
condo defaults precede the subprime mortgage defaults in the single family 
market. Intuitively, more of the condo loan borrowers are investors who are more 
likely to default strategically and at lower levels of negative equity. In addition, 
they may be less attached to the neighborhood (e.g., school district) and therefore 
more inclined to walk away earlier. This provides new insight on the triggering 
event of the housing crisis.  
To increase the power of the test and to better identify the channel of the 
lead-lag effect, further analysis is performed. Specifically, the exogenous 
variation in state foreclosure laws is used to better identify the spillover effect of 
condo market defaults. Due to a faster foreclosure process, loan defaults in the 
non-judicial states lead to more foreclosures through which they have a greater 





loan defaults likely have a greater impact on the subsequent single family 
subprime loan defaults in the non-judicial states. The subsample analysis based on 
judicial and non-judicial states subsamples are reported in Columns (2) and (3) of 
Table 3.8. The within-one-year defaults in the condo market only positively and 
significantly predict second-year defaults among single-family subprime loans of 
the same origination cohort in the same zip code in the non-judicial foreclosure 
states. In judicial foreclosure states, the coefficient is insignificant.  
Table 3.8 Do Early Condo Defaults Predict Subsequent Single Family Subprime 
Defaults? 
 (1) (2) (3) 
                       
        (%)  , 
 
                      
        (%)  , 
 









    
                                  (%) ,   0.038** 0.026 0.044** 
 (2.24) (0.97) (2.03) 
                             (%) ,   0.019 -0.024 0.033* 
 (1.23) (-1.38) (1.80) 
%             ,   -0.023*** -0.016** -0.028*** 
 (-3.93) (-2.19) (-3.38) 
Constant 0.041*** 0.027*** 0.032*** 
 (17.92) (10.37) (10.07) 
    
Fixed effects Zip code and state-origination year 
Cluster state-origination year 
Observations 33,564 13,978 19,586 
R-squared 0.406 0.344 0.421 
Note: 
This table reports the zip code level analysis of the single-family subprime market defaults from loans 
by their origination cohort years (2003–2007). From the loan-level sample with all the condo and 
single-family subprime loans, we compute              2                (%) ,  as the proportion 
of single-family subprime loans in the zip code j originated in year t that default during the second year 
after origination.                ℎ   1              (%) ,  
(         ℎ   1              (%) , ) is defined as the proportion of single-family subprime loans 
(condo loans) in zip code j originated in year t that default in the first year after 
origination. %             ,  is the number of condo loans divided by the total number of single-
family subprime and condo loans originated in year t in zip code j. We also include zip code and state-
origination year fixed effects in all specifications and cluster the standard errors at state-origination 






Next whether condo loan defaults predict subsequent house prices in the 
single family market is directly studied. If the economic intuition on the channel 
of the spillover effect is correct, one should observe a negative relationship 
between current loan defaults in the condo market and subsequent house price 
growth in the single family market within the same zip code. Using data from 
Zillow, we compute the (log) annual change in the zip code-level average 
transaction price in the single family market in year t+1 to be our dependent 
variable. The key explanatory variable is the fraction of (two-year) loan defaults 
by condo borrowers in the same zip code in year t. This study includes, as our 
control variables, the condo loan share, single family house price level in year t at 
the same zip code, as well as zip code and state-year fixed effects. The standard 
errors are clustered at the state-year level to allow correlation among zip codes in 
the same state at a given year. Results provide consistent evidence (Table 2.9). A 
higher level of the current year’s condo default rate is associated with a significant 
drop in the next year’s single family house price growth in the same zip code. 
Furthermore, the negative association is stronger in the non-judicial states 
(coefficient = -0.083) than in the judicial states (coefficient = -0.053). Though the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected that the two coefficients are statistically the 
same, it is observed that the difference is economically large: the predictability of 
condo defaults on single family house price growth is 50% larger in the non-






Table 3.9 Do Condo Defaults Predict Single Family House Price Growth? 
 (1) (2) (3) 







    
              (%) ,   -0.075*** -0.053* -0.083** 
 (-2.81) (-1.79) (-2.33) 
                    (%)  -0.093*** -0.028 -0.128*** 
 (-3.41) (-1.39) (-3.47) 
         ,   -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-6.52) (-7.97) (-4.01) 
%             ,   -0.001 -0.017 0.015 
 (-0.11) (-1.47) (0.94) 
Constant 0.281*** 0.270*** 0.216*** 
 (9.90) (10.37) (5.40) 
  
Fixed effects Zip code and state-origination year 
Cluster state-origination year 
    
Observations 35,513 15,237 20,162 
R-squared 0.814 0.831 0.803 
Note: 
This table reports the zip code level analysis of the predictability of condo loan defaults on subsequent 
house price growth in the single family market. The original loan sample includes all condo and single 
family subprime loans with origination years between 2003 and 2007 in the BBX sample. We obtain 
the final sample in this analysis by aggregating to the zip code level and merging with zipcode-level 
price information from Zillow.               ℎ (%) ,     is calculated as the (log) change in the 
Zillow zip code-level average transaction price in the single family market in year 
t+1.               (%) ,  (                    (%) , ) is defined as the fraction of (within-two-
year) loan defaults by condo (single family) borrowers in the same zip code in year t.          ,   refers 
to Zillow single family house price level in year t at the same zip code.  %             ,   is the 
number of condo loans divided by the total number of single-family subprime and condo loans 
originated in year t in zip code j. We also include zip code and state-origination year fixed effects in all 
specifications and cluster the standard errors at state-origination year level. T-statistics are included in 
parentheses, and ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
The observed difference in the predictive power of earlier condo defaults 
between the judicial and non-judicial foreclosure states may be associated with 
other unobservable factors that lead to higher default rates for both the condo and 
single family subprime loans. For example, in the non-judicial states that have 
stronger creditor rights, lenders may screen less as a result of which the average 
borrower is riskier. A cleaner identification to isolate the house price externality 





only differ on their foreclosure laws. Unfortunately, in the data sample, there are 
very few condo loan originations at the state borders in general, making the 
analysis infeasible.35 This is perhaps unsurprising given that condominiums are 
typically located in more urban areas. Nevertheless, I argue that the selection 
issue is unlikely driving our results for the following two reasons. First, in the 
data (BBX and Freddie Mac), the share of condo loans is similar among judicial 
and non-judicial states (17.09% vs. 13.36%), whereas the selection argument 
would imply a higher concentration of (risky) condo loans in the non-judicial 
states. Second, we compare the default pattern, for all loans, between the judicial 
and non-judicial states in a regression analysis and there is no evidence of 
systematic differences. These pieces of evidence, albeit suggestive, are indeed 
consistent with Mian, et al. (2012): there are no systematic differences between 
non-judicial and judicial states (including at the state borders) in default rates, 
house price growth, leverage, fraction subprime, income, unemployment rate, 
racial mix, poverty, or education.  
Overall, the results in Tables 3.7-3.9 are consistent with the hypothesis that 
condo loan defaults have aggregate implications beyond the condo loan market 
itself. Condo borrowers are more responsive to housing market conditions, 
leading to a faster growth in their within-one-year default likelihoods, compared 
to the single family subprime loans. The early condo loan defaults predict a higher 
subsequent default rate of the same-cohort single-family subprime loans in the 
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same zip code, primarily in non-judicial states with an efficient foreclosure 
process. 36  This suggests that the predictability largely works through the 
mechanism of house price externality. Indeed it is shown that condo loan defaults 
strongly predict future single family house prices in the same zip code, especially 
in the non-judicial states. 
3.7 Summary  
In this chapter an overlooked yet potentially important segment of the 
mortgage market—the condominium loan market—is identified, in understanding 
the recent financial crisis. The number of condominium loan origination has 
increased by 15-fold between 2001 and 2007. During this time period, condo 
loans accounted for 15% of all U.S. residential loan originations, rising from 9% 
in 2001 to 16% in 2007. Moreover, condo loan defaults grows at a faster rate than 
single family loan defaults, even after controlling for observed loan and borrower 
characteristics. For loans originated in year 2006, condo loans are 6.4% more 
likely to default than single family loans of the same cohort, and 12% more likely 
to default than subprime mortgages – presumably the riskier loans—in the single 
family market. 
Despite the fact that condo asset and loan market differs considerably from 
the single family market, it is shown that the observed default pattern among 
condo loans is not explained away by observed and unobserved heterogeneity 
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associated with condo loans (such as location, asset characteristics, or loan 
contract term or contract type differences). It is further observed that the results 
remain robust after we control for (time-varying) lender fixed effects, which 
suggest riskier condo borrowers as the main explanation for the faster default 
growth among condo loans. 
Condo borrowers are unlikely the low credit quality borrowers who default 
because they cannot pay or refinance their mortgages as house prices start to 
decline; in our sample, condo borrowers have better creditworthiness than single 
family borrowers. The investor channel is hypothesized to play a more important 
role in our context: the price run-up in the earlier years of the decade attract more 
investors who are also more likely to make a pure economic decision of deciding 
to default soon after a significant price drop (Haughwout, et al., 2011). Given that 
real estate investors are more present in the condominium market, the observed 
default pattern in the condo loan market thus may be associated with the investor 
behavior. Consistent with the hypothesis, investment-purchase condo loans are 
found to be much more likely to default compared to other condo loans, and the 
effect is strengthened when the option to default is more in the money. 
Lastly, the results reveal the effect of condo loan defaults on the subsequent 
subprime loan defaults in the single family market. Specifically, early condo 
defaults within the same zip code positively predict subsequent defaults by 
subprime mortgages of the same origination cohort in the single family market. In 





family house price growth in the same zip code. This result provides new insight 
of the triggering event of the housing crisis. Using exogenous variation in state 
foreclosure laws, it is confirmed that the predictive effects of condo loan defaults 
concentrate in judicial foreclosure states, consistent with the explanation that 
earlier condo loan foreclosures prompted more defaults among subprime 
mortgages within the same location by exerting downward price pressure on the 
neighborhood house prices.  
Results in this chapter imply that condo loan market is an important channel 
to understand the cause and transmission mechanism of the recent financial crisis 
especially from the perspective of borrowers and investors’ behavior. The 
findings that condo borrowers, especially investors, are riskier also suggest that 
lenders need to exercise more scrutiny in their lending practice in the 
condominium mortgage market. From a public policy point of view, it is found 
that simply requiring more skin-in-the-game regulations for lenders and lower 
LTV for the borrowers under the Dodd-Frank law is only a partial solution from 
avoiding a similar crisis in the future. The evidence provides the first step in 
studying the cause and aggregate implications of the condo loan defaults. Future 
research is required to understand the role of borrowers, especially investors in 





Chapter 4 Foreclosure Concentration and the Exercise of 
Mortgage Default Options 
4.1 Introduction 
In recent years, the United States has experienced a nation-wide crisis in the 
mortgage market with unprecedented number of defaults and foreclosures. 
However, mortgage defaults and foreclosures were not evenly distributed across 
space. Miami, Las Vegas, Phoenix, Detroit and Los Angeles are the hard-hit 
metropolitan (metro) areas with intensive foreclosures. Other metros such as 
Seattle, Houston and Atlanta have much lower foreclosure rates. Also within cities, 
foreclosures are more concentrated in some neighborhoods than in others. For 
example, in Los Angeles, the foreclosure rate in zip code 90056 (Ladera Heights 
in South Los Angeles) is about forty times more than that in zip code 90403 
(Santa Monica in West Los Angeles) in April 201437. Questions arise as what 
socio-economic consequences those concentrated foreclosures bring to urban 
neighborhoods.  
Existing research has found foreclosures generate externalities to urban 
neighborhoods. For example, they lower the values of nearby properties, increase 
neighborhood violent crimes and cause high property turnovers (see, e.g., Harding 
                                                           
37 According to RealtyTrac, May 2014, Los Angeles County Real Estate Trends & Market Info. 
http://www.realtytrac.com/statsandtrends/foreclosuretrends/ca/los-angeles-county, foreclosure rate 






et al., 2009; Immergluck and Smith, 2006a; Gerardi and Willen, 2009). In this 
study, a novel approach is taken to try to answer a new question, which is how 
concentrated foreclosures affect the default decision of mortgage borrowers in the 
surrounding area. The question addressed can be intuitively understood as how 
seeing foreclosure signs in one’s neighborhood affects someone’s likelihood of 
and attitude towards exercising her mortgage default option to enter into default.   
On the one hand, intense foreclosures in a neighborhood bring about a signal 
to nearby borrowers that should they choose to default, similar to borrower’s 
strategic default decision (Riddiough and Wyatt, 1994 and Guiso et al., 2013). On 
the other hand, foreclosure contagion can induce more defaults, either due to 
observational learning from seeing foreclosures in one’s neighborhood (Agarwal 
et al., 2011), or due to the change of view that default is immoral or the ease of the 
stigma effect of default, or due to behavioral responses such as herding (Seiler, et 
al., 2012). 
 Therefore, the ultimate impact of neighborhood foreclosure concentration on 
borrowers’ default decision is an empirical question, which is investigated in this 
study. With a massive dataset of individual mortgage loans from BlackBox Logic 
(BBX), the performance of individual loans can be tracked, to measure 
foreclosure intensity in each urban neighborhood, and further to estimate a model 
of mortgage borrowers’ delinquency decision that incorporates neighborhood 
foreclosure concentration effect. Comparing to existing studies, this work takes a 





concentration on individual borrower’s delinquency probability but also estimate 
the impact of foreclosure concentration on the borrower’s sensitivity to negative 
equity. The latter estimate measures to a certain extent the changing attitude of 
borrowers towards default option exercise. 
In the main analysis, this research focuses on the Los Angeles-Long Beach-
Santa Anna metropolitan statistical area (the Los Angeles MSA). The sample 
includes over 12,000 fixed-rate subprime mortgage loans that were originated 
between 1998 and 2008 and tracked through the first quarter of 2014. The results 
show that on average neighborhood foreclosure concentration enhances borrowers’ 
default option exercise during the study period – borrowers are more willing to 
enter into default when there are intense foreclosures in the neighborhood. 
However, interestingly, the impact of foreclosure concentration varies in different 
regimes: before 2007, higher neighborhood foreclosure intensity is associated 
with reduced borrower sensitivity; entering into the crisis period (2007-2011), the 
impact turns from negative to positive; and post 2012, the impact becomes 
insignificant. Such variations are considered to reflect the balancing of the 
information effect and the contagion effect I discussed above. For example, during 
the crisis period, the foreclosure contagion effect might have been the dominant 
force and outweighed the information effect, so a positive net impact is observed.  
The net impact of neighborhood foreclosure concentration on borrowers’ 
sensitivity to negative equity also varies across different borrower groups. For 





among non-Asian borrowers, but smaller among female borrowers than among 
male borrowers. There is a U-shape in the relation between neighborhood average 
FICO score and the impact of foreclosure concentration on borrowers’ sensitivity 
to negative equity. Both very high and very low FICO neighborhoods see 
increased borrower sensitivity. Finally, lower income neighborhoods see stronger 
relation between foreclosure concentration and borrower sensitivity. These 
heterogeneities are also consistent with the notion that the balancing of the 
information effect and the contagion effect is likely to differ across different 
borrower groups.  
The aforementioned results can be generalized to the whole state of 
California. And these results are robust to alternative house price index (HPI) and 
different measures of neighborhood foreclosure concentration. 
Understanding how mortgage borrowers make their default decisions is 
critical to mortgage default risk management, pricing and underwriting. 
Traditional studies of borrower decision focus on mortgage borrowers’ own socio-
economic status such as the borrower’s FICO score, income constraint, and equity 
position. Recently, some researchers have tried to place borrowers into social 
networks to understand their default decisions (see, e.g., Gangel et al., 2013; 
Guiso et al., 2013; Seiler et al., 2013). This study follows this line of thoughts. 
But different from existing studies that rely on simulated data or survey data, this 
study uses actual default data. The findings indicate that peer behavior has great 





incorporate such network effects. 
From a policy perspective, understanding the impact of foreclosure 
concentration on borrower’s delinquency decision is also important. Delinquency 
is the first step of loan default, and foreclosure is usually the last step. Typically, 
large numbers of foreclosures follow the wave of delinquencies. Interestingly, 
what this research finds is that concentrated foreclosures can feedback onto 
borrower delinquency. Therefore, during the crisis, mortgage default can be self-
enforcing in certain neighborhoods – increased delinquencies lead to more 
foreclosures, and concentrated foreclosures further lead to even more 
delinquencies. From this perspective, timely intervention by the government to 
reduce foreclosure is important to break the loop and to stop the foreclosure 
cascade. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, the data and 
some results regarding neighborhood foreclosure concentration are presented in 
Section 4.2. The hypothesis development and model are discussed in Section 4.3, 
and empirical results regarding the impact of foreclosure concentration on 
borrower delinquency are shown in Section 3.4. Concluding remarks are in the 





4.2 Data and Measures of Foreclosure Concentration 
4.2.1 Data Sources 
The first and main data in this study comes from the loan-level data furnished 
by BlackBox Logic (hereafter BBX). The BBX aggregates data from mortgage 
servicing companies. The most recent BBX data contains roughly 22 million non-
agency (including jumbo, Alt-A, and subprime) mortgage loans throughout the 
United States, making it a comprehensive source for mortgage default studies38.  
BBX provides detailed information on the borrower and the loan at loan 
origination, including the borrower’s FICO score, original loan balance, interest 
rate, loan term (30 year, 15 year, etc.), loan type (fixed-rate, 5-1 ARM, etc.), loan 
purpose (home purchase, rate/term refinance, cash out refinance), occupancy 
status, prepayment penalty indicator and other characteristics. BBX also tracks the 
performance (default, prepayment, mature, or current) of each loan in every 
month.  
Another key data source is the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 
implemented by the Federal Reserve Board, which requires that lending 
institutions report virtually all mortgage application and origination data. HMDA 
is considered the most comprehensive source of mortgage data, covering about 80 
percent of all home loans nationwide and an even higher share of loans originated 
in metropolitan statistical areas (Avery et al., 2007). In particular, it provides a 
nearly complete universe of 122 million U.S. mortgage applications over the 
                                                           





period 2001–2010. The key reason for using HMDA is that it covers borrower 
characteristics such as applicant’s race, sex, and annual income that are not 
contained in the BBX data. HMDA also provides abundant information on the 
loan characteristics at the stage of loan application, including loan amount (in 
thousands), loan purpose (home purchase or reﬁnancing or home improvement), 
borrower-reported occupancy status (owner-occupied or investment), (in the case 
of originated loans) whether the loan was sold to the secondary market within the 
year of origination, and other characteristics. Property-related variables available 
in HMDA are geographic location (census tract level identification) and property 
type (one-to-four-family or manufactured housing or multifamily).  
Given the existence of common variables in the BBX data and the HMDA 
data, BBX loan-level data are matched with selected HMDA loan data using step-
by-step criteria.3940 First, BBX loans are matched to HMDA loans with the same 
loan purpose and occupancy status of the borrowers. Second, based on the 
origination dates of BBX loans, HMDA loans within the same year of origination 
are considered. In addition, BBX loans are only matched to HMDA loans with the 
same zip code. Last, loans from BBX should have the same original loan amount 
as those from HMDA. For all possible HMDA matches for each BBX loan (with 
the same BBX identifier but different HMDA identifiers), only the first record for 
the same BBX identifier is kept. Any BBX loan that has no corresponding HMDA 
                                                           
39 There is no unique common identifier of a loan from these two databases. 
40 In order to match with BBX data, only loan applications marked as originated in HMDA data 
are considered. Those loans originated by FNMA, GNMA, FHLMC and FAMC are removed. 
Those with loan type of FSA (Farm Service Agency) or RHS (Rural Housing Service) are 





loans matched using the above criteria is a non‐match and is excluded from our 
sample41.  
Furthermore, the loan-level data is merged with macro variables such as the 
MSA-level unemployment rate from Bureau of Labor Statistics, the CoreLogic 
Case-Shiller zip code-level Home Price Index, and the S&P Case-Shiller MSA-
level Home Price Index. Treasury bond rate and interest rate swap rate from the 
Federal Reserve and mortgage interest rate from Freddie Mac are also matched 
into the data. 
For the main tests, this research focuses on first-lien, fixed-rate subprime 
mortgage loans for the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Anna metropolitan 
statistical area (the Los Angeles MSA). 42  The advantage of focusing on one 
particular MSA rather than pooling MSAs is that this analysis can be insulated 
from the cross-MSA disparities in borrower behavior that is due to legal and 
institutional differences, and thus gain cleaner inference from our model. Later 
our analysis is generalized to the whole state of California. This study focuses on 
the subprime mortgage loan sample that contains enough number of 
delinquencies, which enable us to estimate a sensible delinquency model. 
                                                           
41 The success rate of our match is about 70 percent. 
42 A series of filters is also applied: we first exclude loans originated before 1998 for accuracy 
consideration; we also exclude those loans with interest only periods or those not in metropolitan 
areas (MSAs); loan occupancy status indicated as second home or vacancy home, loans with 
missing or wrong information on loan origination date, original loan balance, property type, 
refinance indicator, occupancy status, FICO score, loan-to-value ratio (LTV), documentation level 





4.2.2 Measures of Foreclosure Concentration 
A number of neighborhood foreclosure concentrations are created measures 
at the zip-code level. The main measure is the foreclosure intensity calculated as 
the total number of foreclosures in the past two quarters (e.g. for 2009Q1 it is 
2008Q4 and 2008Q3) divided by the total number of housing units (in thousands) 
in each zip code.  A foreclosure intensity rank order of all zip codes in the Los 
Angeles MSA in each quarter is further created and then a dummy variable “High 
foreclosure intensity” is defined as the zip-quarter that ranks in the 90th percentile 
of all zip-quarters. 
Alternative foreclosure intensity is also calculated as the total number of 
foreclosures in the recent four quarters (current quarter plus the past three quarters) 
divided by the total number of housing units in each zip code (in thousands). 
Accordingly, a “High foreclosure intensity” dummy variable is created based on 
rank order. Finally, instead of using the total housing units as the denominator to 
calculate foreclosure intensity, the total population in each zip code is used to 
calculate per capita foreclosure intensity measures. 
Figure 4.1 shows some maps of foreclosure intensity. The first map shows 
the aggregate foreclosure intensity from all years. It is observed that there is great 
variation in foreclosure concentration across neighborhoods. Generally, zip codes 
in the inland cities have greater foreclosure intensity than those along the coast; 
zip codes in northern cities experience greater foreclosure intensity than those in 





Valley, Antelope Valley and San Fernando Valley experienced the highest 
foreclosure intensity: for every one thousand housing units in these zip codes, 50-
135 loans during the period of 1998-2008 turned into foreclosures. San Gabriel 
Valley and Gateway Cities also suffered great waves of foreclosure during this 
period, ranging from 10 to 50 foreclosures per thousand housing units per zip 
code. Westside Cities, located in the west of this area, are shown to have the least 
foreclosure concentrations, with less than 10 foreclosures for every thousand 
housing units at the zip code level.   
 
Figure 4.1 Foreclosure Concentration for LA MSA: for all years 
Note: 
Foreclosure concentration is calculated as the total number of foreclosures in the past two quarters (e.g. 
for 2009Q1 it is 2008Q4 and 2008Q3) divided by the total number of housing units (in thousands) in 






Figure 4.2 Foreclosure Concentration for LA MSA: for Year 2003, 2006, 2009 
and 2012 
Note: 
Foreclosure concentration is calculated as the total number of foreclosures in the past two quarters (e.g. 
for 2009Q1 it is 2008Q4 and 2008Q3) divided by the total number of housing units (in thousands) in 
each zip code. 
The foreclosure intensity maps are further created for each individual year 





foreclosure intensities vary significantly across the four years. 2003 and 2006 
overall have small average foreclosure intensities (0.11 and 0.75 foreclosures per 
thousand housing units, respectively), in contrast to 3.05 and 1.81 foreclosures per 
thousand housing units in 2009 and 2012. Specifically, in 2003, more than half of 
the metropolitan area has foreclosure intensity of less than 1 per thousand, while 
in 2006, zipcodes in northern and southern cities experienced high foreclosure 
intensities, reaching 5 to 8 per thousand. In 2009, we observe even greater 
increases in the foreclosure concentration in the north, south and central area, with 
the greatest concentration in the northern part (25-50 per thousand). The 
foreclosure intensity in 2012, although still at a pretty high level compared with 
that in 2003 and 2006, starts to decrease, with the highest intensity of 20 per 
thousand housing units at the zip code level. The possible explanation for these 
phenomena is that the strong house price appreciation during 2003-2005 helped 
most of the loans in 2003 and 2006 out of foreclosure troubles, while the sharp 
and far-reaching house price decline starting from 2006 led to the much higher 
foreclosure concentration later in 2009 and 2012. The gradually recovering 
housing market in 2012 helped to reduce foreclosures. Among all cities in this 
area, Antelope Valley from the northern part experienced the most serious 
foreclosure problems through the four years, while San Gabriel Valley, the city 
located in the east of this area, remains at very low foreclosure intensity across the 





4.2.3 Descriptive statistics 
Before digging into the main analyses, a preliminary look at the sample is 
taken here. Table 4.1 reports the number of originated loans in our sample by 
vintage, and Table 4.2 presents the numbers of loans at loan termination by the 
choice of default, prepay or current (censor).43 As shown in Table 4.1, the number 
of loans originated rise slowly from 1998 (105 loans) to 2002 (512 loans), while 
starting from 2003 through 2006, there is a sharp jump in the observation 
numbers, with the highest number in 2005 (3,719 loans, 26% of the total sample) 
and lowest in 2003 (1,848 loans, 15% of the total sample). Since 2007, the loan 
number has declined quickly, with only about 61 percent less than that in 2006. 
The origination year distribution of our sample reflects the development of the 
subprime mortgage market. By looking at the loan numbers by termination status 
in Table 4.2, it is shown that among 12,007 loans in the sample, around 39% of 
loans have been defaulted, around 42% have been prepaid, and only 19% remain 
current by the time of January 2014. 
  
                                                           
43 The terminations status of a loan is classified into default, prepay, and censor, whichever is the 
earliest at the end of January 2014. Default is defined as over 60- day delinquency. Prepay refers 
to early repayment of a loan, often as a result of refinancing to take advantage of lower interest 





Table 4.1 Number of Loans in Our Sample by Vintage 





1998 105 0.87 105 0.87 
1999 123 1.02 228 1.9 
2000 184 1.53 412 3.43 
2001 245 2.04 657 5.47 
2002 512 4.26 1169 9.74 
2003 1848 15.39 3017 25.13 
2004 2625 21.86 5642 46.99 
2005 3179 26.48 8821 73.47 
2006 2290 19.07 11111 92.54 
2007 895 7.45 12006 99.99 
2008 1 0.01 12007 100 
Note: 
This table shows the frequency distribution of loan originations in our sample. We include first-lien, fixed-rate 
subprime mortgage loans for the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Anna metropolitan statistical area (the Los 
Angeles MSA), and exclude those loans with interest only periods or those with missing or wrong information. All 
the loans are originated during the period 1998—2008. 
 
Table 4.2 Performance of Loans in Our Sample 





Current 2245 18.7 2245 18.7 
Prepay 5118 42.63 7363 61.32 
Default 4644 38.68 12007 100 
Note: 
This table presents the frequency distribution of loan termination status in our sample, by the choice of 
default, prepay or current (censor), whichever is the earliest at the end of January 2014. Default is 
defined as over 60- day delinquency. Prepay refers to early repayment of a loan, often as a result of 
refinancing to take advantage of lower interest rates. Current (censor) means that the loan is alive at the 
data collection point—January 2014. 
Table 4.3.1 reports the frequencies of some loan and borrower characteristics 
of our subprime FRM sample. Although approximately 52% of loans have full 
documentation of income, asset or employment, there are 26% of loans with low 
or even no documentation. Among the 12,007 loans in our sample, 10,394 loans 





which are usually thought to be less risky than 30-year FRMs. 97% of loans are 
classified as owner-occupied, compared with investment purpose (3%). Regarding 
property type, single family group ranks first (around 89% of the total loans), 
followed by condominium group. In terms of loan purpose, cash-out refinance and 
rate/term refinance account for about 94% of the total loans, while purchase loans 
only account for 6%. Consistent with the usual characteristics of subprime loans, 
about 87% of loans in the sample have prepayment penalty clause in the mortgage 
contracts, which might limit the subprime borrower’s ability to refinance into 
more affordable loans and thus increase the chance of default. In terms of 
borrower characteristics, White and African American borrowers take up 49% and 
12% of the total sample, while Asian borrowers are only 6%. More than 60% of 
the borrowers are male borrowers. 
Table 4.3.2 shows the descriptive statistics of important loan and borrower 
characteristics. Because of high housing costs in Los Angeles MSA, our loans had 
an average original loan balance of $263,130. The average FICO score is 582, and 
the current interest rate reaches 7.22 on average. Borrower’s debt-to-income ratio 
is around 28 percent on average. The average original LTV and combined LTV 







Table 4.3 Summary Statistics of Loan and Borrower Characteristics 








Full doc 6245 52.01 6245 52.01 
Low doc 3028 25.22 9273 77.23 
No doc 147 1.22 9420 78.45 
Reduced doc 143 1.19 9563 79.65 
Unknown doc 2444 20.35 12007 100 
LTV greater than 80 percent 
Yes 10394 86.57 10394 86.57 
No 1613 13.43 12007 100 
Race 
White 5831 48.56 9147 48.56 
Asian 684 5.7 930 54.26 
Black 1430 11.91 2360 66.17 
Other 4062 33.83 12007 100 
Gender 
Male 7315 60.92 7315 60.92 




603 5.02 12007 100 
Loan type 
30-year FRM 11358 94.59 11358 94.59 
15-year FRM 649 5.41 12007 100 
Property type 
Single family 10631 88.54 10631 88.54 
PUD 341 2.84 10972 91.38 
Condo 1035 8.62 12007 100 
Loan purpose 
Home purchase 725 6.04 725 6.04 
Rate/term refinance 2142 17.84 2867 23.88 
Cash-out refinance 9140 76.12 12007 100 
Occupancy status 
Owner-occupied 11611 96.7 11611 96.7 
Investment property 396 3.3 12007 100 
Prepayment penalty type 
No 116 0.97 116 0.97 
Yes 10396 86.58 10512 87.55 
Unknown 1495 12.45 12007 100 
Loan with a second lien 
No 10043 83.64 10043 83.64 








Table 4.3.2 Means, Standard and Deviations of Loan and Borrower Characteristics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Original loan amount  263,130  131,013 22,000 2,500,000 
FICO SCORE  582  34 417 804 
Current interest rate (%) 7.22 1.11 1.64 13.83 
LTV (%) 65 17.17 6 139 
Combined LTV (%) 65 18 6 125 
Payment-to-income ratio 0.28 0.16 0.01 11.37 
Total number of loans 12,007 
Note: 
Table 4.3 reports the summary statistics of loan and borrower characteristics in our sample. Table 4.3.1 
presents the frequency distribution of some important loan and borrower characteristics, while Table 
4.3.2 shows the mean, standard deviations, minimum and maximum of some numerical variables. 
Documentation type is an indicator whether a particular loan has full, low, do or reduced 
documentation of income, asset or employment. LTV greater than 80 percent is equal to Yes if the 
original loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is greater than 80 percent. Race refers to the racial group that the 
borrower belongs to, and Gender indicates whether the borrower is a male or female. Loan type means 
whether the durations of the FRM loan is 30 years or 15 years. Property type refers to the classification 
of the property securing the mortgage: i.e. Single family, PUD (planned urban development) and 
Condo (condominium).  Loan purpose indicates the primary reason the mortgage was taken out by the 
borrower. Occupancy status means the use of the home such as investment, owner-occupied (primary 
residence), etc. Prepayment penalty type is an indicator denoting that a fee will be charged to the 
borrower if they elect to make unscheduled principal payments. Loan with a second lien is Yes if a 
second mortgage is taken out on the same property. Original loan amount is defined as the amount of 
principal on the closing date of the mortgage. FICO SCORE refers to the FICO (formerly the Fair Isaac 
Corporation) borrower credit score at the time of the loan closing. Current interest rate refers to the 
coupon rate charged to the borrower for the most recent remittance period. LTV (%) refers to the ratio 
of the original loan amount to the property value at loan origination, while Combined LTV (%) means 
the ratio of all loan amounts on the property at the time of origination to the property value at loan 
origination. Payment-to-income ratio refers to the percentage of monthly mortgage payment to 
borrower’s monthly income.  
4.3 Hypotheses and Methodology 
4.3.1 Hypothesis Development 
The hypothesis development in this section starts with a brief explanation of 
the default process. Typically borrower’s failure to make monthly mortgage 
payment constitutes a default44, which can result in a sale of the collateral to fulfill 
the borrower’s debt obligation. However, default is not a one-stage process. It is 
                                                           
44 Technically, borrower’s failure to pay taxes or insurance premiums, failure to keep the property 





actually a multiple-stage lengthy process. The borrower first decides whether to 
miss a scheduled monthly payment. If a payment is missed and the loan becomes 
30-day delinquent, late fees will be charged. Subsequently when a mortgage loan 
is 60-day overdue, a notice of default (NOD) is usually sent to the borrower, and 
the servicing of the loan will be transferred from the general servicer to a special 
servicer, who will first seek a workout if appropriate. If a workout is unsuccessful, 
the lender (through special servicer) will start the foreclosure process, which 
typically occurs after the loan is over 90-day delinquency. The actual foreclosure 
sale (trustee sale in non-judicial foreclosure states like California) typically takes 
another several months to occur because foreclosure has to be publicized fully 
(e.g., notification sent to the borrower, notice published at the local newspaper, 
and signs to be put on the property). Finally, if a sale is successful, the lender 
receives sales proceeds net of all the fees and legal costs. An unsuccessful 
foreclosure/trustee sale leads to real estate owned (REO), in which the lender 
obtains the title of the property. Therefore, we can see that borrower delinquency 
is the beginning of the default process while foreclosure is in the subsequent stage 
of default, which can be many months away down the road.  
Many believe that mortgage borrowers are strategic in their delinquency 
decisions in a sense that they not only consider their ability to make the monthly 
payment, the current equity position (whether the house is worth more than the 
remaining loan balance) and house price trend (the possibility of a future recovery 
from the current negative equity position) but also consider what the lenders’ 





sale proceeds from a foreclosure sale usually fall short of the remaining balance 
plus all the transaction costs, lenders usually first seek to “workout” a delinquent 
loan. A loan workout can take the form of a reduced interest rate/payment, 
reduction in loan principal, and extension of the mortgage term, which are 
typically in the borrower’s favor. Foreclosure is typically the worst outcome not 
only to the lender but also to the borrower, because it causes the borrower to lose 
her home and incur significant credit impairment. Therefore, from a game-
theoretic perspective, borrower’s delinquency decision depends upon her own 
strategic perspective on the consequential gains or losses from acceptance, 
rejection, or a counter-offer from the lender and the likelihood of each response. 
Riddiough and Wyatt (1994) argue that borrower’s delinquency decision depends 
on how tough the lender is. Guiso et al. (2013) also argue that borrower’s altitude 
towards strategic default depends on her assessment of the probability of getting 
sued by the lender (a foreclosure).45  
Following this line of thoughts, I would expect that the incidences of 
foreclosure, especially large number of foreclosures in one’s neighborhood can 
serve as a signal to the borrower that the chance of receiving a favorable loan 
modification or short sale is low while the chance of being foreclosed is high 
should she chooses to enter into default. Therefore, foreclosure concentration will 
discourage the borrower’s choice of delinquency. We define this effect as an 
information effect. 
                                                           
45 Strategic default is when the borrower is able to make the monthly payment but chooses not to 





On the other hand, recently there has been a growing literature on foreclosure 
contagion. Several studies have found that nearby foreclosed properties lower the 
price of neighboring properties (see, e.g., Immergluck and Smith, 2006b, Harding 
et al., 2008; Schuetz, et al., 2008; Campbell et al., 2009; Lin, et al., 2009). 
Although the exact mechanism of such foreclosure contagion is still debated in 
the literature, a compelling explanation is the observational learning suggested by 
Agarwal et al. (2012): homeowners update their beliefs about the value of their 
homes when they receive signals about house price trend. Foreclosures in one’s 
neighborhood send out a public signal of a declining property market. Based on 
such a signal, nearby homeowners will adjust their valuation downward, causing 
an observed negative impact of nearby foreclosure on property values. Such 
downward adjustment in valuation apparently increase the probability of default 
as borrowers default their mortgage loans mainly because the value of the 
property is lower than the mortgage loan balance. 46  Therefore, from this 
perspective, concentrated foreclosure in one’s neighborhood has a positive impact 
on someone’s default decision.  
The impact of concentrated foreclosures on borrower’s delinquency decision 
can also arise from herding. People do not always exercise independent judgment 
due to social influence (Shiller, 1995). Meanwhile, in situations where 
information is limited individuals can follow the herd in the hope of gaining the 
superior information of the group (Bikhchandani et al., 1998).  For these reasons, 
                                                           
46 Some researchers argue that insolvency (e.g., loss of income) also cause default. However, if 
there is positive equity, the borrower should be able to sell the property and payoff the loan to 





herd behavior can be a source of mispricing and speculative bubbles (Shiller, 
2008). In a recent study, Seiler et al. (2014) find that homeowners are easily 
persuaded to follow the herd to strategically default their mortgage loan. 
Extending this herding rational to mortgage borrower’s delinquency decision, I 
would expect someone who resides in a neighborhood with concentrated 
foreclosures is exposed to the influence of her neighbors and thus is more likely to 
exercise her default option when she sees many foreclosure signs in her 
neighborhood. 
During the recent mortgage market crisis, there have been heated debates 
regarding whether it is immoral to default one’s mortgage loan (see, e.g., White, 
2010; Guiso et al., 2010). Although many Americans think it is immoral to 
strategically default their mortgage loan, seeing many neighbors have done so 
might have changed some borrowers’ view. In addition, the thought that “I am not 
doing this alone” can ease the stigma effect of mortgage default and thus cause 
borrowers to be more willing to enter into default. 
In summary, this study hypothesizes that foreclosure concentration can have 
both positive and negative impacts on borrower’s delinquency decision. It is 
really an empirical question as to what the net impact is. Further, one may observe 
different net impacts in different times and across different borrower groups, 
depending on how those positive and negative impacts play out differently over 






In order to empirically assess the impact of foreclosure concentration on 
borrower’s delinquency decision, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard model of 
mortgage delinquency. The hazard model is widely used in the mortgage literature 
(see, e.g. Vandell, 1993; Quigley and Van Order, 1995; An, et al., 2012). It is 
convenient mainly because it allows us to work with the full sample of loans 
despite some observations being censored when the data is collected. This is an 
important feature for this study because a large portion of the mortgage loan 
observations is censored.  
Assume the hazard rate of default of a mortgage loan at period T since its 
origination follows the form 
                                         ℎ ( ,   , 
  ) = ℎ ( )exp (  , 
   ).                    (4.1)     
Here h (T) is the baseline hazard function, which only depends on the age 
(duration), T,  of the loan and is an arbitrary function that allows for a flexible 
default pattern over time47; Z , 
   is a vector of covariates for individual loan i that 
include all the identifiable risk factors. In this proportional hazard model, changes 
in covariates shift the hazard rate proportionally without otherwise affecting the 
duration pattern of default. Commonly used covariates include negative equity, 
FICO score, loan balance, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, payment to income ratio, 
and change in MSA-level unemployment rate.  
                                                           
47  Notice that the loan duration time T is different from the natural time t, which allows 





Neighborhood foreclosure concentration is the key variable that will be on 
the right hand side of the delinquency model. However, different from existing 
studies, we take a novel approach to not only include the measure of foreclosure 
concentration in this study as a covariate but also interact the foreclosure 
concentration measure with negative equity. In so doing, the coefficient of 
negative equity is allowed to depend on the measure of foreclosure concentration. 
The model estimated is thus 
ℎ ( ,   , 
  ) = ℎ ( )exp (  , 
   ) 
          , 
    =         ,  +             ,  +             ,  ∙       ,  +   , 
         
(4.2) 
where NegEq ,  is negative equity of loan i in zipcode j at time t, 
ForclRate , is the neighborhood foreclosure rate of zipcode j at time t, and X , 
   are 
other control variables such as FICO score, LTV ratio, etc. 
Existing studies have found negative equity to be a critical driver of 
mortgage borrowers’ default option exercise (see, e.g., Campbell and Dietrich, 
1983; Quigley and Van Order, 1995; Deng et al., 2000). However, existing 
research has also found that mortgage borrowers do not always default when 
facing negative equity (see, e.g., Vandell, 1995; Deng and Quigley, 2002; Foote, 
et al., 2008). Therefore, the coefficient of negative equity in a delinquency model 
measures the sensitivity or responsiveness of the borrower to negative equity in 





exercise default option. Therefore, β  in equation (4.2) measures the impact of 
foreclosure concentration on borrowers’ attitude to exercise their mortgage default 
option. Note that by including neighborhood foreclosure rate as a covariate, the 
direct impact of foreclosure concentration on delinquency probability is also 
measured (the impact is reflected in β in our model). In addition, this variable 
will control for any unobservable neighborhood characteristics that are orthogonal 
to house price movement and other measured changes in the neighborhood if 
there is any such unobservable characteristics. 
4.4 Empirical Analysis on the Impact of Foreclosure 
Concentration on Borrower Delinquency 
4.4.1 The impact of foreclosure concentration on borrower 
default option 
The first set of estimation results is reported in Table 4.4. Model 1 is the 
model without time-fixed effect. In addition to the focus variables seen in 
equation (4.2), we have 25 control variables (the X variables). Most of these 
control variables are significant with signs conforming to existing research or 
economic theory. For example, low or no doc loans have higher risk of 
delinquency and borrowers of those loans are more sensitive to negative equity. 
Owner-occupied loans are less sensitive to negative equity than investor loans. 
FICO score is negatively correlated with delinquency probability but the function 
is concave. In addition, higher FICO score borrowers are more sensitive to 





likely to enter into default, everything else equal. Rate/term refinance loans are 
less likely to be delinquent while cash-out refinance loans are more likely to 
become delinquent. Loans with higher payment to income ratio have higher 
delinquency risk, and African American borrowers and female borrowers are 
more likely to enter into default. Finally, increase in MSA level unemployment 
rate causes more delinquency.   
Next the focus variables in this study are discussed. Consistent with findings 
in the existing literature, negative equity is a highly significant factor of mortgage 
delinquency. The higher the negative equity is the more likely the loan will be 
delinquent (the positive    ). In addition, it can be seen from the significant 
positive coefficient of the square term of negative equity that the function is 
convex, which is as expected – borrowers become extremely sensitive when they 
have a large negative equity. The more interesting findings here are on the zip-
level foreclosure rate and its interaction with negative equity. It is shown that zip-
level foreclosure rate itself is significant but negatively correlated with the 
probability of delinquency (the negative   ). This tends to support the game-
theoretic view that borrowers take nearby foreclosures as an indication of the 
chance of being foreclosed should she chooses to default, and thus nearby 
foreclosures lower the neighboring borrower’s likelihood of becoming delinquent 
on her loan. But as just discussed, this variable can also be measuring some 
unobservable neighborhood characteristics that are orthogonal to other measured 
changes in the neighborhood. Therefore, I do not want to over-interpret this result. 





          ,  ∙       ,  is positive and significant (the positive   ) meaning that 
the higher the foreclosure rate is in neighborhood, the more sensitive borrowers 
are to negative equity in their delinquency choice. This positive net impact of 
neighborhood foreclosure concentration on delinquency suggests that the 
foreclosure contagion effect likely outweighs the information effect.  
To account for possible changes in borrower’s sensitivity to negative equity 
due to other reasons such as the overall market sentiment, we include the 
interaction of current year dummies with negative equity in Model 2. It is 
observed that there is no material change to the results I just discussed.    is still 
positive and highly significant. 
Table 4.5 results of our models where we use a dummy variable to indicate 
where a specific zip code during a specific quarter has high foreclosure rate 
comparing to other zip-quarters. Here high foreclosure rate means that it is in the 
90th percentile of all zip-quarters. Other than this change, the model specification 
is exactly the same here in Table 4.5 as in Table 4.4. Results are consistent with 
those in Table 4.4.    is still positive and highly significant, suggesting strong 
positive net impact of neighborhood foreclosure concentration on borrowers’ 






Table 4.4 MLE Estimates of the Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
Covariate Estimate Estimate 
Negative equity 0.655*** 2.61*** 
 (0.144) (0.177) 
Negative equity square 0.003*** 0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) 
Negative equity *Zip-level Foreclosure unit 0.192*** 0.169*** 
 (0.04) (0.042) 
Zip-level Foreclosure unit -0.069** -0.052* 
 (0.028) (0.029) 
Negative equity *Low/no doc indicator 0.088* 0.048 
 (0.046) (0.042) 
Low/no doc indicator 0.175*** 0.179*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
Negative equity *Owner-occupied property indicator -0.259* -0.226* 
 (0.141) (0.135) 
Owner-occupied property indicator 0.065 0.059 
 (0.082) (0.081) 
Negative equity *FICOSCORE 0.176*** 0.136*** 
 
(0.017) (0.016) 
FICOSCORE -0.132*** -0.116*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
FICOSCORE*FICOSCORE 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Log balance 0.117*** 0.09*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) 
LTV at origination >=80% 0.074** 0.078** 
 (0.035) (0.035) 










15-year FRM 0.067 0.049 
 
(0.062) (0.062) 
Planned-unit development -0.127* -0.121** 
 
(0.066) (0.066) 
Condominium -0.025 -0.044 
 
(0.044) (0.044) 
Rate/term refi -0.471*** -0.473*** 
 
(0.057) (0.057) 
Cash out refi 0.113** 0.056 
 
(0.05) (0.05) 







Table 4.4 MLE Estimates of the Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Continued) 
Covariate Estimate Estimate 
Unknown prepayment penalty clause 0.121 0.128 
 
(0.156) (0.157) 
Change in MSA unemployment rate 0.322*** 0.417*** 
 
(0.02) (0.024) 
Payment-to-Income (PTI) 0.018** 0.016* 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
Asian -0.056 -0.035 
 
(0.051) (0.051) 
Black 0.064* 0.062* 
 
(0.037) (0.037) 
Other race -0.025 -0.011 
 
(0.026) (0.026) 
Female 0.042* 0.037 
 
(0.024) (0.024) 
Time Fixed Effects NO 
Current year-
fixed effect in 
negative equity 
beta 
N 263,656 263,656 
-2LogL 136,406 135,952 
AIC 136,462 136,036 
Note: 
This table presents the Cox proportional hazard model result for the refined Subprime sample in the 
Los Angeles MSA, during the period 1999-2013. Negative equity is calculated with the 
contemporaneous house value (based on MSA level HPI) and the market value of the mortgage loan 
outstanding, adjusted by MSA-level house price volatility. Zip-level Foreclosure unit is calculated as 
the permillage of the total number of foreclosures in the past two quarters (e.g. for 2009Q1 it is 
2008Q4 and 2008Q3) in the total number of housing units in each zip code. Log balance refers to the 
log of the original loan amount. Call option is computed the difference between the par value of the 
mortgage and the present value of the remaining payments evaluated using the current market 
mortgage rate. Change in MSA unemployment rate refers to the difference between the unemployment 
rate at current time and at origination time. The other explanations of the variables are shown in Table 
4.3. Parameter estimates are reported standard errors are included in the parentheses. Note that ***, ** 

























Time Fixed Effects NO 
Current year-fixed effect in negative equity 
beta 
Control variables 
Negative equity, negative equity square, negative equity * low/no doc 
indicator, low/no doc indicator, negative equity * owner-occupied property 
indicator, owner-occupied property indicator, negative equity * FICO, FICO, 
FICO square, log loan balance, original LTV greater than 80%, call option 
value, 15-year FRM indicator, planned unit development indicator, 
condominium indicator, rate/term refinance indicator, cash-out refinance 
indicator, prepayment penalty indicator, prepayment penalty unknown 
indicator, change in MSA unemployment rate from origination to current, 
payment-to-income ratio, Asian borrower, African American borrower, other 
non-white race borrower, female borrower. 
N 263,887 263,887 
-2LogL 136,410 135,947 
AIC 136,466 136,033 
Note: 
This table presents the Cox proportional hazard model result for the refined Subprime sample in the 
Los Angeles MSA based on alternative neighborhood foreclosure concentration measure, during the 
period 1999-2013. High Foreclosure Intensity equals one if the zip-quarter ranks in the 90th percentile 
of all zip-quarters for its foreclosure intensity. The other explanations of the variables are shown in 
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. Parameter estimates are reported standard errors are included in the 
parentheses. Note that ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
4.4.2 Impact of foreclosure concentration by different regimes 
It is reasonable to assume that the information effect of neighborhood 
foreclosure concentration to be stable over time. However, the contagion effect 
might vary in different regimes. Before 2007, the housing market was glorious. 





Therefore, the foreclosure contagion effect is expected to be minimal. These are 
exactly what the next a few tests show. In Table 4.6, results of a model are shown 
where the impact of neighborhood foreclosure concentration is allowed to vary in 
different regimes. The whole study period is divided into four regimes: pre-2007 
is the period of housing boom; 2007 to 2009 is when the market experiences the 
first wave of the housing and mortgage market crisis; 2010-2011 is when we had 
the second wave of the crisis during which Los Angeles had a second downturn in 
the housing market after a short recovery in the second half of 2009; post 2012 is 
when the Los Angeles housing market had a real recovery. The net impact of 
neighborhood foreclosure concentration is indeed negative pre-2007, consistent 
with the notion that foreclosure contagion effect was small if not zero while the 
information effect was significant and negative. During 2007-2009, the net impact 
turned positive, likely due to the fact that foreclosure contagion became 
significant and prevalent. In 2010 and 2011, the net positive impact became even 
stronger compared to that during 2007-2009, possibly because of stronger 
contagion effect due to the desperation brought by the second wave of the crisis. 
Finally, post-2012 the net impact is not significant, likely due to a balance of the 










Negative equity *Zip-level 
Foreclosure unit * Pre 2007 
-0.317*** 
(0.090) 








Negative equity *Zip-level 
Foreclosure unit*Post 2012 
0.062 
(0.06) 















Negative equity, negative equity square, negative equity * low/no 
doc indicator, low/no doc indicator, negative equity * owner-
occupied property indicator, owner-occupied property indicator, 
negative equity * FICO, FICO, FICO square, log loan balance, 
original LTV greater than 80%, call option value, 15-year FRM 
indicator, planned unit development indicator, condominium 
indicator, rate/term refinance indicator, cash-out refinance 
indicator, prepayment penalty indicator, prepayment penalty 
unknown indicator, change in MSA unemployment rate from 
origination to current, payment-to-income ratio, Asian borrower, 






This table presents the Cox proportional hazard model result for the refined Subprime sample in the 
Los Angeles MSA with respect to different housing market regimes, during the period 1999-2013. The 





reported standard errors are included in the parentheses. Note that ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 
10% significance, respectively. 
 
4.4.3 Impact of foreclosure concentration by different borrower 
groups 
The information effect and contagion effect could also vary with respect to 
different borrower groups. This research conducts such tests subsequently. In 
order to avoid the confounding effect of housing market regimes, the tests are 
conducted with the post 2007 subsample. The first test is whether Asian 
borrowers behave differently from the rest of the population. Table 4.7 shows the 
results. Interestingly, it is shown that the net impact of neighborhood foreclosure 
concentration for Asian borrowers is significantly different from non-Asian 
borrowers. Both its impact on delinquency probability and its impact on 
borrower’s sensitivity to negative equity are stronger among Asian borrowers than 
among non-Asian borrowers. A possibly explanation is that due to cultural 
differences Asians are more susceptible to herd behavior48. Table 4.8 shows the 
comparison between African American borrowers and the rest of the population. 
There is almost no difference between African Americans and non-African 
Americans. 
  
                                                           
48 For example, Chiang and Zheng (2010) find stronger evidence of herding in Asian stock market 
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Negative equity, negative equity square, negative equity * low/no doc 
indicator, low/no doc indicator, negative equity * owner-occupied property 
indicator, owner-occupied property indicator, negative equity * FICO, 
FICO, FICO square, log loan balance, original LTV greater than 80%, call 
option value, 15-year FRM indicator, planned unit development indicator, 
condominium indicator, rate/term refinance indicator, cash-out refinance 
indicator, prepayment penalty indicator, prepayment penalty unknown 
indicator, change in MSA unemployment rate from origination to current, 
payment-to-income ratio, African American borrower, other non-white 





This table presents the Cox proportional hazard model result for the refined Subprime sample in the 
Los Angeles MSA by comparing Asian and non-Asian borrowers, during the period 2007-2013. The 
other explanations of the variables are shown in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. Parameter estimates are 
reported standard errors are included in the parentheses. Note that ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 
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Negative equity, negative equity square, negative equity * low/no doc 
indicator, low/no doc indicator, negative equity * owner-occupied property 
indicator, owner-occupied property indicator, negative equity * FICO, 
FICO, FICO square, log loan balance, original LTV greater than 80%, call 
option value, 15-year FRM indicator, planned unit development indicator, 
condominium indicator, rate/term refinance indicator, cash-out refinance 
indicator, prepayment penalty indicator, prepayment penalty unknown 
indicator, change in MSA unemployment rate from origination to current, 






This table presents the Cox proportional hazard model result for the refined Subprime sample in the 
Los Angeles MSA by comparing African American and the rest of the population, during the period 
2007-2013. The other explanations of the variables are shown in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. Parameter 
estimates are reported standard errors are included in the parentheses. Note that ***, ** and * indicate 
1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
Next, female borrowers and male borrowers are compared. Interestingly, 
seen from Table 4.9, females have smaller   , suggesting that either the contagion 





possibly explanation is that females have higher opportunity cost of 
homeownership and are more concerned with the negative consequences of 
foreclosure, which makes the information effect to be stronger and offsets more of 
the contagion effect. 
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Negative equity, negative equity square, negative equity * low/no doc 
indicator, low/no doc indicator, negative equity * owner-occupied 
property indicator, owner-occupied property indicator, negative equity * 
FICO, FICO, FICO square, log loan balance, original LTV greater than 
80%, call option value, 15-year FRM indicator, planned unit 
development indicator, condominium indicator, rate/term refinance 
indicator, cash-out refinance indicator, prepayment penalty indicator, 
prepayment penalty unknown indicator, change in MSA unemployment 
rate from origination to current, payment-to-income ratio, Asian 





This table presents the Cox proportional hazard model result for the refined Subprime sample in the 
Los Angeles MSA by comparing female and male borrowers during the period 2007-2013. The other 





standard errors are included in the parentheses. Note that ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance, respectively. 
4.4.4 Impact of foreclosure concentration by different 
neighborhoods 
Whether the foreclosure concentration effects vary in different 
neighborhoods is further analyzed. First neighborhoods are classified by average 
FICO score. For each zip code, the average FICO score of fixed-rate subprime 
mortgage loans originated during our study period and rank order all zip codes in 
the Los Angeles MSA are calculated. Then a dummy variable is used to indicate 
whether a neighborhood is in the upper or lower quartile in average FICO score. 
Finally, these dummy variables are interacted with our focus variables. Table 4.10 
shows the model results. Interestingly, the results show that there is a U-shape in 
the relation between neighborhood average FICO score and the impact of 
foreclosure concentration on borrowers’ sensitivity to negative equity.     is 
significantly higher in very high and very low average FICO neighborhoods, 
while the middle tier FICO neighborhoods see decreased borrower sensitivity. 
Notice that it is already observed that borrowers with higher FICO score are more 
sensitive to negative equity (the positive coefficient of the interaction term 
between negative equity and FICO score), which is suggestive that borrowers 
with higher FICO score are more financially sophisticated and more responsive to 
financial opportunities. The finding that the neighborhood foreclosure 
concentration impact is more profound among high FICO neighborhood is 
consistent with such a financial sophistication explanation. In a separate test 





find that lower-income neighborhoods see stronger relation between foreclosure 
concentration and borrower sensitivity to negative equity, while there is no 
significant difference between moderate-income neighborhoods and high-income 
neighborhoods in terms of the impact of foreclosure concentration on borrowers’ 
sensitivity to negative equity. 
Lastly, the analysis is generalized to the whole state of California. Results in 
Table 4.12 show that the impact of neighborhood foreclosure concentration in 
California is very similar to what we find in Los Angeles MSA. 
A number of robustness tests are conducted including the use of different 
house price index to construct the negative equity measure as well as alternative 
foreclosure rate measure (e.g., per capital vs. per housing unit foreclosure rate). 
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Negative equity, negative equity square, negative equity * low/no doc 
indicator, low/no doc indicator, negative equity * owner-occupied 
property indicator, owner-occupied property indicator, negative equity * 
FICO, FICO, FICO square, log loan balance, original LTV greater than 
80%, call option value, 15-year FRM indicator, planned unit 
development indicator, condominium indicator, rate/term refinance 
indicator, cash-out refinance indicator, prepayment penalty indicator, 
prepayment penalty unknown indicator, change in MSA unemployment 
rate from origination to current, payment-to-income ratio, Asian 









This table presents the Cox proportional hazard model result for the refined Subprime sample in the 
Los Angeles MSA by comparing the lower, middle and upper quartiles of FICO SCORE at zipcode 
level during the period 2007-2013. Lower_FICO (Upper_FICO) equals one if the zip-quarter ranks in 
the 10th (90th) percentile of all zip-quarters for its FICO SCORE. The other explanations of the 
variables are shown in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. Parameter estimates are reported standard errors are 












Negative equity * Zip-level 
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Upper_ Income -- 
Control variables 
Negative equity, negative equity square, negative equity * low/no doc 
indicator, low/no doc indicator, negative equity * owner-occupied property 
indicator, owner-occupied property indicator, negative equity * FICO, 
FICO, FICO square, log loan balance, original LTV greater than 80%, call 
option value, 15-year FRM indicator, planned unit development indicator, 
condominium indicator, rate/term refinance indicator, cash-out refinance 
indicator, prepayment penalty indicator, prepayment penalty unknown 
indicator, change in MSA unemployment rate from origination to current, 
payment-to-income ratio, Asian borrower, African American borrower, 









This table presents the Cox proportional hazard model result for the refined Subprime sample in the 
Los Angeles MSA by comparing the lower, middle and upper quartiles of borrower median income at 
zipcode level during the period 2007-2013. Lower_Income (Upper_Income) equals one if the zip-
quarter ranks in the 10th (90th) percentile of all zip-quarters for its median income. The other 
explanations of the variables are shown in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. Parameter estimates are reported 








Table 4.12 Hazard Model Results for All Subprime Loans in the State of California 
Covariate Estimate Estimate 
Negative equity 0.442*** 2.383*** 
 (0.072) (0.095) 
Negative equity square 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Negative equity *Zip-level Foreclosure unit 0.154*** 0.113*** 
 (0.022) (0.024) 
Zip-level Foreclosure unit -0.07*** -0.051*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Negative equity *Low/no doc indicator 0.115*** 0.033 
 (0.032) (0.029) 
Low/no doc indicator 0.169*** 0.191*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) 
Negative equity *Owner-occupied property indicator 0.001 -0.011 
 (0.071) (0.062) 
Owner-occupied property indicator -0.089** -0.091** 
 (0.041) (0.04) 
Negative equity *FICOSCORE 0.172*** 0.122*** 
 
(0.011) (0.01) 
FICOSCORE -0.102*** -0.088*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
FICOSCORE*FICOSCORE 0.047*** 0.05*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Log balance 0.132*** 0.128*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
LTV at origination >=80% 0.106*** 0.108*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) 










15-year FRM -0.093*** -0.098*** 
 
(0.035) (0.035) 
Planned-unit development -0.103*** -0.097*** 
 
(0.035) (0.035) 
Condominium 0.019 0.031 
 
(0.031) (0.031) 
Rate/term refi -0.381*** -0.378*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Cash out refi 0.172*** 0.134*** 
 
(0.026) (0.026) 







Table 4.12 Hazard Model Results for All Subprime Loans in the State of California 
(Continued) 
Covariate Estimate Estimate 
Unknown prepayment penalty clause -0.04 -0.065 
 
(0.084) (0.084) 
Change in MSA unemployment rate 0.31*** 0.373*** 
 
(0.011) (0.012) 
Payment-to-Income (PTI) 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Asian -0.093*** -0.074** 
 
(0.032) (0.032) 
Black 0.036 0.043* 
 
(0.024) (0.024) 
Other race -0.018 -0.011 
 
(0.014) (0.014) 
Female 0.034** 0.029** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) 
Time Fixed Effects NO 
Current year-




N 748,241 748,241 
-2LogL 489,080 487,835 
AIC 489,136 487,919 
Note: 
This table presents the Cox proportional hazard model result for the refined Subprime sample in the 
State of California, during the period 1999-2013. Negative equity is calculated with the 
contemporaneous house value (based on MSA level HPI) and the market value of the mortgage loan 
outstanding, adjusted by MSA-level house price volatility. Zip-level Foreclosure unit is calculated as 
the permillage of the total number of foreclosures in the past two quarters (e.g. for 2009Q1 it is 
2008Q4 and 2008Q3) in the total number of housing units in each zip code. Log balance refers to the 
log of the original loan amount. Call option is computed the difference between the par value of the 
mortgage and the present value of the remaining payments evaluated using the current market 
mortgage rate. Change in MSA unemployment rate refers to the difference between the unemployment 
rate at current time and at origination time. The other explanations of the variables are shown in Table 
4.3. Parameter estimates are reported standard errors are included in the parentheses. Note that ***, ** 







Existing research has found foreclosure to be contagious in that foreclosure 
reduces the price of nearby non-distressed sales. This paper finds another type of 
foreclosure contagion – foreclosures can induce nearby mortgage borrowers to 
exercise their default option more ruthlessly. This type of foreclosure contagion is 
especially prominent during a downturn of the housing market. Therefore, during 
the mortgage market crisis, there are a large number of mortgage loans become 
delinquent, many of which subsequently were foreclosed. Those foreclosures 
were definitely bad results for the borrowers, the lenders and the investors. But 
the damage was not limited to the borrowers and lenders who are directly 
involved in the default process. Those foreclosures generate externalities to the 
neighborhood – they induce more borrowers in the surrounding area to enter into 
default. This circular reaction can go on and on and lead to foreclosure cascades. 
Therefore, it is important for the government and lenders to take timely actions to 
stop or reduce foreclosures and thus to break the loop of such a crisis. 
Certainly, the impact of neighborhood foreclosure concentration on borrower 
default behavior is not limited to the contagion effect. It is actually shown that 
sometimes the impact can be on the opposite direction – foreclosures can 
discourage borrower’s delinquency if borrowers take foreclosures as a signal of 
how lenders will deal with delinquencies. This information effect can dominate 
the contagion effect during the market boom. From this perspective, borrowers are 





feature of mortgage default into consideration to achieve better understanding and 
estimation of mortgage default risk. 
Future research should try to establish the exact mechanism of the 
foreclosure contagion discovered in this paper, and assess the relative roles of 






Chapter 5 Probabilistic Data Linkage in Real Estate 
Studies: Applications of Propensity Score Matching and 
Hard Matching with Machine Learning Techniques 
5.1 Introduction 
Since the recent few decades, data linkage, which is matching or integrating 
different datasets to identify the records of the same entity, is frequently used and 
has become an increasingly popular method in many fields, including statistics, 
economics, medicine (or public health), political science, sociology and even law, 
for the purpose of extending the amount of information available for the same 
entity and thus making decisions and taking actions (Gu et al., 2003).  
The increasing popularity of data linkage arises from the fact that in most 
cases, the need for information often requires the analysis based on a large 
number of variables, which usually cannot be fulfilled by a single dataset. Data 
linkage can help exploit the information already available in different data sources, 
i.e. to carry out a statistical integration of information already collected. In 
addition, the advances in data processing techniques make data linkage 
technically and economically feasible to carry out the huge amount of operational 
work in integrating records from multiple datasets, thus to produce an enhanced 





However, there is no consensus on how exactly data linkage ought to be done, 
how to measure the success of the linking procedure and whether linking 
estimators are sufficiently robust to misspecification so as to be useful in practice 
(Heckman et al., 1998). Linking multiple datasets depends on the situations of 
those datasets and the requirements for information. Data linkage methods 
generally employ both deterministic and probabilistic linking algorithms (Jaro, 
1995; Silveira and Artmann, 2009). If a unique identifier or key of the entity of 
interest is available in the record fields of all data sources to be linked, which is 
perfect but not commonly used in the current climate of data sources, the 
deterministic data linkage is used straightforwardly, by simply matching based on 
the identifier. If the unique key is not available, which is more complicated but 
more frequently encountered, the linkage becomes fuzzier since not all units can 
be unambiguously identified (Steiner and Cook, 2013).  
One direct way for this fuzzy linkage, or probabilistic data linkage, is 
statistical hard matching, which identifies common covariates among different 
datasets and links these data using the common covariates. The other way is 
propensity score matching (PSM), which refers to the pairing of treatment and 
control units with similar values on the propensity score, and possibly other 
covariates, and the discarding of all unmatched units (Rubin, 2001). Both hard 
matching and PSM are commonly used in real estate studies, but neither method 
is perfect, regarding their advantages and disadvantages. In general, PSM is more 
suitable when dealing with a large number of covariates, whereas hard matching 





both methods are limited in that they control for observed covariates but do not 
account for bias resulting from the unobserved covariates that may affect whether 
the entity from different data is the same or not and thus result in selection bias of 
linked records. This bias may in turn affect the results of analysis based on the 
biased data linkage. Also, PSM and hard matching both produce similar results 
when matching on a smaller number of covariates.  
Mortgage data, the main data used in the whole thesis, have several 
characteristics that require an effective linking method. First, mortgage data 
usually track individual loans from certain lenders. Therefore, although there 
might be no unique identifiers among distinct mortgage data, loans from different 
data but the same group of lenders can be linked, if there are certain common 
attributes among these data. Second, the mortgage data provide distinct 
information at certain periods, i.e., loan application, loan origination, and loan 
termination. Thus, searching a way to link these data can help provide an overall 
idea about individual loan performance, probably through application to 
origination to termination. Third, because of data constraints and different 
collection methods, the common variables among the mortgage data might be just 
a few, thus might not capture the distinct characteristics of the loan records. The 
fact that the frequently used linking approaches mostly depend on common 
variables make it uncertain whether the linking is effective.   
In this context, a comparative analysis of different methods of matching on 





limitations and potential of different approaches and in particular the ones based 
on machine learning techniques (Michie et al. 1994, Mitchell 1997). This analysis 
is also motivated during working on the fourth chapter, when I try to link BBX 
and HMDA data to analyze the foreclosure concentration impacts on borrower 
default behavior. This study is done by a systematic study, comparison and 
combination with traditional statistical matching techniques. A multi-strategy 
approach is used where several algorithms are applied to the same data and their 
results compared to find the best model. This is justified by the fact that it is very 
hard to select an optimal model a priory without knowing the actual complexity of 
a particular problem or dataset. This study provides important insights into the 
nature of the problem and allows us to address some fundamental questions such 
as: By comparing various linking approaches, what is the appropriate one to link 
multiple datasets in real estate studies, especially mortgage studies, when there are 
no unique identifiers? Among the linkage approaches, how can we minimize the 
selection bias and identification errors? Past studies comparing different 
approaches to the matching problem have been sometimes rightly criticized for 
using only one technique, for not being done in a systematic way or for consisting 
of mainly anecdotal results. In this study, I try to overcome this problem by 
systematically analyzing a variety of methods on linking the same groups of 
datasets, including statistical hard matching, statistical hard matching with 
machine learning techniques, i.e. Naïve Bayes classifier and Decision Tree 
Classifier, and propensity score matching. Many of these algorithms and methods 





applications nowadays have been used in many economics and finance 
applications. There are several other advantages in comparing different methods 
in the same study: the pre-processing of the data is more homogeneous and the 
results can be compared in a more direct manner.  
In this study, the BBX into HMDA data are linked with the common 
covariates among these two datasets, using the three approaches: pure statistical 
hard matching as in the literature, statistical hard matching combined with 
machine learning techniques, and propensity score matching. Firstly, with the 
statistical hard matching, I use the SAS program to link the selected common 
attributes and link BBX and HMDA data, se well as checking for and eliminating 
observations with duplicate linking records. Secondly, combining with the 
statistical hard matching, in dealing with the duplicate linking records, 
classification algorithms such as Naive Bayes and Decision Tree are applied to 
learn the intrinsic correlation of the key variables, including but not limited to 
selected common attributes, and produce the learned models for identifying the 
true matches. Thirdly, with propensity score matching, the BBX and HMDA 
records with the exactly same propensity scores or with the same three digits after 
the decimal point of propensity scores are regarded as match; the SAS program is 
applied to check for and eliminate observations with duplicate BBX id when there 
are multiple matches. Three groups of linked results are generated and compared 
accordingly. In the next step, to make sure the absence of sample selection 
problem, several checks for the matched samples are conducted, including the 





key variables, and summary statistics comparison. The bootstrapping approach is 
also used to estimate the accuracy rate of predicting the outcome of the loans for 
each method.  
As a result, under the pure statistical hard matching and the matching with 
machine learning, the BBX-HMDA one-to-one exact matched sample forms the 
basis for the sample of about 2.5 million loans used in the analysis, which 
accounts for around 20% of the original BBX dataset. With the help of the SAS 
program to check for and eliminate observations with duplicate BBX id in 
multiple matches under pure statistical hard matching, there remain 2.6 million 
“actual” matches with unique BBX id from original multiple matches, which is 21% 
of the original BBX data. By applying machine learning techniques, it is shown 
that the model from Decision Tree Classifier obtains higher estimation score (81%) 
than Naïve Bayes Classifier (72%), inferring that Decision Tree Classifier better 
fits the data situation, and the high probability confirms that the one-to-one 
matched sample can be considered as true match exempted from misclassification 
problem. The trained model further classifies around 18% matches with unique 
BBX id from the original multiple matches. With regards to propensity score 
matching, it obtains only 26 thousand matches (less than 1% of the original BBX 
data) with exactly same propensity scores, but generates another 4.6 million 
matches (round 36% of the original BBX data) when the match is based on 
approximate propensity scores. Therefore, by comparing the number of linkages 
under the three approaches, it is observed that using statistical hard matching 





matching with machine learning (Group 2), followed by propensity score 
matching (Group 3).  
Next, in assessing the representativeness of the linked samples to the entire 
population of loans, several representativeness analyses are conducted on the 
linked groups, including examining the distributions of the key variables (by 
looking at kernel density distributions for continuous attributes and frequency 
plots for categorical attributes), comparing the summary statistics of the matched 
and original samples, and conducting the bootstrapping analysis on the outcome 
of default based on the key variables from both datasets. Results in general show 
that statistical hard matching with machine learning approach did a better job in 
dealing with selection bias and misclassification relative to the traditional 
approaches used in social science, such as pure statistical hard matching and 
propensity score matching. However, it is also shown that the performance of 
statistical hard matching, while not the best, is generally acceptable when there 
are no alternatives. Propensity score matching, although well packaged in various 
programs, should be used more carefully. 
In conclusion, this study is expected to apply the commonly accepted 
techniques in statistics and computer science to linking records from multiple 
datasets in real estate field. This research is potentially useful in filling in 
additional or missing information, by adding in extra attributes. With more 
complete information on population units more complex research questions can 





accuracy and reliability of survey or administrative data or vice versa; one can 
assess whether the sample survey data are producing reliable inferences using 
some population administrative datasets to assess the representativeness of the 
sample data. Last, it can help enhance data quality, by providing more information 
for people to understand the non-response or non-report side of the current data. 
This study also extends the literature by comparatively analyzing different linking 
methods on multiple mortgage datasets to help better understand the advantages 
and potential limits of each method, as well as trying to overcome the selection 
bias and misclassification issues. These attempts help provide a creative way to 
other authors who also need to link multiple data sources with no unique 
identifiers and conduct deep analysis based on a representative matching dataset. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section proposes 
data sources for studies and data preparation procedure. Section 5.3 develops the 
three methodologies used this study. Empirical results are discussed in the fourth 
section, while representative analysis is presented in the Section 5.5. Finally, 
concluding remarks are drawn in the last section.  
5.2 Data Description 
Two data sources are matched: loan-level data furnished by BlackBox 





collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). 49  The BBX 
database contains information on home location, mortgage amount, loan terms, 
and loan purpose. The HMDA data requires lenders to report data on borrower 
demographics, income, and geographic location for almost all loan applications in 
the United States. Therefore, the basic assumption is that most BBX mortgages 
should be contained in the HMDA database. The matched loans are identified 
using the common data fields across the databases. This analysis is limited to 
loans originated between 2001 and 2010.  
5.2.1 BlackBox Logic (BBX)  
Our estimates first rely on micro loan-level data set—BBX, which 
aggregates data from mortgage servicing companies that participate in their 
servicing agreement. The most recent BBX data cover about 22 million mortgages 
throughout the United States. The BBX dataset provides extensive information 
about the loan, property, and borrower characteristics at the time of origination as 
well as dynamically updated monthly data on loan performance subsequent to 
origination. Property-related variables are property appraisal value, geographic 
location (at zipcode level), and property type (single-family residence, condo, or 
other type of property). Loan characteristics available to us are loan amount at 
origination, interest rate type (whether the mortgage is fixed-rate or an adjustable-
rate product), term to maturity, lien position, loan purpose (whether the loan was 
intended for home purchase or refinancing), and lender-defined subprime flag, the 
                                                           
49 The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) was enacted in 1975, and implemented by the 
Federal Reserve Board. It requires that lending institutions report virtually all mortgage 





documentation type of the mortgage (full, low or no documentation), whether the 
loan was originated for an investor as well as coupon rate on the mortgage. 
Credit-risk-related variables include FICO credit score and loan-to-value (LTV) 
ratio of the borrower at origination. This study uses the loan-level data from BBX 
for loans originated in 2001-10. 
Although BBX has substantial loan-level attributes, there are limited 
demographic or borrower-related information, which are significant in 
understanding the borrower and lender characteristics at the earlier stage of loan 
application and at the later stage of loan outcomes (if the loan application is 
accepted). Therefore, the data with Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) files 
are considered due to its valuable information on the income of all loan applicants, 
in addition to race and various loan characteristics.  
5.2.2 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 
The second dataset used is the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), 
which provides information on prime market share at MSA level. Under the 
HMDA data, most originators report basic attributes of the mortgage applications 
that they receive in metropolitan statistical areas to the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council. This data is considered the most comprehensive 
source of mortgage data, covering around 80 percent of all home loans nationwide 
and a higher share of loans originated in metropolitan statistical areas (Avery et 





HMDA provides abundant information about borrower and lender 
characteristics at the stage of loan application. Borrower characteristics 
incorporates applicant race, applicant sex, annual income and borrower-reported 
homeownership status (owner-occupied or investment). In terms of lender 
knowledge, HMDA indicates the application status for each applicant (denied or 
approved/originated). We can also gain the information of lender differences; for 
example, the number of loans originated by a lender in a given year (Agarwal et al. 
2012). HMDA data provides a nearly complete universe of 122 million U.S. 
mortgage applications over the period 2001–10. Property-related variables 
available are geographic location (census tract level identification), and property 
type (one-to-four-family or manufactured housing or multifamily). HMDA also 
includes some but not much loan information, such as loan amount (in thousands), 
loan purpose (home purchase or reﬁnancing or home improvement) and (in the 
case of originated loans) whether the loan was sold to the secondary market 
within the year.  
In summary, both datasets are nationally representative and have been used 
by many researchers as major sources of information on mortgage analysis or 
potential behavior of borrowers, but they seldom have been used together, due to 
the lack of common record identifiers. The gap and significance in the literature 
motivates me to combine these two data sets using various linking approaches.  
Table 5.1 provides definitions of the variables that are used in this study, for 





Table 5.1 Variable list and definitions 
Variable Variable explanations 
Panel A Variables from BBX data 
Original loan amount (*1000) 
The amount of principal on the closing date of the mortgage (in 
thousands). 
FICO score 
The FICO (formerly the Fair Isaac Corporation) borrower credit score 
at the time of loan closing. 
Original term 
The number of months between the first payment date and the date the 
principal is due from the borrower. 
Issuance balance 
The coupon rate charged to the borrower for the initial remittance 
period. 
Original LTV 
The ratio of the original loan amount to the property value at loan 
origination; LTV is short for loan-to-value ratio. 
Combined LTV 
The ratio of all loan amounts on the property at the time of origination 
to the property value at loan origination. 
Original appraisal value (*1000) 
The estimate of the property value at the time of loan origination, as 
supplied by the data provider (in thousands). 
Current interest rate 
The coupon rate charged to the borrower for the most recent 
remittance period. 
D_Second lien 
A dummy that is equivalent to 1 for second lien loan, which is 
subservient to the main or first mortgage on a piece of real estate 
property; 0 otherwise. 
D_Subprime A dummy that equals to 1 if it is a subprime loan, defined by a lender. 
D_Heloc 
A dummy that is equivalent to 1 if it is a loan in which the lender 
agrees to lend a maximum amount within an agreed term, where the 
collateral is the borrower's equity in his/her house (HELOC is short for 
home equity line of credit). Otherwise it takes 0. 
D_Interest only loan 
1 if it is a loan in which, for a set term, the borrower pays only the 
interest on the principal balance with the principal balance unchanged, 
0 otherwise. 
D_FRM 1 for fixed-rate mortgages, 0 otherwise. 
D_Prepayment penalty 
1 if a fee will be charged to the borrower if they elect to make 
unscheduled principal payments, 0 otherwise. 
D_condo 1 if the property securing the mortgage is condominium, 0 otherwise. 
D_Single family 1 if the property securing the mortgage is single family, 0 otherwise. 
D_Option ARM 
1 if it is an adjustable rate mortgage with added flexibility of making 
one of several possible payments on your mortgage every month, 0 
otherwise. 
D_Purchase loan 
1 if the primary reason the mortgage was take out by the borrower is to 
purchase, 0 otherwise. 
D_Refinance loan 
1 if the primary reason the mortgage was take out by the borrower is to 
refinance, 0 otherwise. 
D_Owner occupied loan 
1 if the use of the property is owner occupied (primary residence), 0 
otherwise. 
D_Investment loan 1 if the use of the property is investment, 0 otherwise. 
D_Full documentation 
1 if the amount of property documentation provided by the borrower is 
full documentation, 0 otherwise. 
D_Low/No documentation 
1 if the amount of income documentation provided by the borrower is 





Table 5.1 Variable list and definitions for this study (Continued) 
Variable Variable explanations 
Panel B Variables from HMDA data 
Application status 1 if the applicant got acceptance of the loan, 0 otherwise. 
Applicant race 
Indicating the race of the applicant: i.e., American Indian or Alaska 
Native, Asian, Black or African American, Native Hawaiian and 
White. 
Applicant Ethnicity 
Indicating the ethnicity of the applicant: i.e., Hispanic or Latino, Not 
Hispanic or Latino 
Applicant sex Indicating the sex of the applicant: i.e., male and female. 
Applicant annual income Gross Annual income of the applicant, in thousands of dolloars. 
Loan type 
The type of loan, defined by the lender: i.e., Conventional (any loan 
other than FHA, VA, FSA, or RHS loans), FHA-insured (Federal 
Housing Administration), VA-guaranteed (Veterans Administration), 
and FSA/RHS (Farm Service Agency or Rural Housing Service).  
Property type  
The type of the property securing the mortgage: i.e., one to four-
family, manufactured housing, multifamily 
Loan purpose 
The primary reason the mortgage was take out by the borrower: i.e., 
home purchase, home improvement, refinancing. 
Owner-occupancy status 
The use of the property: i.e., owner-occupied as a principal dwelling, 
not owner-occupied. 
Lien status 
The relative claim position on a given property being used as collateral 
for a loan: i.e., secured by a first lien, by a subordinate lien, not 
secured by a lien. 
Notes: 
1. This list of variables only includes those used in this study, not all variables. 
2. The variables with “D_” represent dummies. 
5.2.3 Data Preparation and Harmonization 
 Data linkage needs to happen on linking on key variables, which both 
datasets have in common. Since no formal identifiers such as unique serial 
numbers are observed between these two datasets, informal key attributes are used 
as an identifier for the purposes of linking. The common variables in both datasets 
have to be aligned to each other in terms of definitions and measurement, and 
their distributions should be made comparable so that at the very least the two 
datasets do not differ significantly by means of the common variables (Kum and 





national level, a very close correspondence between the two files in terms of the 
common variables is reasonably expected. Exceptions to this rule are generally 
the result of non-exact correspondence between actual records the two datasets 
have and this inevitably introduces error into the matching procedure due to 
mismatched samples. 
The selection of the specific common variables for matching should be 
made carefully to maximize the explanatory power. This is because the validity of 
matching relies heavily on the power of the common variables to act as good 
predictors that can be transformed into effective informal identifiers. The common 
attributes between the two datasets are lien status, property type, loan purpose, 
occupancy status, original loan amount, origination year, and zipcode.5051 Among 
these common attributes, property types in BBX and HMDA data are defined 
differently.52 Lien status is also questionable as a linking attribute, due to its 
incompleteness in HMDA data. Therefore, for this study the common variables 
used throughout different methods are loan purpose, occupancy status, original 
loan amount, origination year and zipcode.  
Several filtering criteria are applied before actual linking. First, only loan 
applications marked as originated in HMDA data are considered. Those loans 
originated by FNMA, GNMA, FHLMC and FAMC are removed. Those with loan 
                                                           
50 With regard to HMDA data, the Loan Application Date and Loan Action Taken Date (as well as 
the Loan Number) are considered non-public fields and are not released in any of the public 
FFIEC data products. The individual raw HMDA loan data are only available on an annual basis. 
51  There are no zipcodes in original HMDA data, but it contains census tract information. 
Therefore, using the census tract it is easy to identify the zipcode for each record. 
52 For instance, condominium loans are an independent category in BBX, while included in 1-4 





type of FSA (Farm Service Agency) or RHS (Rural Housing Service) are 
excluded as well. 
Table 5.2 compares the frequency distributions of the common variables 
used in linking procedure, in BBX and HMDA data respectively. The results 
show that the distributions of the three variables, loan purpose, occupancy status 
and original loan amount, are similar between BBX and HMDA, which infers that 
the two datasets are comparable, with respect to the key common attributes.  
Table 5.2 The Frequency Distributions of Key Common Variables used in Data 
Linkage: BBX vs. HMDA 
Loan purpose BBX HMDA 
Home purchase 41.69% 38.53% 
Rate/term refinance or Cash-out refinance 47.63% 53.32% 
Unknown and other 10.68% 8.15% 
Occupancy status BBX HMDA 
Owner-occupied 81.12% 89.58% 
Investment property 9.19% 9.90% 
Unknown and other 9.69% 0.52% 
Original Loan Amount BBX HMDA 
Less than $10K 28.59% 37.33% 
$100K-$300K 43.52% 46.85% 
$300K-$500K 17.82% 11.12% 
Greater than $500K 10.06% 4.70% 
Note: 
This table shows the frequency distributions of three key variables, loan purpose, occupancy status and 







In this study, a variety of methods on linking the same groups of datasets 
are tested and compared, including statistical hard matching, statistical hard 
matching with machine learning techniques, i.e. Naïve Bayes Classifier and 
Decision Tree Classifier, and propensity score matching. 
5.3.1 Statistical hard matching (Method 1) 
The design of statistical hard matching (the “Method 1”) in this study is 
similar with other hard matching studies in real estate field (Agarwal et al, 2012; 
Agarwal et al., 2012; Ferreira and Gyourko 2011; Ghent et al., 2011; Haughwout 
et al., 2009; Hernandez-Murillo and Sengupta 2012; Pace and Zhu, 2012; Reid 
and Laderman 2009; Voicu et al., 2011). In the first stage, the BBX loans are 
matched to HMDA loans with the same loan purpose, occupancy status of the 
borrowers, loan origination year, zipcodes, and original loan amount. Any BBX 
loan that has no corresponding HMDA loans using the criteria in Section 5.2.3 is 
a non‐match. Any loan is a multiple match if it matches to multiple HMDA loans. 
Lastly, any BBX loan that matches to one and only one HMDA loan is a one-to-
one match. All one-to-one matches with unique BBX and HMDA identifiers are 
kept, while all non-matches are excluded from the final matched sample. For 
multiple matches, the SAS program is applied to check for and eliminate 
observations with duplicate linking records. The linking results using Method 1 is 





5.3.2 Machine learning techniques (Method 2) 
The second approach is the statistical hard matching combined with 
machine learning techniques (the “Method 2”). Machine learning is a key 
technique that exploits the nature of the dataset, e.g., the underlying patterns and 
relationship of variables. Classification algorithms such as Naive Bayes and 
Decision Tree are commonly used in the field of computer science, medicine, 
statistics, etc. The classifiers first learn the underlying pattern (term as model) 
from a set of labeled data (term as training set), and then apply the model to the 
unseen data (termed as predicting set) and predict the label (matched or non-
matched in this analysis) for this predicting set. To compare the performance of 
different classifiers, I also apply the models to a small set of labeled data (term as 
testing set) and report their accuracy in this set.53 
5.3.2.1 Naïve Bayes Classifier 
A naive Bayes classifier assumes that the presence (or absence) of a 
particular feature of a class is unrelated to the presence (or absence) of any other 
feature, given the class variable. 54  In many practical applications, parameter 
estimation for naïve Bayes models uses the method of maximum likelihood.  
The probability model for the classifier is a conditional model: 
                                                           
53 In statistical modeling, a training set is used to fit a model that can be used to predict a "response 
value" from one or more "predictors" from which it can construct or discover a predictive 
relationship. A test set is a set of data that is independent on the training data but follows the same 
probability distribution as the training data. A predicting set is a set of data that is unknown about 
the classification. A test set is a predicting set in certain situation. 
54 For example, a fruit may be considered to be an apple if it is red, round, and about 4” in 
diameter. A naïve Bayes classifier considers all of these properties to contribute to the probability 
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over a dependent class variable C with a small number of outcomes or 
classes, conditional on several feature variables 1F through nF . Using Bayes’ 
theorem, and under the “naïve” conditional independence assumptions that each 
feature iF is conditionally independent of every other feature jF  for j i  given 
the categoryC , this can be written as55 
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In practice, there is interest only in the numerator of that fraction, because 
the denominator does not depend on C and the values of the features iF are given, 
so that the denominator is effectively constant. Therefore, the conditional 
distribution over the class variable C is 
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1
1




p C F F F p C p F C
Z 
 （                             (5.3) 
                                                           










where Z is the scaling factor dependent only on 1 2, ,..., nF F F , that is, a 
constant if the values of the feature variables are known. For further explanations 
please refer to the Appendix.  
The matching problem in this analysis is identical to a binary classification 
issue, which the probabilities of classifying the record as “match” or “unmatch” 
based on probability distributions of the measured features: 
                      P(match|  ,    , … ,   ) =
 (     ) (  ,   ,…,  |     )
 (  ,   ,…,  )
                   (5.4) 
                P(unmatch|  ,    , … ,   ) =
 (       ) (  ,   ,…,  |       )
 (  ,   ,…,  )
             (5.5) 
Based on the conditional independence assumption of naïve Bayes model, 
assume that each feature     is conditionally independent of every other feature     
for j ≠ i . So the above equation becomes  
     P(match|  ,    , … ,   ) =
 (     ) (  |     ) (  |     )… (  |     )
 (  ,   ,…,  )
           (5.6)    





If there is identical number of observations in each class in the training set, 
we will have P(match) = P(unmatch) = 0.5 in the training sample. 






For each record in the test set, the probability of match and unmatch is 
compared based on equation (5.6) and (5.7): the larger probability predicts the 
matching status of the record. Then we compare the predicted matching status 
with the actual matching status and calculate the probability that these two are the 
same among the entire test set.  
The major advantage of the naive Bayes classifier is its short computational 
time for training. In addition, since the model has the form of a product, it can be 
converted into a sum through the use of logarithms – with significant consequent 
computational advantages. However, due to its strict independence assumption, it 
actually contradicts the real world situation: the attributes may have intrinsic 
correlations with one another.  
5.3.2.2 Decision Tree Classifier 
Decision trees classifier, commonly accepted in statistics, data mining and 
machine learning, uses a decision tree as a predictive model which maps 
observations about an item to conclusions about the item’s target value. This 
approach is the best known and most widely used learning methods in data mining 
applications. The goal is to create a model that predicts the value of a target 
variable based on several input variables. Samples are classified by sorting them 
down the tree from the root to the leaf node. The leaf node provides classification 
of the sample. Each non-leaf node in the tree specifies a test of one or more 
attributes of the sample. Each branch descending from a node corresponds to one 





root node of the tree, testing the attribute specified by this node, and moving 
down the tree branch corresponding to the value of the attribute in the given 
sample. This is repeated for the subtree rooted at the new node. The process 
continues until a leaf is encountered, at which the object is asserted to belong to 
the class named by the leaf (Quinlan, 1986). Decision trees can be translated into 
a set of rules by creating a separate rule for each path from the root to a leaf in the 
tree, called top-down induction of decision trees (Quinlan, 1993).56   
Data comes in records of the form: 
                                          1 2 3 ,( , ) ( , , , ..., )kx Y x x x x Y                                       (5.8) 
The dependent variable, Y , is the “target variable” that we are trying to 
understand, classify or generalize. The vector x  is composed of the input 
variables, 1 2 3, , ,..., kx x x x , used to predict Y .  
The determination of the node splitting is based on ID3 (Inductive 
Dichotomizer 3), which uses a single best attribute to test at each node of the tree 
for classifying the samples. A statistical property called information gain is used, 
to measure how well a given attribute separates the training examples according 
to their target classification. 
  In order to define information gain precisely, I begin by defining a measure 
                                                           
56 A tree can be “learned” by splitting the source set into subsets based on an attribute value test. 
This process is repeated on each derived subset in a recursive manner called recursive partitioning. 
The recursion if completed when the subset at a node has all the same value of the target variable, 
or when splitting no longer adds value to the predictions. This process of top-down induction of 
decision trees (TDIDT) is an example of a greedy algorithm, and it is by far the most common 





commonly used in information theory, called entropy, that characterizes the 
(im)purity of an arbitrary collection of examples. If the target attribute can take on 
C different values, then the entropy of S relative to this C-wise classification is 
defined as  
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is the proportion of S belonging to class j . Take a 
binary classification as an example: given a collection S, containing positive and 
negative examples of some target concept, the entropy of S relative to this 
classification is   
                            1 2 1 2 2 2( ) log ( ) log ( )Engropy S p p p p                             (5.10) 
where 1p  is the proportion of positive examples in S and 2p  is the 
proportion of negative examples in S. As the data become purer and purer, the 
entropy value becomes smaller and smaller.57 
The information gain, which measures the effectiveness of an attribute in 
classifying the training data, is simply the expected reduction in entropy caused 
by partitioning the examples according to this attribute: 
                                                           
57 Notice that the entropy is 0 if all members of S belong to the same class. The entropy is 1 when 
the collection contains an equal number of positive and negative examples. If the collection 
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where A  is an attribute, ( )Values A is the set of all possible values for 
attribute A , and v
S
is the subset of S  for which attribute A  has value v  (i.e., 
 | ( )vS s S A s v   ). The first term in Equation (5.11) is the entropy of the 
original collection S, and the second term is the expected value of the entropy 
after S is partitioned using attribute A. 
5.3.2.3 Comparison of the machine learning techniques 
Bias measures the contribution to error of the central tendency of the 
classifier when trained on different data. Variance is a measure of the contribution 
to error of deviations from the central tendency. Learning algorithms with a high-
bias profile usually generate simple, highly constrained models which are quite 
insensitive to data fluctuations, so that variance is low. Naive Bayes is considered 
to have high bias, because it assumes that the dataset under consideration can be 
summarized by a single probability distribution and that this model is sufficient to 
discriminate between classes. On the contrary, algorithms with a high-variance 
profile, e.g. decision tree classifier, can generate arbitrarily complex models 
which fit data variations more readily. As we are aware that data in different years 
have different nature, we need to train classification models for each year 
respectively, and use those models to obtain the classification for predicting 





Under Method 2, the first step is the same as pure statistical hard matching. 
After obtaining all possible HMDA matches for each BBX loan, the BBX loans 
are then classified as non-matches, one-to-one matches, or multiple matches. Non-
matches are excluded from the final matched sample as well.58 Machine learning 
techniques are applied to check the accuracy of one-to-one matches, and select the 
possible true match from multiple matches. 
To follow the convention in machine learning, I also split the matched data 
into training set, test set and predicting set in this study. The training set is a 
combination of 80% of the one-to-one matches and random selection of the same 
amount of the non-matches. 59  The distribution probabilities of the measured 
features to the classification as a match or non-match are calculated by the two 
techniques. These measured features include the common covariates used in the 
statistical hard matching as well as other attributes, i.e., property appraisal values, 
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, borrower FICO score, subprime loan indicator, 
HELOC indicator, interest-only loan indicator, fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) 
indicator, prepayment penalty indicator, property type (condo, single family or 
multifamily), option ARM indicator, loan document type indicator (full 
documentation, low documentation or other), applicant income, race, sex, 
ethnicity, and loan type (conventional loan, FHA loan or other). The goal is to 
                                                           
58 Although machine learning techniques can also be applied to non-matches to check the non-
matches, it may result in additional selection bias and lots of uncertainty. Therefore, non-matches 
are excluded in this research to avoid unnecessary bias. 
59 The one-to-one matches used as part of the training set are randomly selected from the original 
one-to-one matches, using the SAS program, and the non-matches used are randomly selected 





learn the intrinsic correlation of the key variables, including but not limited to 
selected common attributes, and produce the learned models.  
The test set is the rest 20% of the one-to-one matches combined with the 
randomly selected 20% of the non-matches, but with the classification (“match” 
or “unmatch”) hidden first. The learned models from the training data are applied 
to the test set to predict the classification. The accuracy rate of the models are 
calculated as the percentage of records having the same predicted classification as 
the hidden ones, based on all significant variables including but not limited to 
common variables. The higher the accuracy rate, the better the classifier fits to the 
matching sample, and thus the better the learned model fits to the actual data 
situation. This is also to confirm that the one-to-one matches do not suffer from 
misclassification problem in general. The predicting set in this research is the 
multiple matches, where the better learned model is applied to select the actual 
match. The linking results using Method 2 is regarded as Group 2 in the following 
section. 
5.3.3 Propensity score matching (Method 3) 
The third method is the propensity score matching (the “Method 3”), which is 
commonly applied in statistics, economics, medicine and other fields. The 
propensity score is a balancing score: conditioning on the true propensity score 
asymptotically balances the observed covariates. Propensity scores are used in 





on these propensity score probabilities, rather than matching patients on the 
values of the individual covariates. 
The estimated propensity score ( )ip x , for subject i , ( 1,...,i N ) is the 
conditional probability of being assigned to a particular category given a vector of 
observed covariates ix (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983): 
                                                  ( ) Pr( 1| )i i ip x z x                                         (5.12) 
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Where 1iz  for treatment, 0iz  for control, ix is the vector of observed 
covariates for the thi subject. Since the propensity score is a probability, it ranges 
in value from 0 to 1. 
The vast majority of published propensity score analyses use logistic 
regression to estimate the scores. Logistic regression is attractive for probability 
prediction, since it is mathematically constrained to produce probabilities in the 
range (0, 1), and generally converges on parameter estimates relatively easily. 
Further, logistic regression is a familiar and reasonably well-understood tool of 
researchers in a variety of disciplines, and is easy to implement in most statistical 
packages (Westreich et al., 2009). In this study, logistic regression is applied to 





The method of matching records in different data sources based on 
propensity scores demonstrated here is based on matching on an allowable 
absolute difference between exact propensity scores, or a “radius” around the 
score. This matching is done using a generalized SAS macro for propensity score 
matching that can match a “control group” to a “patient group” at an N:1 ratio, 
using an algorithm to maximize the number of propensity score matches (Fraeman, 
2010). This optimization algorithm is based on retaining the matches for loan 
records with the fewest possible number of matches first. 
Following Fraeman (2010), the procedure of applying propensity score 
matching in this study is basically two steps. In the first step, the BBX and 
HMDA data are aggregated into one data, with only BBX identifier, HMDA 
identifier and the selected common variables listed in Section 4.3.3; a new 
variable “source” is defined as 1 if the record is originally from BBX data, 0 if it 
is from HMDA data. The common variables, as the form of dummies, are 
included in the logistic regression to get the propensity scores, with dependent 
variable as “source”.  Notice that since there are around 20,000 zipcodes among 
the data in each year, the constraints of the calculation matrix prevent the 
inclusion of all these zipcodes into the logistic regression at one time. In order to 
control for zipcode effects in such condition, records are separated into 100 
groups, based on the zipcodes. 60 The BBX and HMDA records with the exactly 
same propensity scores are regarded as match; the SAS program is applied to 
check for and eliminate observations with duplicate BBX id when there are 
                                                           





multiple matches. The rest of the BBX and HMDA records are put into next 
round’s matching. In the next step, the matching criterion is relaxed: other things 
being equal, the records with the same three digits after the decimal point of 
propensity scores are regarded as match. Records in BBX that cannot find 
corresponding matches in HMDA are excluded. For multiple matches, the SAS 
program is applied to check for and eliminate observations with duplicate BBX id. 
The linking results using Method 3 is regarded as Group 3 in the following 
section. 
5.4 Empirical Results on Data Linkage 
5.4.1 Basic linking results of Method 1 and Method 2 
Both pure statistical hard matching and the matching with machine learning 
techniques return the same results of one-to-one matches, original multiple 
matches and non-matches. Under the matching algorithm in this study, the BBX-
HMDA one-to-one exact matched sample forms the basis for the sample of about 
2.5 million loans used in the analysis, which accounts for around 20% of the 
original BBX dataset. More than 2.6 million loans from BBX are multiply linked 
to HMDA data, similar with the number of one-to-one matches.61 The remaining 
BBX loans are taken as non-matches which have no corresponding HMDA loans. 
The difference between Method 1 and Method 2 lies in the way to deal with 
multiple matches: how to select the match from multiple matches.  
                                                           
61 The total multiple matches account for around 10 million linkage: for each record in BBX there 
are more than one record in HMDA that satisfy the matching criteria. On average, 4 records from 





In Method 1, which is the pure statistical hard matching, with the help of the 
SAS program to check for and eliminate observations with duplicate BBX id in 
multiple matches, there remain 2.6 million “actual” matches with unique BBX id 
from original multiple matches, which is 21% of the original BBX data. Therefore, 
combined with the one-to-one matched results, there are in total 5.1 million 
matches (40% of the original BBX), under the method of pure statistical hard 
matching.  
In Method 2, by studying the potential influences of the variables on the 
classification from the training set and test set, the contributions (probabilities) of 
those variables to the final classification are calculated and a trained model is 
produced based on the probabilities. It is shown that comparing the two trained 
models obtained by the two techniques, the model from Decision Tree Classifier 
obtains the highest score (accuracy rate of around 81%), while that from Naïve 
Bayes Classifier gets around 72%. This result infers that Decision Tree classifier 
best fits the one-to-one matches’ situation. This high probability also confirms 
that the one-to-one matched sample does not suffer from misclassification 
problem and can be considered as true match, while the randomly selected non-
matches are the “actual” non-matches.  
Based on the above results, the better learned model from Decision Tree 
Classifier is applied to the predicting set, which is the multiples matches, to find 
the “actual” matches. This trained model helps predict approximately 18% 





together with one-to-one matches, there are around 4.8 million (38%) total 
matched sample. Detailed results are available upon request.  
5.4.2 Data linkage result with Method 3 
With regards to propensity score matching, in the first step with the exactly 
same propensity scores, it obtains only 26 thousand matches (less than 1% of the 
original BBX data). However, in the second step when the matching criterion is 
relaxed, another 4.6 million matches are generated, which are as round 36% of the 
original BBX data. In total, there are 4.6 million matches when applying 
propensity score matching, which account for more than 36% of the original 
sample. Results for propensity score matching are available upon request. 
Table 5.3 shows the comparison of the linkage performance by looking at 
the number of linkages for the three groups: the original BBX sample, the linking 
records from statistical hard matching alone, statistical hard matching with 
machine learning, and propensity score matching. It is observed that among these 
three approaches, using statistical hard matching (Group 1) obtains slightly more 
linking records than using statistical hard matching with machine learning (Group 
2), followed by propensity score matching (Group 3). This is due to the nature and 
linking mechanism of these three approaches: statistical matching relies on the 
program to keep only one record for each group of multiple matches, while the 
method with machine learning calculates the probability of correct linking based 
on common and uncommon variables. Thus those did not satisfy the probability 





sample. Finally, propensity score matching depends on the propensity scores for 
linking two records from BBX and HMDA, which may miss a group of linking 
records. 
Table 5.3 Number of linkages for the three matched groups: 2001-2010 
Year Original BBX data Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
2001  419,359  151,111  151,801  292,536  
2002  679,599  268,906  248,785  376,318  
2003  1,369,929  674,877  490,318  983,138  
2004  2,133,744  953,077  925,079  810,999  
2005  3,545,879  1,351,353  1,315,772  1,034,646  
2006  3,458,331  1,274,137  1,245,401  745,992  
2007  1,020,773  426,748  399,744  356,488  
2008  3,601  1,713  1,707  1,380  
2009  816  564  535  17  
2010  477  268  269  41  
Total 12,632,508  5,102,754  4,779,411  4,601,555  
Percentage   40.39% 37.83% 36.43% 
Note:  
This table shows the number of linkages for the three groups, by year 2001-2010. The percentages of 
the linked sample to the original BBX data are calculated. 
In the next section, the linking records from each method are examined 
carefully, using various representativeness analyses. 
5.5 Representativeness Analysis 
A closely related issue to the outcome of data linkage is whether the linked 
data A ∩ B is representative of a population in A ∪ B or subpopulation in data A 
or data B without bias in key parameters. An obvious issue is that any matching 
error in linking data A and data B can result in a ‘dirty’ sample set A ∩ B that 





To assess the representativeness of the linked samples to the entire 
population of loans, several representativeness analyses are conducted, comparing 
the matched samples and original sample. The matched sample from pure 
statistical hard matching (Method 1) is named as Group1, statistical hard 
matching with machine learning techniques (Method 2) as Group 2, and the one 
drawn from propensity score matching (Method 3) as Group3.  
5.5.1 Distributions of key variables 
If the matched sample is representative of the whole population of loans, the 
distributions of the key variables from both datasets should be consistent between 
matched and original sample. Therefore, the key variables of the matched samples 
obtained from the three approaches are examined if they have similar distributions 
as those of original BBX and HMDA in general.  
First the kernel density distributions of loan characteristics from BBX 
original dataset and Group 1 through Group 3 are checked, i.e. original loan 
amount, original loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, borrower FICO score (Figure 5.1). It 
is shown that the kernel density plots of these covariates reveal differences 
between the matched groups and the original BBX data. Shown in Figure 5.1.1 
and Figure 5.1.3, with regard to original loan amount and FICO score, the kernel 
density distributions of the three groups are quite similar. However, concerning 
the distributions of original LTV ratio, Figure 5.1.2 shows that Group 1 and 
Group 2 are much closer to the distributions of the original BBX sample, 






Figure 5.1 Kernel Density Plots of the BBX variables from the Original and 
Matched Samples: 2001-2010 
Fig. 5.1.1 Kernel density plot of Original Loan Balance: original vs. matched 
groups 
 







Fig. 5.1.3 Kernel density plot of FICO score: original vs. matched groups 
Note: 
This set of figures shows the kernel density plots of three key variables, original loan amount, original 
LTV ratio, and FICO score in BBX dataset. Four groups of data are compared: the original BBX 
dataset (Original), the matched sample from pure statistical hard matching (Group1), from machine 
learning techniques (Group2), and from propensity score matching (Group 3). Those datasets include 
loans originated over the period 2001-2010; only loans with original loan amount less than $10 million 
are included in the sample. Y-axis indicates the probability of density, while X-axis indicates the value 
distribution of variables. 
The distributions of the original loan amount, original LTV ratio and FICO 
score in each year are plotted as well, presented in the Appendix. Figure A1 
shows the set of density plots for original loan amount for the four groups; before 
2007, the distributions of the four groups are almost the same, while since 2008, 
the distributions of Group 3, which is under the propensity score matching, have 
gone away from those of the original BBX sample, while Group 1 and Group 2 
still have the same trends. By looking at the distributions of the original LTV ratio 
for the four groups by year, Figure A2 reveals that except Year 2001, the 





BBX sample, with similar trends and smaller differences. This finding is 
consistent with that in Figure 5.1.2, which is the aggregate distribution of original 
LTV through 2001-2010. Presented in Figure A3, when looking into the 
distributions of FICO score by year, those of Group 3 are much more volatile than 
other groups and run away from the distributions of the original BBX sample, 
especially after Year 2007. These gradually increasing differences among the 
distribution plots confirm our thinking that propensity score matching tend to 
produce some bias when selecting the linking records.  
With respect to the borrower information coming from HMDA dataset, the 
kernel density plots of borrower income, and the frequency distributions of 
applicant race, sex and ethnicity for original and matched samples are compared. 
Seen from Figure 5.2, the kernel density distributions of income for original 
HMDA sample, Group 1 and Group 2 have the same trend, while the distribution 
for Group 3 is quite distinct from all three groups. This result implicates that the 
matched results is not representative of the original HMDA data with respect to 







Figure 5.2 Kernel Density Plots of Borrower Income from the Original and 
Matched Samples: 2001-2010 
Note: 
This figure shows the kernel density plots of key variable, applicant annual income, in HMDA dataset. 
Four groups of data are compared: the original HMDA dataset (Original), the matched sample from 
pure statistical hard matching (Group1), from machine learning techniques (Group2), and from 
propensity score matching (Group 3). Those datasets include loans originated over the period 2001-
2010; only loans with original loan amount less than $10 million are included in the sample. Y-axis 
indicates the probability of density, while X-axis indicates the value distribution of variables. 
For borrower characteristics, such as sex type, race type, and ethnicity type, 
the frequency distributions, comparing original HMDA dataset, Group 1, Group 2 
and Group 3 are plotted. Shown in Figure 5.3, the frequency distributions of these 
attributes among the three groups are following the same trend, with slight 
differences in the percentages. The distributions of sex type (Figure 5.3.1) and 
race type in Group 2 (Figure 5.3.2), which is obtained from statistical hard 
matching with machine learning technique, are more similarly distributed with the 
original data, than Group 1 from pure statistical hard matching and Group 3 from 





shown that the distribution of Group 1 is closer to that of the original HMDA 
sample than other groups. 
 
Figure 5.3 Frequency Distribution of Borrower Information from the Original 
and Matched Samples: 2001-2010 
Figure 5.3.1 Frequency Distribution of Borrower Sex Type: original vs. 
matched groups 
 








































Figure 5.3.3 Frequency Distribution of Borrower Ethnicity Type: original vs. 
matched groups 
Note: 
This figure shows the frequency distribution of borrower variables (in percentages) of the loan 
application time. All the loans are originated over the period 2001-2010. Three groups of data are 
compared: the original HMDA dataset (Original), the matched sample from pure statistical hard 
matching (Group1), from machine learning techniques (Group2), and from propensity score matching 
(Group 3). Figure 5.3.1 shows the frequency distribution of borrower sex type; Figure 5.3.2 presents 
the distribution of borrower race type; Figure 5.3.3 displays the distribution of borrower ethnicity type. 
Y-axis indicates the probability of density, while X-axis indicates the value distribution of variables. 
In summary, these observations suggest that the sample under statistical hard 
matching with machine learning is generally more representative of the entire 
BBX sample and HMDA sample with respect to the key variables. Next the 
summary statistics comparisons are made for these groups, to present big pictures 
of the data. 
5.5.2 Summary statistics comparisons  
To check whether there is sample selection bias for the matched sample, 
another way frequently used in economic literature is to compare the summary 
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original BBX dataset and the total matched samples, using three approaches, are 
compared.  
Table 5.4 compares the descriptive statistics of the original BBX sample, 
total matched sample with pure statistical hard matching, with machine learning 
techniques, and under propensity score matching. In general, the gaps among the 
three groups are small, e.g. FICO score, original LTV, percentage of 
condominium loans, margin, and percentage of fixed-rate mortgage (FRM). 
Consistent with the assumptions, the gaps between original sample and the 
matched sample with statistical hard matching alone (Group 1) and with machine 
learning techniques (Group2) are smaller, relative to those between original 






Table 5.4 Summary Statistics of BlackBox: Original vs. Matched Groups 
Variable Original Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Original loan amount (*1000) 237 243 245 240 
FICO score 667 674 673 674 
Original term 337 342 342 334 
Issuance balance 235,195 241,585 242,440 237,518 
Original LTV 71.36% 71.80% 71.55% 70.49% 
Combined LTV 80.58% 80.28% 80.66% 80.09% 
Original appraisal value (*1000) 347,190 349,681 349,977 353,142 
Current interest rate 7.58 7.34 7.44 7.42 
D_Second lien 27.83% 28.24% 27.98% 26.41% 
D_subprime 26.57% 23.54% 24.15% 23.36% 
D_Heloc 1.01% 0.22% 0.18% 1.10% 
D_Interest only loan 19.57% 19.72% 19.6% 16.87% 
D_FRM 41.33% 40.90% 41.55% 42.56% 
D_Prepayment penalty 43.60% 44.33% 43.96% 41.01% 
D_Condo 8.57% 9.97% 9.55% 8.20% 
D_Single family 73.24% 75.40% 74.48% 74.37% 
D_Multifamily 1.12% 0.86% 0.88% 1.06% 
D_Option_ARM 5.51% 5.95% 6.12% 4.75% 
D_Purchase loan 41.77% 47.14% 47.23% 41.01% 
D_Refinance loan 47.83% 52.86% 50.79% 49.81% 
D_Owner occupied loan 80.94% 83.56% 82.99% 85.88% 
D_Investment loan 11.34% 15.53% 15.05% 10.39% 
D_Full documentation 33.41% 34.72% 33.65% 32.95% 
D_Low/No documentaion 36.57% 40.67% 41.99% 33.18% 
Sample Size (*1000) 12,633 5,103 4,779 4,602 
Note: 
This table presents the summary statistics of BlackBox Analytics (BBX) dataset. Three groups of data 
are compared: the original BBX dataset (Original), the total matched sample drawn from pure 
statistical hard matching (Group1), statistical hard matching combined with machine learning 
techniques (Group2), and propensity score matching (Group 3). Those datasets include loans originated 
over the period 2003–2010; only loans with original loan amount less than $10 million are included in 
the sample. The variables with “D_” represent dummies. The details and explanations of the variables 






5.5.3 Bootstrapping analysis 
Option based theoretical and empirical models for mortgage default analysis 
have been well developed during the past two decades (see, for example, Kau et 
al., 1992; Kau and Keenan 1999; Deng et al., 1996, 2000), and they have 
increased in realism and sophistication in the past decade (see Ambrose et al., 
2001; Deng and Gabriel 2006 as two examples). In this analysis, we follow the 
literature as well as our first paper and estimate the accuracy of the matched 
sample using bootstrapping logistic analysis on the outcome of default.  
In statistics, bootstrapping is a method for assigning measures of accuracy 
to sample estimates (Efron, 1993). This technique allows estimation of the 
sampling distribution of almost any statistic using only very simple methods 
(Varian, 2005). The basic idea of bootstrapping is that the sample we have 
collected is often the best guess we have as to the shape of the population from 
which the sample was taken.62 Bootstrap offers to provide a way to simulate 
repeated observations from an unknown population using the obtained sample as a 
basis. 
As an example, assume that we are interested in the average (or mean) 
height of people worldwide. We cannot measure all the people in the global 
population, so instead we sample only a part of it, and measure that. Assume the 
sample is of size N, and then we measure the heights of N individuals. From that 
                                                           
62 For instance, a sample of observations with two peaks in its histogram would not be well 
approximated by a Gaussian or normal bell curve, which has only one peak. Therefore, instead of 
assuming a mathematical shape (like the normal curve or some other) for the population, we 





single sample, only one value of the mean can be obtained. In order to reason 
about the population, we need some sense of the variability of the mean that we 
have computed. 
To use the simplest bootstrap technique, I take our original data set of 1/2 
heights, and, using Stata, make a new sample (called a bootstrap sample) that is 
also half size of the original sample. The new sample is taken from the original 
one using sampling with replacement so it is not identical with the original "real" 
sample. I repeat this step 2000 times, and for each of these bootstrap samples the 
logistic test is conducted on the outcome of default on the same variables used in 
Table 3.2, Chapter 3 and the estimates of the coefficients (each estimate is called 
bootstrap estimate) are retained. A histogram of bootstrap estimates is now 
presented. This provides an estimate of the shape of the distribution of the mean 
from which questions about how much the mean varies can be answered. These 
estimates also show the amount of increase in the predicted log odds of default = 
1 that would be predicted by a one unit increase in the predictor, holding all other 
predictors constant. With the estimated results, we calculate the predicted log 
odds of default = 1 with the actual ones, and obtain the probability of predicting 
correctly. Finally the results of accuracy predicted probability among the three 
matched groups are compared.  
As a result, under the bootstrapping analysis, the probability for predicting 
the outcome of default in Group 2 (with machine learning) is around 94%, 





3 (propensity score matching). Therefore, the bootstrapping analyses support that 
among the three approaches, statistical hard matching with machine learning 
performs the best, followed by pure statistical hard matching. The propensity 
score matching is considered to predict the outcomes least correctly. 
In summary, the representativeness analyses above all confirm that the 
machine learning approach did a better job in dealing with selection bias and 
misclassification relative to the traditional approaches used in social science, such 
as pure statistical hard matching and propensity score matching. However, it is 
also shown that the performance is statistical hard matching, while not the best, is 
acceptable when there is no alternatives. Propensity score matching, although well 
packaged in various programs, should be used more carefully. 
5.6 Summary 
This study compares various data linkage approaches to deal with 
probabilistic data linkage in real estate studies. Previous analyses mainly focus on 
statistical hard matching, which identifies common covariates among different 
datasets and links these data using the common covariates, or propensity score 
matching (PSM), which refers to the pairing of treatment and control units with 
similar values on the propensity score, and possibly other covariates, and the 
discarding of all unmatched units (Rubin, 2001). Both statistical hard matching 
and PSM are commonly used in real estate studies, but both methods are criticized 





As such, exploring other linking approaches and comparing with current 
linking methods in real estate studies is worthy, for the purpose of more reliable 
results with the matches sample. Machine learning, commonly used in the field of 
computer science, medicine, statistics, etc., is a key technique that exploits the 
nature of the dataset, e.g., the underlying patterns and relationship of variables. 
Classification algorithms such as Naive Bayes and Decision Tree work in the 
following way: the classifiers first learn the underlying pattern (term as model) 
from a set of labeled data (term as training set), and then apply the model to the 
unseen data and predict the label (matched or non-matched in this analysis) for 
this predicting set. Machine learning techniques can identify the potential patterns 
and especially some unobvious patterns that even human expert cannot easily 
figure out from data. Such knowledge makes the decision in data linkage wisely, 
instead of selecting randomly. In machine learning, the data linkage problem can 
be formulated as a binary classification problem, that is, judging whether two 
records from different datasets belong to the same entry or not. This approach 
may act as an alternative to link multiple datasets and deal with selection bias and 
misclassification errors. 
Hence, the BBX into HMDA data are linked with the common covariates 
among these two datasets, using the three approaches: pure statistical hard 
matching as in the literature, statistical hard matching combined with machine 
learning techniques, and propensity score matching. Three groups of linked 
results from these approaches are generated and compared accordingly. As a 





learning, there are 2.5 million (20% of the original BBX) one-to-one exact 
matches. After eliminating observations with duplicate BBX id in multiple 
matches under pure statistical hard matching, there remain 2.6 million “actual” 
matches left, which consists of 21% of the original BBX data. With machine 
learning techniques, it is shown that the model from Decision Tree Classifier 
better fits the data situation, with higher estimation score than Naïve Bayes 
Classifier. The high probability of correct linking (above 80%) suggests that the 
one-to-one matched sample can be considered as true match exempted from 
misclassification issue. The trained model further identifies around 18% matches 
with unique BBX ids from the original multiple matches. Under propensity score 
matching, it obtains only 26 thousand matches (less than 1% of the original BBX 
data) with exactly same propensity scores, but generates another 4.6 million 
matches (round 36% of the original BBX data) when the match is based on 
approximate propensity scores. In summary, by comparing the number of linkages 
under the three approaches, it is observed that using statistical hard matching 
(Group 1) obtains slightly more linking records than using statistical hard 
matching with machine learning (Group 2), followed by propensity score 
matching (Group 3).  
To confirm the absence of sample selection problem, several checks are 
conducted to compare the three matched groups with the original BBX and 
HMDA data, including the approaches frequently used by other economic studies 
such as distributions of the key variables, and summary statistics comparison. 





attributes, the kernel density distributions are analyzed, while and frequency plots 
for categorical attributes are shown. Secondly, the summary statistics of crucial 
variables from the matched and the original samples are conducted and compared. 
The bootstrapping approach is also used to estimate the outcome of default based 
on the key variables from the linked groups. Overall, the findings imply that 
statistical hard matching with machine learning approach did a better job in 
dealing with selection bias and misclassification relative to the traditional 
approaches used in social science, such as pure statistical hard matching and 
propensity score matching. What’s more, by repeating 2000-time logistic 
regression analyses in bootstrapping approach, we find that the probability for 
predicting the outcome of default in the matched sample drawn from machine 
learning is higher than that from other approaches, which further supports the 
advantage of machine learning approach towards others. 
The total matched dataset under machine learning approach provides us 
good opportunities to conduct innovative analysis, by examining racial, ethnic, 
gender, and income differences in mortgage lending, controlling for both the risk 
profile of the mortgage and the characteristics of the neighborhood where the 
property is located. The machine learning approach used in data linkage 
procedure is beneficial to not only real estate studies, but also any data matching 
issues trying to deal with sample selection problems and misclassification issues. 
However, it is also shown that due to the complexity of the machine 





readers from fields other than computer science. In comparison, the performance 
of statistical hard matching, while not the best, is generally acceptable when there 
are no alternatives. Propensity score matching, although commonly accepted in 
statistics and social science and well packaged in various programs, should be 
used more carefully. 
In summary, shown in Section 2.5, Chapter 2, as with any linkage, the 
quality of the match is limited to the quality of the original data se well as the 
ability of the vector covariates to distinguish uniqueness among the two 
populations. An error-free "match" is not guaranteed. Potential for mismatch 
because of recording errors, different recording conventions, or changes to 
information over time may be occurred. Although the match-merge process is 
designed to control matching error, the conclusions to be drawn from any match 




Chapter 6 Conclusions 
This research firstly aims to investigate the unique risk patterns of borrowers, 
especially investors and their behaviors in the U.S. condominium (condo) loan market in 
the early 2000s, which have been overlooked in understanding the financial crisis. 
Secondly, it examines the impact of neighborhood foreclosure concentration on 
individual borrower’s delinquency decision, which is crucial to mortgage default risk 
management, pricing and underwriting. Finally, it compares and discusses the advantages 
and disadvantages of various approaches in dealing with data linkage issues in real estate 
studies, aiming to help provide certain implications for future real estate research. Three 
studies were conducted accordingly and results found that, using U.S. condominium 
market as a natural experiment, mortgage borrowers, especially investors play a 
significant role in understanding the current financial crisis. In addition, findings showed 
that neighborhood foreclosure concentration increases borrowers’ default option exercise 
during the study period, but the impacts differ in different regimes and across different 
borrower groups. The comparison of various data linkage approaches and results reveal 
that statistical hard matching with machine learning approach did a better job in dealing 
with selection bias and misclassification relative to the traditional approaches used in 
social science, such as pure statistical hard matching and propensity score matching. In 
this chapter, I first briefly review the research and then highlight the contributions of the 




6.1 Review of the Research 
The U.S. market have experienced the longest periods of housing market booms in 
history. The surging house prices have resulted in lower mortgage interest rates, lower 
down payment criteria, more financing alternatives and more relaxed lending standards, 
compared with previous stage. However, the great expansion of mortgage lending has led 
to great credit risks, which has resulted in the substantial surge in the residential 
mortgage delinquencies, followed by the collapse of the house price boom in the U.S. 
housing market and the recent financial crisis. Such collapse in the values of mortgages 
further brings a substantial increase in foreclosures and large decline in house prices. As 
a result, the fast increasing foreclosures and house price drops recursively lead to the 
increasingly worse housing market. 
The current mortgage crisis and the following disasters on the financial market 
induce various discussions on the possible triggers of this crisis, among academia and 
practitioners. Literature on the possible triggers of the current financial crisis, including 
innovation in mortgage products, fast growth of securitization, the market players’ 
wisdom and borrower behavior helps to get a better understanding on the crisis. However, 
borrower behavior especially investor behavior in mortgage choices is crucial in 
triggering the current financial crisis but largely overlooked in previous literature, due to 
the data limits and identification issues of investors from consumers in the housing 
market.  
This research documents the unique risk patterns of borrowers, especially investors 




which have been overlooked in understanding the financial crisis. This analysis addresses 
question regarding the default probability of the condo loans relative to commonly 
discussed single-family mortgages conditioning on various loan and borrower 
characteristics, macroeconomic conditions and so on. In addition, several competing 
explanations for the observed evidence on the faster default growth in the condo loan 
market are examined, such as the unique characteristics of the condo home markets 
which is the unobserved heterogeneity issue, the lender (supply side) effect, and the 
borrower (demand side) effect. The following questions are investigated:  
1) Do condo loans differ from single-family loans with respect to default patterns?  
2) If yes, what is the driving factor of the unique default pattern in the condo loan 
market?  
3) In a neighborhood with condo loan defaults, does impact of condo loan defaults 
resulting from risky borrowers have negative spillover effects on the neighboring 
single-family loans? Or do early condo defaults predict the neighboring single family 
subprime market’s subsequent default rate?  
If the third assumption that defaults and thus foreclosures have spillover effects on 
nearby borrowers’ default probabilities holds, the great influences of neighborhood 
defaults and foreclosures are worth deeply studied in better understanding the intrinsic 
mechanism of the crisis and finding the solutions. Since recently, the impact of 
neighborhood foreclosure concentration on individual borrower’s delinquency probability 
has been increasingly emphasized and studied. There is a great amount of evidence that 
foreclosures can have great influences on neighborhoods, from the view of house price 




community, acceleration of racial transition, children performance, and emotional and 
physical impact on people. However, the impact of foreclosure concentration on the 
borrower’s sensitivity to negative equity, i.e., to a certain extent the changing attitude of 
borrowers towards default option exercise, has not been fully discussed. Thus whether the 
information effect or foreclosure contagion effect dominates neighborhood foreclosure 
concentration impact on nearby borrowers’ delinquency decision is an open question.  
As such, I examine the impact of neighborhood foreclosure concentration on 
individual borrower’s delinquency probability. I also estimate foreclosure concentration 
on the borrower’s sensitivity to negative equity, which is to a certain extent the changing 
attitude of borrowers towards default option exercise. Accordingly, the following 
questions are examined:  
1) Does concentrated foreclosure increase or decrease the probability or the attitude of 
the geographically neighboring borrowers to make their default decision?  
2) Will these increases or decreases differ in different regimes and across different 
borrower groups?  
When digging into the research about borrower and investor behavior and 
foreclosure concentration, it is shown that in most cases, while each of these datasets 
provides certain information, these datasets lack a significant amount of information due 
to the constraints of data sources, thus no single source of data has all of the information 
required for certain undertaking. Given these challenges and data limitations, in the 
absence of the ideal data source with complete and necessary information, there is a 
necessity to link records in two or more separate but intrinsically correlated data sets in 




restrictions on the data available, to overcome the limitations of existing data sources, 
thereby enhancing the application of datasets. However, current linking approaches such 
as statistical hard matching and propensity score matching are observed to have potential 
shortages in linking multiple datasets.  
Therefore, more advanced and well-developed technique in the field of computer 
science, machine learning, is applied to deal with multiple matches and compared with 
other approaches such as pure statistical hard matching and propensity score matching. 
Research questions are shown accordingly: 
1) By comparing various linking approaches, what is the appropriate one to link multiple 
datasets in real estate studies, especially mortgage studies, when there are no unique 
identifiers?  
2) Among the linkage approaches, how can we minimize the selection bias and 
identification errors? 
The findings in the first research confirm the notion that borrower behavior, 
especially investor behavior, plays a significant role in understanding the current 
financial crisis. First of all, the results document that there is a sharp increase in condo 
loan defaults relative to single-family loan defaults over the years. Condo loan default 
rate also grows at a faster rate, even compared with subprime loans. What’s more, it is 
shown that the leading factor of the unique default pattern in the condo loan market is due 
to inherently riskier loan borrowers in the condo loan market, compared with single 
family loan market: investment-purchase condo loans are much more likely to default 
compared to other condo loans, and the effect is strengthened when the option to default 




compared with single-family loans originated in the same cohort, but also the earlier 
condo loan defaults prompt more defaults in the single-family sector in the same area 
afterwards. 
 The results on foreclosure concentration impacts reveal that on average 
neighborhood foreclosure concentration enhances borrowers’ default option exercise 
during the study period – borrowers are more willing to enter into default when there are 
intense foreclosures in the neighborhood. However, interestingly, the impact of 
foreclosure concentration varies in different regimes: before 2007, higher neighborhood 
foreclosure intensity is associated with reduced borrower sensitivity; entering into the 
crisis period (2007-2011), the impact turns from negative to positive; and post 2012, the 
impact becomes insignificant. The net impact of neighborhood foreclosure concentration 
on borrowers’ sensitivity to negative equity also varies across different borrower groups. 
The outcomes of applying and comparing various data linkage approaches show that, 
in general, statistical hard matching obtains slightly more linking records than using 
statistical hard matching with machine learning, and much more than using propensity 
score matching. After that, several representativeness analysis results on the linked 
groups are presented, including examining the distributions of the key variables (by 
looking at kernel density distributions for continuous attributes and frequency plots for 
categorical attributes), comparing the summary statistics of the matched and original 
samples, and conducting the bootstrapping analysis on the outcome of default based on 
the key variables from both datasets. Findings support that statistical hard matching with 
machine learning approach is a comparatively better approach in dealing with selection 




hard matching and propensity score matching. Propensity score matching, although well 
packaged in various programs, should be used more carefully. The performance of 
statistical hard matching, while not the best, is generally acceptable when there are no 
alternatives.  
These findings in the three studies have several implications. First, it implies that 
condo loans are inherently riskier than single-family loans. The evidence also suggests 
that investment-driven, riskier borrowers in the condo market are the most plausible 
driver for the observed default patterns in this market. What’s more, investors are more 
responsive to market conditions in their default behavior. Given that real estate investors 
are more present in the condominium market, the observed default pattern in the condo 
loan market thus may be associated with the investor behavior. Second, the impact of 
neighborhood foreclosure concentration on borrower default behavior is not limited to the 
contagion effect. It is actually shown that sometimes the impact can be on the opposite 
direction – foreclosures can discourage borrower’s delinquency if borrowers take 
foreclosures as a signal of how lenders will deal with delinquencies. This information 
effect can dominate the contagion effect during the market boom. From this perspective, 
borrowers are strategic in their default decisions. Credit risk modelers thus should take 
this game feature of mortgage default into consideration to achieve better understanding 
and estimation of mortgage default risk.  
Overall, the results of this research answer the questions that I attempted to 
investigate. Although it is impossible to stop the influences of the financial crisis, prevent 




this research, it does provide a better understanding of those problems. The contributions 
of the current research are summarized in the next section. 
6.2 Potential Contributions 
This research enriches the literature, provides alternative explanations for real-life 
problems and sheds lights on policies that are helpful to address these problems. 
First, with respect to the literature contributions, the study in Chapter 3 is of great 
significance. This study is the first to document a strong, robust and economically 
important default pattern in the much ignored condominium loan market. Previously 
almost all mortgage studies focus on single-family loan market. Specifically, the loan 
origination growth rate and default pattern in the condo market are comparable to the 
subprime mortgage market (Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011). Condominium 
borrowers, the group of which is less studied, are unlikely the low credit quality 
borrowers who default because they cannot afford to pay or refinance their mortgages as 
house prices start to decline, tend to have higher FICO scores, use subprime mortgages 
less frequently, and on average are charged a lower interest rate. These unique characters 
of condo borrowers may reveal distinct default behavior compared with single-family 
borrowers. Therefore, the condominium loan market, given the characteristics, provides a 
unique opportunity to identify and analyze the investor behavior. 
Second, the new empirical evidence from the influences of borrower behaviors, as 
revealed in this research, adds to the understanding of the economic channels that explain 




providing evidence that investor behavior, as manifested in the condo market’s loan 
default pattern in our context, play an important role in explaining mortgage defaults in 
the crisis. It is shown that investment-purchase condo loans not only drive the observed 
condo loan market default pattern in triggering more defaults, but condo defaults also 
prompt more defaults of single family subprime mortgages at the same location, through 
the channel that foreclosures on the defaulted properties depress neighboring house prices. 
The findings that condo borrowers, especially investors, are riskier also suggest that 
lenders need to exercise more scrutiny in their lending practice in the condominium 
mortgage market. From a public policy point of view, it is found that simply requiring 
more skin-in-the-game regulations for lenders and lower LTV for the borrowers under the 
Dodd-Frank law is only a partial solution from avoiding a similar crisis in the future. 
Therefore, this thesis’s attempt to study the characteristics and delinquency probabilities 
of loans from borrowers’ perspective is not only academically meaningful, but also is 
important in explaining what we have experienced in the recent crisis. 
Third, the foreclosure concentration study in this research is among the few direct 
analyses of the neighborhood foreclosure concentration. Identifying and understanding 
concentration effects in foreclosures helps provide a better understanding of how and 
why such crises spread. Traditional studies of borrower decision mainly focus on 
mortgage borrowers’ own socio-economic status such as the borrower’s FICO score, 
income constraint, and equity position. However, to place borrowers into social networks 
to understand their default decisions are crucial to mortgage default risk management, 
pricing and underwriting. Comparing to existing studies, this work takes a novel 




individual borrower’s delinquency probability but also estimate the impact of foreclosure 
concentration on the borrower’s sensitivity to negative equity, which is to a certain extent 
the changing attitude of borrowers towards default option exercise. The presence of 
foreclosure concentration is relevant to policy makers concerned with mitigating the 
spread of home foreclosures. The finding that peer behavior indeed has great influence on 
borrower’s actual default choice indicate that those default models to predict the 
borrower’s default risks should incorporate such network effects. 
Fourth, from a policy perspective, the findings about the impact of foreclosure 
concentration on borrower’s delinquency decision have great policy implications. The 
results show that increased delinquencies result in more foreclosures, and concentrated 
foreclosure further result in even more delinquencies. Thus, mortgage default, especially 
during the crisis, can be self-enforcing in certain neighborhoods. Considering the great 
financial and social impacts of mortgage defaults, and the potential recursive enforcing of 
foreclosures in the same neighborhoods, these findings call for the government’s timely 
intervention to reduce foreclosure, not only for current situation, but also to break the 
loop and stop the foreclosure cascade in the future. 
Fifth, the application of data linkage in the fifth chapter is potentially useful in filling 
in additional or missing information, by adding in extra attributes. With more complete 
information on population units more complex research questions can be further 
addressed. Linking multiple datasets might be a way of checking accuracy and reliability 
of survey or administrative data or vice versa; one can assess whether the sample survey 




assess the representativeness of the sample data. Last, linking records helps enhance data 
quality, by providing more information for people to understand the non-response or non-
report side of the current data.  
The data linkage study also extends the literature by comparatively analyzing 
different linking methods on multiple mortgage datasets to help better understand the 
advantages and potential limits of each method, as well as trying to overcome the 
selection bias and misclassification issues. In particular, this study systematically 
compares the commonly used approaches for probabilistic linkage and applies advanced 
techniques from computer science field to try to solve the selection bias problems in 
linking process, by letting the computer to exploit the nature of the dataset, e.g., the 
underlying patterns and relationship of variables based on both common covariates and 
the rest covariates. These attempts help provide a creative way to other authors who also 
need to link multiple data sources with no unique identifiers and conduct deep analysis 
based on a representative matching dataset. 
In summary, this research achieves its objectives. The findings answer my research 
questions and are meaningful to address the targeted research problems. Therefore, the 
significance of this research, as mentioned in the introduction chapter, has been realized. 
6.3 Limitations and Future Research 
In this section, all of the limitations of this research and their reasons are listed, 




The first essay is one of the first studies in U.S. to document the unique risk patterns 
of borrowers, especially investors and their behaviors in the U.S. condominium (condo) 
loan market in the early 2000s. Results in this essay imply that condo loan market is an 
important channel to understand the cause and transmission mechanism of the recent 
financial crisis especially from the perspective of borrowers and investors’ behavior. 
However, the evidence in this study only provides the first step in studying the cause and 
aggregate implications of the condo loan defaults from borrowers’ perspective. Future 
research can be extended to better understand the role of borrowers, especially investors 
in that market in fueling and potentially exacerbating the crisis. I will attempt to study the 
changing behaviors of investors through the whole default process, across the financial 
crisis and in different regions, rather than focusing on the final delinquency outcome.  
Throughout the first study, the most important role is the investor channel: the price 
run-up in the earlier years of the decade attracts more investors who are also more likely 
to make a pure economic decision of deciding to default soon after a significant price 
drop. In order to examine the investor behaviors, this study uses the U.S. condominium 
market as the natural experiment, since results show that real estate investors are more 
present in the condominium market. Therefore, the observed default pattern in the condo 
loan market thus may be associated with the investor behavior. However, the 
identification and analyses of investors are constrained by the data: whether the 
borrower’s purpose of buying the property as a homeowner or investor is self-reported by 
the borrower and recorded by the mortgage lender. Thus in the attempt to obtain a better 
mortgage, those borrowers may not report their actual purpose. Although some attributes 




the FICO score, this is not the direct way to identify the “actual” investors. In the future 
the study will be better supported if a comparably trustable reported or discovered 
investor data is applied. Nevertheless, note that the current study does contain a sample 
that represents the relative best information about investor, and it is the best data that can 
be found for studying the investor behavior till now. In addition, although some borrower 
characteristics are obtained, the first essay still lacks of other demographic characteristics 
of condo borrowers, such as education, their preferences in living areas, their revenues 
and expenditures, etc. For example, Chinco and Mayer (2014) study the local and out-of-
town long distance investors, which is quite interesting to me. Unfortunately, the current 
information is the best that I can obtain. In the future research I would try to find this 
kind of information, and further study the condo investor behaviors. 
The research in Chapter 4 presents rich findings about foreclosure concentration 
effects on neighborhood borrowers’ default option exercise, through different regimes, 
and across different group of people. The evidence shows that foreclosures can induce 
nearby mortgage borrowers to exercise their default option more ruthlessly, which is 
especially prominent during a downturn of the housing market. However, there are also 
some other ways that can generate foreclosure contagion, such as observational learning, 
herding and so on. More specifically, observational learning suggests that homeowners 
update their beliefs about the value of their homes when they receive signals about house 
price trend (Agarwal et al., 2012). Foreclosures in one’s neighborhood send out a public 
signal of a declining property market. Based on such a signal, nearby homeowners will 
adjust their valuation downward, causing an observed negative impact of nearby 




increase the probability of default as borrowers default their mortgage loans mainly 
because the value of the property is lower than the mortgage loan balance. Another 
channel of foreclosure contagion is through herding. Homeowners are easily persuaded to 
follow the herd to strategically default their mortgage loan (Seiler et al., 2014). Extending 
this herding rational to mortgage borrower’s delinquency decision, someone who resides 
in a neighborhood with concentrated foreclosures is exposed to the influence of her 
neighbors and thus is more likely to exercise her default option when she sees many 
foreclosure signs in her neighborhood. In addition, there might be moral issue that seeing 
many neighbors have done so might have changed some borrowers’ view. However, 
among these mechanisms through which the foreclosure contagion affects the borrower’s 
default option exercise, it is not clear what the direct mechanism is in this study. In order 
to better understand the foreclosure contagion effect, future research should try to 
establish the exact mechanism of the foreclosure contagion discovered in this paper, and 
assess the relative roles of observational learning, herding and other channels in 
generating such foreclosure contagion. 
Furthermore, the fourth essay only focuses on LA MSAs, which is relatively a 
restricted sample. The reason is that I want to have a more homogeneous sample without 
the trouble of location differences. But it is also interesting to look at those areas with 
distinct foreclosure phenomenon. For example, Arizona is among the leading 6 states that 
have the greatest foreclosure concentration; however, its foreclosure concentration drops 
quickly afterwards. In the meantime, Illinois and Ohio did not appear in the leading states 
in 2011, but these two states become the top states that lead the nation’s foreclosure 




influence the attitudes would be interesting and it might help understand the foreclosure 
concentration effects from a different angle. This direction might be my next step in 
trying to better understand the foreclosure concentration impacts in U.S. 
Finally, the results in Chapter 5 suggest that statistical hard matching with machine 
learning approach performs better in dealing with selection bias and misclassification, 
relative to the traditional approaches such as pure statistical hard matching and propensity 
score matching. However, the results from pure statistical hard matching and the one with 
machine learning do not differ much in general; the performance of statistical hard 
matching, while not the best, is generally acceptable when there are no alternatives. As 
we know that as with any linkage, the quality of the match is limited to the quality of the 
original data se well as the ability of the vector covariates to distinguish uniqueness 
among the two populations. Therefore, it might be possible that the similarity of the 
performances between these two groups might be partially due to the specific 
characteristics of the data. Therefore, in future research it will be good to apply and 
compare these approaches to more general data in real estate studies, to check the 
performances of the resulted groups. In addition, it should be noted that due to the 
complexity of the machine learning techniques, it is difficult to apply and explain these 
techniques, especially to the readers from fields other than computer science. In order to 
make this approach better understood and applied, future research might focus on the 
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Figure A1 Kernel Density Plots of the original loan amount from the Original 





Figure A1 Kernel Density Plots of the original loan amount from the Original 
and Matched Samples: by loan origination year (2001-2010) (Continued) 
Note: 
This set of figures shows the kernel density plots of the key variable, original loan amount in BBX 
dataset, by origination (2001-2010). Four groups of data are compared: the original BBX dataset 
(Original), the matched sample from pure statistical hard matching (Group1), from machine learning 
techniques (Group2), and from propensity score matching (Group 3). Only loans with original loan 
amount less than $10 million are included in the sample. Y-axis indicates the probability of density, 









Figure A2 Kernel Density Plots of the original LTV ratio from the Original and 





Figure A2 Kernel Density Plots of the original LTV ratio from the Original and 
Matched Samples: by loan origination year (2001-2010) (Continued) 
Note: 
This set of figures shows the kernel density plots of the key variable, original loan-to-value (LTV) ratio 
in BBX dataset, by origination (2001-2010). Four groups of data are compared: the original BBX dataset 
(Original), the matched sample from pure statistical hard matching (Group1), from machine learning 
techniques (Group2), and from propensity score matching (Group 3). Only loans with original loan 
amount less than $10 million are included in the sample. Y-axis indicates the probability of density, 









Figure A3 Kernel Density Plots of the FICO score from the Original and Matched 





Figure A3 Kernel Density Plots of the FICO score from the Original and Matched 
Samples: by loan origination year (2001-2010) (Continued) 
Note: 
This set of figures shows the kernel density plots of the key variable, original loan-to-value (LTV) ratio in 
BBX dataset, by origination (2001-2010). Four groups of data are compared: the original BBX dataset 
(Original), the matched sample from pure statistical hard matching (Group1), from machine learning 
techniques (Group2), and from propensity score matching (Group 3). Only loans with original loan amount 
less than $10 million are included in the sample. Y-axis indicates the probability of density, while X-axis 





Figure A4 Kernel Density Plots of borrower income from the Original and Matched 
Samples: by loan origination year (2001-2010) 
 
Figure A4 Kernel Density Plots of borrower income from the Original and Matched 






Figure A4 Kernel Density Plots of borrower income from the Original and Matched 
Samples: by loan origination year (2001-2010) (Continued) 
Note: 
This set of figures shows the kernel density plots of the key variable, borrower income in HMDA dataset, by 
origination (2001-2010). Four groups of data are compared: the original HMDA dataset (Original), the matched 
sample from pure statistical hard matching (Group1), from machine learning techniques (Group2), and from 
propensity score matching (Group 3). Only loans with original loan amount less than $10 million are included in 






Table A1 Summary Statistics of Freddie Mac Full Sample 







     
D_default within 2 yrs   1%  1% 1%                    0% 
FICO score   659  660   658       2*** 
Original LTV 75% 75% 75%       0*** 
Log_Original loan balance 11.91      11.87           11.91  -0.04*** 
Current interest rate   6.00 6.08 5.99  0.09*** 
D_Owner occupied 90% 78% 91% -13%*** 
Log_HPI 5.19 5.24  5.18  0.06*** 
Log_duration 3.79 3.77  3.79 -0.02*** 
     






Panel B: Summary statistics for Freddie Mac by loan origination year (2003–2007) 
 
Condo SF Diff. Condo SF Diff. Condo SF Diff. Condo SF Diff. Condo SF Diff. 
Original Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
                
D_default within 2 yrs 0% 0% 0%*** 0% 1% 0%*** 0% 1% 0%*** 1% 1% 0%*** 3% 3% 0%** 
FICO score 660 659 1*** 659 658 1*** 660 659 1*** 660 659 1*** 660 658 2*** 
Original LTV 74% 73% 1%*** 75% 76% -1%*** 75% 75% 0%*** 76% 76% 0%*** 77% 77% 0%*** 
Log_Original loan 
balance 
11.75 11.87 -0.12*** 11.80 11.88 -0.08*** 11.90 11.94 -0.04*** 11.95 11.97 -0.02*** 12.00 11.98 0.02*** 
Current interest rate 5.82 5.76 0.06*** 5.89 5.85 0.04*** 5.89 5.86 0.03*** 6.46 6.44 0.02*** 6.40 6.42 -0.02*** 
D_Owner occupied 82% 94% -12%*** 78% 91% -13%*** 77% 91% -14%*** 77% 90% -13%*** 76% 87% -11%*** 
Log_HPI 5.27 5.19 0.08*** 5.26 5.19 0.07*** 5.22 5.17 0.05*** 5.22 5.17 0.05*** 5.20 5.15 0.05*** 
Log_duration 3.79 3.87 -0.08*** 3.83 3.87 -0.04*** 3.93 3.90 0.03*** 3.72 3.64 0.08*** 3.59 3.49 0.01*** 
                
Sample Size 
(in thousands） 
106 1,153  67 628  75 630  75 494  76 488  
Note: 
This table presents the summary statistics of the Freddie Mac sample. This dataset includes only single-family and condominium (condo) loans originated during the period 
2003–2007. Panel A reports the results from aggregate-level summary statistics of the loans and compares the average values of the variables by full sample, single-family 
loans, and condo loans, respectively. Panel B shows the full sample summary statistics results by origination year. The variables with “D_” represent dummies. D_default 
within 2 yrs is equal to one for defaulting within two years of the loan origination date. Current interest rate refers to the coupon rate charged to the borrower for the most 
recent remittance period. Log_Original loan balance is defined as log of the amount of principal on the closing date of the mortgage. FICO score refers to the FICO 
(formerly the Fair Isaac Corporation) borrower credit score at the time of the loan closing. Original LTV means the ratio of the original loan amount to the property value at 
loan origination. D_FRM is equal to one for fixed-rate mortgages. D_Owner occupied takes one if the property is owner occupied. Log_HPI is log of the MSA-level 
quarterly FHFA/OFHEO House Price Index. Log_Duration is the log of the elapsed time from origination to the end of the sample period or to the first classification as 
being prepaid or delinquent at least 60 days. Note that ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
